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MONISM IN THE VEDAS

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Chapter I

137

from linguistic difficulties, which are by no means small, there are many textual difficulties. There is no philosophical arrangement of the conceptions. The terms used are misleading and the same term is often used in several senses. Different doctrines about the world-view seem to be heaped up in a confused manner. Many passages are "puerile in the extreme. They are tedious, low, and commonplace." The Gods are often invoked for nothing better than to protect their worshippers, to grant them food, flocks, families, etc.

In this state of affairs there are only two courses open to us. Either we must reject the whole Veda as unintelligible or we must search for gems hidden in what appears to be rubbish. The adoption of the first alternative is not right so long as we believe in the possibility of the growth of religious and philosophical ideas. The Hymns of the *Rgveda* are the earliest records of the Aryan civilization, and, whatever their views be, they contain almost the earliest imaginations, faiths and ideas—moral, religious and philosophical—of our forefathers. It is on the basis of these that the whole edifice of later Indian civilisation (at least in so far as its Aryan aspect is concerned) is constructed. If we do not have a clear notion of these basic ideas, we shall miss many important points in their later development. For this reason, if for no other, a careful study of the Hymns is indispensable.

2

This brings us to the question of the interpretation of the Hymns. Any searching for the truth is impossible unless we interpret the passages correctly. It is misleading to start with preconceived ideas about what is taught in the Hymns or about the method of interpretation. It is also wrong to start with the idea that the Hymns, as the earliest records of human thought, can only represent the primitive thoughts of our forefathers, or to presuppose that the interpretation of the Hymns should be naturalistic or spiritualistic. The character of the interpretation must be decided only by the disposition of the Hymns and not by our predispositions. So in the order of our treatment, the question of interpretation must be decided first, and then, with its help the ultimate position for which the Hymns stand.

Of the difficulties connected with the interpretation of the Hymns, the linguistic ones can be overcome with the help of a fair understanding of Sanskrit Grammar in its application to the Vedas. But the apparent unintelligibility and confusion remain even after we are able to get at the literal meaning of the passages. A note on the ultimate significance of the passages may remove this difficulty. The different senses in which the same words are

used may be fixed in accordance with the propriety of the senses. The ideas contained in the passages may be systematised in the light of the final view for which the passages stand. Having thus a principle that is consistent with the final view taught by the passages, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that after all the passages in view teach the highest spiritualistic truth as the single principle of the universe, which is the basis of the Upanishadic conception of *Brahman* and the Vedanta conception of *Svatantra*.

3

To a superficial reader the Hymns seem to teach many contradictory doctrines, which may be summarised in the following manner :—

(1) *Some passages seem to identify different entities.*—In most of the Hymns prayers are offered to the entities signified by the names Agni, Varuna and so on. But the entities that are signified by each term are many, each being different from the others in its very nature. For instance, let us take the name Agni. It is said (11.6.2): "With this log, O Agni, may we worship thee." In this passage the term *Agni* stands clearly for fire, physical fire, but not the Fire-God for the Fire-God by himself has nothing to do with a log. But in the continuation of the same passage, verse 5 says, "He gives us rain from heaven." Verse 7 addresses him as 'O Sage', and in verse 8 he is termed wise. These epithets are inapplicable to physical fire; they can be applied only to an intelligent being which may be called a deity. There are still other passages which present Agni as the ruler of the universe, the lord of men, the wise king, the father, the brother, the son and the friend of man. Nay, all the powers and names of other gods are distinctly attributed to Agni. Here Agni who is so highly exalted can be neither *agni* in the physical sense, nor *agni* the finite deity. Similar instances may be multiplied by referring almost to every name.

(2) *Some passages differentiate between natural aspects and deities, called by the same name.*—1.125.56 says, "He who gives alms goes to the highest place in heaven, he goes to the Gods." Going to the Gods would be impossible if natural elements themselves were Gods. In another passage the Gods are said to dwell in heaven. To say that natural elements dwell in heaven does not signify anything. Another passage says that Gods are immortal. The natural elements are neither immortal nor mortal.

(3) *The names of some Gods are clear in their meaning and others are mythical.*—The names Agni, Surya, Usas, Maruts, etc., are clear and intelligible. And the names Varuna, Mitra, Indra, etc., are proper names and dim in their application.

(4) *All gods are said to be equally important.*—In some passages the equal importance of all gods is expressed. One Hymn says, "Among you, O Gods, there is none that is small, none that is young. You are all great indeed."

(5) *Every god is presented as if he is supreme.*—In some passages the God that is invoked is not conceived of as limited by the powers of other gods. At the time of the invocation, he is said to be the real God, supreme and absolute. The other Gods disappear for a moment from the vision of the poet and He only who is to fulfil their desires stands in full light before the eyes of the worshippers.

(6) *The gods are said to be different from the God Absolute.*—There are other passages that distinguish the gods, Agni and so on, from the one God who is the Lord of all. A Hymn refers to the unknown God and represents Him as the God above all other gods.

(7) *Some passages make no distinction between the God Absolute and the other gods.*—Some other passages tell us that God is one, but He is called by several names. In 1-164-46 the poet says, "They call Him Indra, Mitra, Varuna and Agni. That which is one the wise call It in divers manners. They call It Agni, Yama, Matarisvan. 1-114-5 says, "Wise poets make the beautifully winged, though He is one, manifold by words."

(8) *Some passages make the gods omnipresent.*—In some passages the poet asks himself whether the God he invokes really exists. For example the poet questions the existence of Indra. His question is immediately succeeded by an answer, as though it is given to the poet by Indra himself. *R.V.* 8-89-3 says, "If you desire strength, offer to Indra a Hymn of praise; a true Hymn, if Indra truly exists. For some one says 'Indra does not exist'. Who has seen him? Whom shall we praise? Now Indra answers from within the poet, 'Here I am, O Worshipper, behold me here. In might I surpass all things.'"

A similar vision occurs to another poet. This poet invites a God to a sacrifice and implores His pardon for his offences and suddenly exclaims that he has seen the God and that he feels that his prayer is granted. In invocation to Varuna *R.V.* 1-25-8 says, "He knows months, wind, the wide, the bright, the mighty, those who reside on high, the wise, He perceives all wondrous things, what has been done and what will be done." Verse 18 of the same passage says, "Did I see the God who is to be seen by all? Did I see the chariot above the earth?" Next the exclamation occurs: "He must have accepted my prayers."

(9) *The God Absolute is said to be unknown.*—*R.V.* 10-121-9 says, "In the beginning there arose the golden child. He was the one born Lord of all that is.... He whose commands all the bright gods revere.... One king of the breathing and awakening of the world. He who alone is God above all gods."

(10) *One passage declares that all is God.*—*R.V.* 1-16-5-10 says "Aditi is heaven. Aditi is the firmament. Aditi is mother, father and son. Aditi is all the Gods. Aditi is the five classes of men. Aditi is generation and birth." The Gods are said to be the sons of Aditi. Aditi here is the Goddess Absolute. In this passage nature and God appear to be equivalent. The *Purusa Sūkta* makes this God, who is all this, much more than the world.

To a person who reads the Hymns without any preconceived ideas as to the interpretation of the passages or the doctrine taught in them, it looks as though there are several doctrines contradicting each other. In some prayers the natural elements and the deities presiding over them and God the Absolute are all heaped one upon the other in a confused manner, so as to imply that all are one. In others the presiding deities are distinguished from the elements. Some assert the equality of all gods. Some ignore the existence of other gods in the interest of a particular God. In others the Absolute God is distinguished from the deities and the elements. Others again tell us that this God is unknown. Still others question the existence of this God and assert that He is actually realised by the poet within himself. Some others tell us that the Supreme Lord alone is the true God, while there are other prayers which make Him the origin of all.

These views are apparently conflicting with one another. The natural elements are inert, with nothing spiritual in them. Invocation to them makes higher religion impossible. Each of the deities is said to be free from the influence of other deities. Invocation to them presents only polytheism. This makes the idea of a Supreme Lord impossible. But this polytheism is denied in the conception of a single God. The assertion that God is one, and is the origin of all is incompatible with reference to elements and deities.

Do the Hymns really teach contradictory doctrines? An affirmative answer does not take us very far. We have already noted that the teaching of the Hymns forms the very basis of later Indian thought. The teaching of the earlier Hymns culminates in explicit Absolutism in the conception of *Puruṣa* in the *Puruṣa Sūkta*. *Puruṣa* under the name of *Prajāpati* becomes the central Reality in the *Brahmaṇas*. *Brahman* or *Ātman* occupies the

place of Puruṣa or Prajāpati in the Upanishads. Brahman is presented as Īśvara in the *Bhagavadgītā*. And in the Darśana period several conceptions, *Svabhāva*, *Karma*, *Sīva* and so on, prepare the ground for the reassertion of Brahman or Īśvara as the sole Reality. The process of this reassertion takes place in the Vedānta Systems, by Advaita Vedānta in its conception of Nirguṇa, by Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta in its conception of Īśvara and by Dvaita Vedānta in its conception of *Svatantra*. This would be impossible if the earlier Hymns are supposed to stand for no doctrine prominently.

Nor is the idea that the Hymns teach contradictory doctrines consistent with the general spirit of the Vedic teaching, which gives us the impression that the Veda as a whole stands for a unity of thought. It is on the basis of this thought that the several divisions of the Vedas have been from the beginning considered to be the parts of an identical literature. Consistently with this circumstance the whole Veda from the very beginning is accepted by all the orthodox Indian thinkers as presenting a unity of thought. And it is for this reason that the whole Veda is taken to be the final authority (*Pramāṇa*) in matters of spiritual importance. This is the significance of the well-known expressions, "Dharma is that which is sanctioned by the Veda" (*Vedapranīhito dharmaḥ*), "The source of the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality is finally the Veda" (*Brahman Śāstrayoni*) and so on. These traditions would have been impossible if any portion of the Veda had taught something that definitely denied the truth of the Absolute. In spite of apparent contradictions, therefore, the teachings of the Hymns are capable of being reduced to a unity.

4

We may now hold tentatively that the purpose of all doctrines is finally the same. But what is this final purpose that every doctrine can possibly have in view? As an answer to this question, we may, for the present, refer to the efforts of modern scholars in this direction, because to a mind which wants a ready answer, they seem to offer a pleasing solution.

Among modern scholars who have rendered very great service to the cause of oriental learning Duessén and Max Müller stand out most prominently. They both tried to systematise the teaching of the Hymns without rejecting it on account of its seeming contradictions. They were fully convinced that the teaching stands for a unity of purpose. To illustrate this they traced the development of the teaching in a historical manner.

The following are briefly their views about the teaching:—

In his *Outlines of Philosophy*, Duessén says:—"In India alone we can trace back religion to its first origin. Man in passing from brute state to

human consciousness found himself surrounded by and dependent on various natural powers, and ascribed to them not only will but also human personality. These personified natural powers were further considered as the origin, the maintainers and controllers of what man found in himself as the moral law." He further observes that in course of time the Vedic religion decayed. Man began to doubt the existence of Gods and the time was ripe enough for a philosophy to bring out the conception of the unity of the world, and there appeared such a philosophy.

We have to note that this position requires a careful interpretation. Duessén starts with the conviction that the beginning of Vedic religion is nothing more than the worship of natural aspects. In order to maintain this position he ignores the special features of the Gods and says that they are only personified natural aspects. But his whole supposition is falsified by the expressions that are intelligible only on the basis of the poets' conception of intelligent deities behind the natural phenomena. He further says that at the next stage the nature-religion began to decay; now the time was ripe for philosophy and there appeared the conception of the unity of the world. As we shall see very shortly there is nothing in the Hymns to support the idea of the decay of nature-religion. Even granting that it decayed, he does not explain how there happened the miraculous appearance of philosophy. And his idea of the gradual growth of religion in the Hymns is not in keeping with the disposition of the Hymns.

Max Müller makes a definite improvement on Duessén's position. With Duessén he agrees that the Hymns contain no single doctrine but represent the religious views of the Vedic Āryas in their historical development. Then he takes into account the probable order of the historical development of religious views. He admits that nature-worship is the first stage of religious life. He supposes that from nature-worship evolves polytheism or the belief in the existence of several deities presiding over various natural elements. Next, he thinks, there evolves the belief in a supreme lord of the universe or Monotheism. He then holds that it is possible to apply the unity realised in the conception of God-head to the world with its origin. Monotheism presents the unity of God-head. If this unity is considered to be the self of the universe, then it is the conception of the unity of all, which is Monism. So his view is that monism results from Monotheism.

5

For Max Müller the order of the development of religion consists in the gradual transition of religious beliefs from nature-worship through polytheism and monotheism to monism. He next applies this order to the

Hymns, but soon finds that he cannot do justice to his own order as applied to them. With reference to monotheism and monism his work was quite easy. He collected passages under each head and traced the earlier and later ones according to the development of ideas. But his work was not easy with reference to the ideas of nature-worship and polytheism as leading to monotheism. He examined the passages that were akin to these conceptions, but soon realised that the implications of these passages were entirely different.

As we have already noted, in the praise offered to the entity signified by a term, there are passages referring to a natural element, passages referring to the deity presiding over it, and passages referring to the God Absolute. Max Müller observed a difficulty here and tried to surmount it in a peculiar manner. He saw the elements of nature-worship in them. But unlike Duessen, he could not stop there, because the worship of natural elements is not consistent with the thought of God-head with which the passages abound. He seemed to vacillate between the two, unable to decide whether the Vedic religion started from the worship of natural elements, or from that of the deities presiding over them. We find expressions relevant to both these ideas in his exposition of Vedic thought in the *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*. On page 36, he says, "The process on which originally all Gods depended for their very existence, the personification of, or the activity attributed to, the great natural phenomena, while more or less obscured in all other religions, takes place in the Rig-Veda as it were in the full light of day." In this passage he implies that the nature-gods are other than the natural phenomena. He abandons this position in describing the conviction of the Vedic people "that the regularly recurring events of nature require certain agents". He further adds, "It seemed impossible to them that sun and moon should rise every day, should grow strong and weak again every month or every year, unless there was an agent behind who controlled them." He, however, decides the case finally in favour of the idea of the Gods as different from natural phenomena and makes nature-worship equivalent to the worship of the Gods that preside over natural elements. But the worship of these Gods is not the same as nature-worship. To hold that this was the religion of the Hymns is inconsistent with the passages that have only elements in view. So he had to interpret them so as to make them consistent with his theory. "With this log, O Agni! may we worship thee." Unless he took Agni to mean the deity presiding over the natural element, how could he derive from this passage the religion he had in view? This kind of interpretation was inevitable for him. For in his developed thought he held the natural elements and deities to be different

from each other. This is very well illustrated by another passage (in his *Chips from a German Workshop*) where he says, "The Gods of the Veda are conceived as immortal; passages in which the birth of a certain God is mentioned have a physical meaning. They refer to the birth of the day, the rising of the sun, the return of the year." So to preserve the distinction between Gods and elements and to support the idea that the passages teach only the worship of nature-deities, he had to reduce them to a unity of thought in favour of the deities. At this point he has implicitly abandoned the view that the growth of religion from almost its very beginning could be traced in the Veda. He is, however, so deeply convinced of the gradual growth of religion, that to make up the loss felt with reference to the Hymns, he postulates the idea that the religion of the Veda began even before the arrival of the Aryas in India.

So far we have seen how according to Max Müller the first stage of the Vedic religion in the Hymns is characterised by the belief in the Gods that preside over natural phenomena. But he is not prepared to regard polytheism as the religion of the early Hymns, because by this time he has realised that to regard it so is inconsistent with the attribution of absolute qualities made with reference to each God. He says on page 17 of the same work: "Each God is to the mind of the supplicant as good as all Gods. He is felt at the time as real divinity, as supreme and absolute, without suspicion of those limitations which to our mind a plurality of Gods must entail on every single God. All the rest disappear for a moment from the vision of the poet and he only who is to fulfil their desires stands in full light before the eyes of the worshippers." It is easy to find passages in which almost every important deity is represented as supreme and absolute. This surely is not what is commonly understood by polytheism. Thus he is averse to calling the religion of the Veda by the name of polytheism. "Yet it would be equally wrong to call it Monotheism." So he places the Vedic religion somewhere between polytheism and monotheism and says, "If we must have a name for it, I should call it Kathenotheism," i.e., Henotheism.

At this point, it is necessary to interpret him carefully. The first thing we have to note is this. He has not followed a single principle in his interpretation of the passages in question. Consciously or unconsciously he has adopted one principle in interpreting the first half of his work and another with reference to the second half. The following considerations will make the point clear.

On the strength of expressions, Max Müller has distinguished between those passages that refer only to the physical aspects of nature and those

that deal with the deities presiding over them ; and as a result he has held that the deities are different from the natural aspects. Why did he do this? Why did he not interpret the passages referring to deities in a physical sense and conclude that the Vedic Āryas were worshippers of nature? He could not do it because he felt clearly that different expressions stand for different entities and observed the forces of certain expressions that could not be applied to the natural elements and that could be intelligible only with reference to the intelligent beings that control them, those whom we call Nature-Gods. The functioning of the natural elements is the work of these Gods, even as the functioning of the human body is the work of the indwelling intelligent principle, whatever be the name we give to it. If these ideas had not been felt by our author, he could not have had the satisfaction of having interpreted the passages referring indiscriminately to both elements and deities.

But his idea of Kathenotheism is highly inconsistent with the spirit of these considerations. He adopts this view to reconcile the God of limited divinity with the God Absolute. In the description of the entity signified by the same term, some passages refer to the God of limited divinity and others to the God Absolute. If he had followed the principle he adopted in his consideration of natural elements and their Gods, he would have concluded that the two types of passages refer to two different entities: (1) the God limited, (2) the God Absolute. He did not do it. Somehow he ignored the distinction between the two types and concluded that they refer to the same entities, the God limited. But his conclusion was not without difficulty inherent in it. The God Agni, for instance, is called the ruler of the world, the sole God, God of Gods, etc.; absolute qualities are attributed to Agni. If Agni is still a God of ordinary divinity, then to attribute absolute qualities to him becomes meaningless. To justify this attribution he had to interpret the passage suitably. But in interpreting it he had to minimise the meaning of the terms that represent Agni as the Absolute God. Without minimising it how could he apply them to a mere deity? He had also, on the other hand, to raise the deity so as to make it appear to be the Absolute. Unless the deity appears to be the absolute, at least for the time being, how could he attribute the highest qualities to the deity? But to do either is impossible for him. His supposition does not permit him to do it. His supposition from the beginning has been that the Vedic poets, at the first stage, were not conscious of the Absolute God reigning supreme in the Universe. This supposition is the key-note of Kathenotheism. But this supposition and his idea of Kathenotheism contradict each other. Granting for a while that they were not conscious of the God Supreme and were

concentrating only on some aspect of nature and the deity ruling over it, how could they think of the terms that could be applied in their full sense only to the supreme lord? Unless they thought that it was possible to have the ruler of the world, how could they have the expression of a universal ruler and the thought behind it? They thought that it was possible to have a deity who ruled over an aspect of nature and they had it. The fact that they had it is clear from expressions which would be meaningless if that deity is denied. So on the strength of these expressions we think that they believed in a deity. Similarly on the strength of expressions that can have justification only with the belief in the Absolute, should we not conclude that they believed in the Absolute also? So unless we hold that they were conscious of the Absolute how can we think of minimising the meaning of certain expressions? It is possible to have a secondary meaning of an expression because the expression already has a primary meaning. Let us take for example the expression "Richard, the Lion Heart". Unless the word Lion has a primary meaning how can it be applied metaphorically to the King of England? So the expressions that represent the Absolute can be applied metaphorically to the deities only if the Absolute is already known. To admit this is to admit the fact that the Vedic religion did not stop with the deities, but had the Absolute in view.

So also it is with regard to the raising of the deity to the level of the Absolute. If the poet is not at all conscious of the Absolute, how can he raise a particular deity to the level of the Absolute? Only that person who has an idea of God can apply the term "God" metaphorically to his master or King. So to raise a particular deity to the level of the Absolute, a belief in the Absolute is necessary. Further, in explaining the same idea Max Müller says in his *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* (p. 40), "*Indra, Agni or Varuna* is, for the time being, the only God in existence." He means that the poet for the time being forgets the existence of other deities in extolling a particular deity. Here the idea of forgetfulness is not intelligible. Does this idea imply the denial of other gods? Or is it indifference to the idea of other gods? Or does it consciously thrust the other gods into the background? To be indifferent to the idea of other gods is not opposed to consciousness of them. Even thrusting them into the background does not deny this consciousness. So long as there is a consciousness of other gods, the idea of polytheism is not transcended and the way to monotheism or to monism is not open. If forgetting the other gods for the moment involves the denial of other gods, then we have to explain what the term "other gods" means. We cannot say that they are mere divinities, because the thought of ordinary divinities is not opposed to that of the Absolute. There may be

innumerable deities and yet at the same time there may be the God Absolute. So what is denied in the idea of forgetting the other gods must be their absolute character. The idea of several absolutes is a contradiction in terms. So in considering a particular god to be absolute the possibility of others being the absolute is denied. Whatever value may be attached to this conclusion in describing a god as god of gods the idea of other gods is certainly not forgotten. So is generally every god described in being extolled. Though there may not be the actual expression 'God of gods' in the case of a particular god there are expressions yielding the same idea. So a god is termed absolute even though the poet is conscious of other gods. Therefore the god so termed must be the Absolute.

6

So on Max Müller's own postulation that there are deities controlling Nature, his conception of Kathenotheism should give way. We have now to answer the question: What is then the meaning of the passages that represent the attributes of several entities? It is easy to find an answer to this if we start from the same postulation of our author. He holds that the deities are different from the natural aspects, because there are expressions relevant only to the deities. Similarly we may hold that the Absolute is different from the deities. So in an invocation to the entity signified by the same name, there are involved three factors:—(1) the physical aspect of nature, (2) the deity presiding over it, and (3) the God Absolute, the ruler or the principle of the whole universe including even deities. The fact that these three entities are signified by the same name shows that they are intimately connected with one another. The relation that holds good between a natural element and the corresponding deity holds good between the deity and the Absolute. Just as the deity controls the element, the Absolute controls the deity. Among these three entities the functions of the natural element are traced to the deity behind it. Among the two the deity takes the place of the soul in the human body. But the deity is imperfect. An imperfect god cannot be the controller of the cosmic order and therefore in the light of this order he cannot control the particular aspect of nature which belongs to him. If the activities of an aspect of nature do not go hand in hand with those of other aspects, then there would be chaos in the world. In fact there would be no world at all. But the conviction of the Vedic poets was entirely different. They did not believe that the world is chaos. From the very beginning they realised that the world is an orderly system. They called the world-order *Rita*. They made the god in question the custodian of this order. So they were quite certain that there is the full

reflection of the cosmic order even in an insignificant activity of an insignificant element. If we note the significance of this point, we can never reasonably believe that they could concentrate only on a particular aspect of nature and the deity presiding over it. If they were to pronounce a judgment on the action of any element or of a deity, in the light of the cosmic order, then they could not ignore the part played by the Absolute both in the element and in the deity in it. So the action of an element or of the corresponding deity must be finally traced to the Absolute in it. For the action of an element the deity is the immediate source. And for the action of the deity the source is the Absolute. If the deity is the soul of the element, the Absolute is the soul of the deity. The Absolute may be viewed as functioning in the element through the deity. Thus these three factors are related to one another by the relation of body and soul. This is why they are called by the same name. Thus the word *Agni* refers not only to the element of fire and to the deity in it, but also to the Absolute in it. The same is true with reference to all the invocations. The poet in a given circumstance has to invoke the Absolute in an element and he starts from the element, passes through the deity and stops with the Absolute. Or he may start with any one of these entities and stop with any one of them as the case may be. But it is never forgotten that an element is an element, a deity is a deity and the Absolute is Absolute.

So there is neither Nature-worship nor Polytheism nor Kathenotheism in the Hymns. From the very beginning there is what we call according to our convenience Monotheism or Monism. This is the difference between the view here propounded and the view of Max Müller. He takes finally the view that the Vedic religion begins with a stage of religious growth that may be called Kathenotheism. Our view is that it begins with Monotheism which is the same as Monism. He implies that the previous stages of the same religion are represented by Nature-worship and Polytheism. We have doubted the correctness of this order with reference to the Vedic thought. The desire to trace the historical order of religion in a definite manner might have been the cause of his view.

7

Our conclusion that Monotheism or Monism is found in the Vedas from the very beginning is further supported by the following considerations. It is in the first place consistent with the Vedic monotheistic and monistic conceptions recognised by all. In the second place, it is consistent with the development of the Upanishadic and the Vedāntic conceptions of God based upon it. In case there is no idea of a supreme god in the early Hymns, the

appearance of later monotheistic or monistic doctrines would have become impossible. There is no high road from polytheism to monotheism. If in the Hymns themselves there were a vacillation between Polytheism and Monotheism, then the future Upanishadic and Vedāntic Absolutisms would have had no chance at all. So we may hold that Monotheism is the religion of the Hymns and that it is not different from Monism in Vedic thought; both terms denote the same idea, namely, the idea of a single principle of the universe.

Let us now try to see what form it took in the later Hymns.

8

The highest divine qualities attributed to the various entities signified by names such as *Agni* are the qualities of the Absolute. Because the Absolute God is present in the minor gods such as *Agni*, He is called by various names. The names of all deities are but the different names of one and the same God. Many passages make this idea clear. *Rg.* 1:164-46 says, "They call Him *Indra*, *Mitra*, *Varuna*, *Agni*, etc." "That which is one the wise call It in diverse manners." "They call It *Agni*, *Yama*, *Mātariśvan*." "Wise poets make the beautifully winged, though He is one, manifold by words." *Rg.* 10:114-5. Nay, even the words that signify natural elements also stand for Him. The elements and deities are what they are, because He is in them. He is the maker of all. Therefore He is denoted by all words. All the words of the Hymns stand for Him. Having Him only in view as the principle of the reality of all, several passages say "All is He" and "He is all".

When once we have formed the idea of the Absolute God and His qualities, it is easy to interpret metaphorically the words that represent Him. Absolutistic expressions can be applied to the various deities because He is in them. But this application is only secondary. In the same manner the words that stand for Him and the deities can be applied to elements, because He and the deities are in them. So the expressions of the Hymns can be interpreted in three ways:—(1) as representing the natural elements, (2) as representing the deities, and (3) as representing the Absolute God. The ultimate object of this religion is to offer prayers to the Absolute manifesting itself in Nature. So there is every reason to hold that the Hymns stand primarily for the Absolute.

In the opinion of the Vedic Āryas a religion having the Absolute as its ultimate object was a necessity. From the beginning, yearning for *Mukti* (emancipation) has been peculiar to Indian thought, religious or philosophical. The main object of the prayer to a God is well expressed in the Hymns to

Soma 9-113-7. "Where there is freedom and delight, there make me immortal. Where there is happiness and delight, where joy and pleasure reside, where the desires of our desire are attained, there make me immortal." This yearning for immortality is what is called 'the desire for *Mukti*' (*Mumukṣa*) in the later thought. If the religion of the *Vedas* were confined to Nature-deities, then the desire for immortality would have no ground at all. A Nature God who has to deal with only an aspect of Nature cannot make a man's soul immortal. To make it immortal is rather the work of the God Absolute, who is immanent in all and therefore in the soul of man.

With the idea of the Absolute as the source of all and therefore of even insignificant activities of the world, the prayer for ordinary things, things like food, family, cattle, etc., is quite relevant. It is nothing but the expression of the complete dependence of man on the Absolute. Or consistently with the idea of *Mukti* the significance of the prayer may be the desire to have only that food, family or cattle which conduces to the spiritual good of the individual.

The fact that monotheism and monism are not different in the Vedic teaching is illustrated in the passages which represent the Absolute as the very principle of the soul of man. We may explain this by referring to the passages already quoted in another connection. A worshipper entertains a doubt with regard to the existence of *Indra*. Then *Indra* replies from within the soul of the poet himself by saying "Here I am, O worshipper! Behold me here. In might I surpass all things." Another worshipper doubts the existence of *Varuna*. He offers a prayer: "However we break the laws from day to day men as we are, O God *Varuna*, do not deliver us unto death, nor to the blow of the furious, nor to the wrath of the spiteful." Next he asks: "Did I see the God who is to be seen by all?" Next the vision occurs and he says, "He must have accepted my prayers." In these passages the unity of all (monism) is given as *Indra* or *Varuna* which is the name of the God Supreme (monotheism). If *Indra* and *Varuna* stand for mere deities, then how can they remove the doubt of the worshippers from within the soul? To say that they are within the soul is to admit the immanence of the Absolute in the whole world including even the human soul. Here we see clearly how the God who is said to be the God of gods, maker of all (monotheism), is taken to be the indwelling force in all (monism). So God is the soul of the whole world. Monotheism and monism are one. This is the true religion of the early Hymns. Nature religion is quite opposed to the spirit of the Vedic religion. The Vedic religion is through and through spiritual and its essence is "God is the source and the indwelling principle of all."

The Hymns give this God some other names also, such as *Prajāpati*, *Brhaspati*, *Brahmanaspati*, etc. In the so-called monistic passage He is realised to be one, the real of the reals and the Absolute through and through. He is the unity of the universe and the universe is his expression. Without Him the universe does not exist. He transforms Himself with His various limbs into the various aspects of the universe. The *Vīśvakarma Sūkta* shows how He is the origin of all that is. The *Nāśādiya Sūkta* makes Him the source of what is and what is not. The *Puruṣa Sūkta* explains how He is not only the one spiritual principle of all, but also much more than the universe. He is both immanent and transcendent. We are all in Him and of Him, and to realise Him in all is the aim of our life. And this is the central teaching of the Hymns.

JOURNAL
OF THE
MYSORE UNIVERSITY
VOLUME IV (A)

- Part I.—Madhya's Conception of *Sautantra*. By H. N. Raghavendrachar.
Part II.—Factor Analysis and Human Abilities. By B. Kuppaswamy.
Part III.—Rabindranath Tagore—A Tribute. By B. N. Shama Rao.
Part IV.—The Aesthetic Problem. By N. S. N. Sastry.
Part V.—An Unorthodox Approach to Parnassus. By V. A. Thiagarajan.
Part VI.—Jalalu'd-din Rûmî. By Khizr Ali Khan.
Part VII.—The Phonetics of Praṇaya. By M. Lakshminarasimhiah.
Part VIII.—Rabindranath Tagore as a Humorist. By C. N. Ramaswami Sastri.
Part IX.—Monotheism in Islam. By Habibunnisa Begum.
Part X.—European Accounts of the Mughal Period. By B. S. Krishnaswamiengar.
Part XI.—Macaulay's Indian Career. By P. G. Sathyagirinathan.
Part XII.—Monism in the Vedas. By Vidwan H. N. Raghavendrachar.

"The Sankhya Theory of evolution in the light of modern thought"

This paper evaluates the Sankhya theory of evolution. It points out how Sankhya is more advanced than modern theories of evolution. Finally it concludes how aptly the Sankhya-Vāda of Sankhya results in the Sadāśah-kārya-Vāda of Madhva's Prakṛiṣa-Mīmāṃsā.

14

THE SANKHYA THEORY OF EVOLUTION IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN THOUGHT

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I

1. The term 'evolution' in modern sense means change. It is not a blind and chartless change. It is a change in describable and definable directions. It is evident in the growth of an organic life. Such growth consists in the descent of the more complex from the simple with increasing diversity in, and interdependence of, parts.

2. 'Evolution' thus defined can be applied only to particular aspects of Sāṅkhya Philosophy. The Sāṅkhya term for evolution is *parināma*. *Parināma* is change. It is either a change of an entity into itself or into a complex entity or a change of a complex entity into a more complex entity. Sāṅkhya traces all change finally to what he calls *prakṛiti*. *Prakṛiti* is the name given to three factors—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Prakṛiti* at a stage changes into itself. This is the state of equilibrium (*samyāvasthā*). At another stage her state of equilibrium is disturbed by the presence of *puruṣa*, the spiritual principle and now she changes into a complex entity. And in the continuation of the changing process, she changes from the less complex to the more complex. At the stage of equilibrium the three factors change into themselves—*satva* changing into *satva*, *rajas* into *rajas* and *tamas* into *tamas*. If this state is disturbed by the presence of *puruṣa*, then the three factors mix with one another and

give rise to a complex entity. In the continuation of the changing process, there is more of mixing and more complex entities appear. It is only to the second and the third aspects of change, namely, the change consisting in the appearance of the complex from the simple and of the more complex from the less complex that the term evolution in its modern sense can be applied.

3. To prepare the ground for our study of comparative importance, I may very briefly indicate the Sāṅkhya position in its main aspects.

To start with, Sāṅkhya points to the complex and diverse behaviours and dispositions of both organisms and material objects. He observes three aspects in an entity—(1) that which exhibits the characters of illumination and lightness; (2) that which exhibits the characters of activity and strain; and (3) that which exhibits the characters of dulness, heaviness and darkness. He calls the first *satva*, the second *rajas* and the third *tamas*. He applies this idea to the whole world and reduces it to the three factors. He explains the complexity or diversity of the objects by the complex and diverse mixing of the three factors with one another. Perhaps to indicate the mixing character of the three factors, he calls them *gunas*.

Satva, *rajas* and *tamas*, in one word *prakṛiti* is the matter from which the complex entities appear. In accounting for the relation between *prakṛiti* and the products evolving from her, he points to the fact that a particular product, say oil, comes only from a particular matter, say oil seed, and from no other matter, say sand, and concludes on the basis of this idea that the product is implicitly present in the matter out of which it is produced. He applies this idea to *prakṛiti* and her products and holds that all products are latent in her. To signify this he calls her *avyakta*, the latent product. What is latent becomes patent owing to the operation of other conditions, such as the operation of a machine in the case of oil. To present this idea he calls his position *Satkārya vāda*—the existent-product-theory.

The introduction of the idea of the operation of other conditions as causing change in a matter into another entity, may give us the notion that change itself is freshly introduced to matter which is, without such introduction, motionless. Sāṅkhya warns us against any such notion. He makes his position clear by setting a limit to such operation. If *prakṛiti* were really changeless, then no condition can introduce change into it. The fact that *prakṛiti* is the matter of all is meaningless, unless change is taken to be her very essence. If so, she must be changing, even in the absence of the operation of other conditions. Such disposition is exhibited in her state of equilibrium. But her change into a state where her equilibrium is disturbed must be the result of the operation of a condition external to it. Though change is *prakṛiti* herself, her change in complex directions requires the operation of something external.

Which is the external principle which would operate on her equilibrium? A relevant answer would be that which is opposed to her. She is change and consists of three factors. So, that which is opposed to her must be devoid of change and factors. As the ground of all that is material she is material. Therefore the opposite one must be spiritual. To imply these ideas, the other principle is given the name *puruṣa*. So far the position is that *puruṣa*, the spirit, disturbs *prakṛiti* in her equilibrium and the result is her change into diverse forms.

In saying that *puruṣa* disturbs *prakṛiti* are we attributing a change of mode in him? No, to attribute any change to him is inconsistent with the original position that *puruṣa* is changeless. If he does not change how can he disturb *prakṛiti*? Sāṅkhya adopts a device to meet this difficulty. He holds that it is not actually *puruṣa* that disturbs *prakṛiti*; but it is his presence. *Puruṣa* is ever passive. In the presence of *puruṣa* *prakṛiti* is disturbed in her equilibrium, her constituents mix with one another, and consequently there is the appearance of complex entities.

Is this activity of prakṛiti consisting in new change purposeless? No, says Sāṅkhya. Purposeless activity is chartless. If all that is is really purposeless, then a living being's enjoying the facts of its experience would be meaningless and in fact there would be no enjoyment at all. All conscious activity is conditioned by some purpose consisting in at least obtaining casual satisfaction. Enjoyment is not consistent with a material thing as prakṛiti. It necessarily points to a spiritual entity to which it can be attributed.

Enjoyment is an expression of change. Puruṣa is changeless. Without an enjoyer enjoyment is impossible. From this it follows that enjoyment is the result of prakṛiti's disposition under the influence of puruṣa's presence. Puruṣa is thus ultimately the passive source of enjoyment. On the basis of this idea, it is possible to hold, though in a very restricted sense, that the new change in the prakṛiti has a purpose and the purpose is no other than the enjoyment of puruṣa.

The actual enjoyer is, in a sense, a product of prakṛiti and puruṣa. To say that he is a product of both is to hold that both are confused in him. His essence consists in attributing the character of puruṣa to prakṛiti and the character of prakṛiti to puruṣa. So enjoyment consists in the confusion of both. Sāṅkhya calls this confusion *avivekākhyāti*—nondiscrimination between prakṛiti and puruṣa.

The fact that nondiscrimination is responsible for enjoyment necessarily leads to the idea that discrimination between prakṛiti and puruṣa brings about the cessation of prakṛiti's change into new forms. Discrimination is called *viveka-khyāti*. It results in keeping prakṛiti and puruṣa aloof each from the other. With the attainment of aloofness, prakṛiti is prakṛiti and puruṣa is puruṣa. Each has nothing to do with the other. It may be remembered that puruṣa is ever aloof, because he is ever passive. Just as he is said to have enjoyment from the standpoint of prakṛiti's disposition, he is said to have

aloofness from the same point of view. So there is much propriety in holding that it is prakṛiti that has enjoyment and aloofness. Sāṅkhya recognises this. He talks of them as belonging to puruṣa only from the point of view that the new change in prakṛiti is finally traced to puruṣa through his presence. His names for enjoyment and aloofness are respectively *bhoga* and *apavarga*. He says that prakṛiti changes for the attainment of puruṣa's *bhoga* and *apavarga*.

The Sāṅkhya idea of prakṛiti's evolution in the form of the world is based on two fundamental ideas—(1) If an entity has diverse dispositions, then there must be the corresponding dispositions in the matter out of which it comes. If an entity consists in *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, then the matter from which it comes must consist in the same factors. The idea is that a complex entity cannot come out of a simple entity. If prakṛiti consists of only one factor, then the resultant product cannot exhibit diverse characters. If prakṛiti constitutes of different factors, then only the mixing together of the factors may give rise to complex entities. We have also noted that the complexity of the new entities is already implicit in their matter. And (2) If the appearance of the complex things is due to the complex intermixing of the original constituents, then there is the need for the interference of an external principle. Such need is more felt with reference to the appearance of conscious activities in prakṛiti which is by itself insensient. So, unless there is the influence of spirit, there can appear nothing that has spiritual value.

What is the nature of the process of evolution? The Sāṅkhya works simply enumerate the stages of the course of evolution. Why there are those stages only in a particular order is not explicitly answered. Yet on the strength of certain expressions,¹ it seems to me that it is possible to account for the order of the stages. The

¹ *Vāchaspati*.—*Vṛttau satyām Buddhau tamobhābhavā sati yāḥ satva samudekāḥ saḥ adhyavāsīḥ*—*buddhi*.

characters of the constituents of prakṛiti themselves give us a clue to the nature of the process of evolution. Of the three factors, satva being of the character of illumination must respond more readily to the presence of spirit. So the intermixing of the factors at the first stage must be characterised by more of satva. With this idea Sāṅkhya holds that the first entity that evolves is the principle of life and intellect. To indicate this idea, he calls this entity *buddhi*. In the further intermixing, *rajas* has a chance to be more dominant. The entity that results is given the name *ahamkāra*. It evolves from *buddhi*. At this stage in giving a chance to the domination of *taṃas*, Sāṅkhya distinguishes between two aspects of *ahamkāra*—(1) *Ahamkāra* that is further determined by *satva*; and (2) *Ahamkāra* that is determined by more of *taṃas*.

The resultants of the former aspect are the eleven sense organs. And the resultants of the latter aspect are the essences of the five *bhūtas* called *tanmātras*. From these essences the five gross elements appear. So far, the process is characterised by a definite order. The entities that determine this order are given the name *tattvas*. The further changes have no definite order. They are only products that are gross and sensible and they are not *tattvas* as they are not different from earth, etc.

The *tattvas* are most manifest in the human organism. Each organism has its own experience. On the basis of this fact, Sāṅkhya deduces that each organism belongs to a particular puruṣa. This means that puruṣas are many.

Though puruṣas are many, they are distinguished by the same character, the character of spirituality. This

This indicates the satva character of *buddhi*. To identify *adhyavasthya* with it suggests the fact that it readily responds to the presence of puruṣa.

matte nānyotrādhi kṛitah śaktah khalvāhamātra.....yo abhīmāṇah saḥ asādhāraṇavyāpārāśvat ahamkārah. This is the expression of the pravartaka character of *rajas*. He holds that *buddhyādi* is revealed by *āptavachana*.

means that experience in all organisms must be similar. But it is not the case. What is it due to? To answer this, Sāṅkhya has recourse to another principle, the principle of *karma*. Each puruṣa has his own *karma*. For this reason he has experience peculiar to him. What is the difference in *karma* due to? Sāṅkhya does not recognise the propriety of this question at all. He holds that the process of evolution is timeless. Time is only a fiction. The notion of it is due to the observation of the succession of change. Question about the origin of *karma* presupposes the reality of time. Therefore it is irrelevant. Our tracing the process of evolution to prakṛiti and puruṣa has only logical importance, not the temporal.

Though prakṛiti's evolution in the case of each puruṣa is different, we talk of a common world, because such a world is made possible by the *karma* common to many or all puruṣas. With the attainment of discrimination in the case of a puruṣa, prakṛiti ceases to evolve for him. Yet her activity continues for the sake of the *bhoga* and *apavarga* of other puruṣas.

So far the Sāṅkhya position with regard to the doctrine of evolution is briefly indicated. The principal ideas that form the basis of his treatment are the following: (1) The process of evolution points to two ultimate principles, the material and the spiritual and change must be the essence of the material. (2) The original matter must be diverse. (3) The whole process of evolution must be implicitly present in the original matter. (4) The process of evolution must necessarily involve purpose. (5) There must be a determining principle of the process such as *karma*. (6) The process of evolution must be timeless.

II.

We may now compare the Sāṅkhya position with the modern ideas. The history of modern thought presents several theories of evolution. Three stages in it may be distinguished:

(1) At the first stage scientists and philosophers after the Greek atomists favoured a mechanistic view of the world. They made matter the ultimate principle of all including life. To this class belong Galileo, Newton, Descartes and others. They made no distinction between living and non-living matter. They explained the apparent differences of the qualities and behaviours of things by the differences in degree of complication in the numbers and configurations of material particles in motion that constitute living organisms. Against their views we may note that they have very little to be compared with Sāṅkhya. Sāṅkhya is very definite that the mechanistic view does not explain the appearance of the world consisting in the distinction between living and non-living matter and spiritual and non-spiritual values.

The next stage consists in entertaining a biological view of evolution. After Heraclitus with his view 'All things flow' Lamarck and Darwin subordinated everything in the world to evolution. Lamarck pointed out that the process of striving and the consequent modification of organs has been going on in all domains of life and the results of the process have been inherited by the species. Darwin pointed to the fact that breeders selected the qualities which they wanted and they interbred those individuals that had these qualities and thus developed new species. He applied this idea to nature and held that in her natural selection in the struggle for existence takes the place of the breeder. The position was subsequently followed by detailed discussions with regard to organic transformation and the question of inheritance. Against this position we may note the following points. The whole position is only concerned with showing the manner of evolution. The best that can be said in favour of this position is that natural selection operates on chance variations that take place in the 'Genes' and their combinations. But this leaves no scope for the ascent through modification of use and disuse of the parental organs. The word chance is only a name of ignorance.

Subsequently it was realised that the notions of evolution so far are only the expressions of mechanistic view of life and that the mechanical rearrangement of material particles does not offer a satisfactory account of the appearance of novelties, new qualities, relations, new powers and behaviours and new levels of existence in the process of evolution. Fresh theories were propounded under the head emergent evolution. Margan, S. Alexander and others are the formulators of new theories.

Margan starts his scheme of evolution with electromagnetic energies. He denies that the higher forms are present either implicitly or explicitly in the earlier stages of the process. Yet all the higher forms emerge from the lower simpler individuals. He holds that within ourselves the activity existent at a higher level is caused by the urge of the ideal. He says that it is to acknowledge a really existent ideal independent of emergent ideas.

Against this position we may note the following: To hold that the higher is not implicit in the lower is to take away all necessary relation between the two. In this case anything may emerge from anything. The spirit of the conception of the urge of the ideal as causing the higher emergent is not consistent with the idea of emergent evolution, because it means that before the realisation of the ideal there it is as an implicit fact. So his conclusion that there is a really existent ideal is unwarranted.

S. Alexander starts his scheme of evolution from space-time. Space-time is the matrix or the stuff of reality. Everything that has an empirical existence is a specific configuration, contour or complication of space-time. Every new level emerges from a complication which is a new simplification of the level next below it. The relation between these two levels resembles that between body and mind. The higher emergent is based on a complexity of the lower existents. Thus life is a complex of material bodies and minds of living ones. At each stage of quality the complexity gathers itself together and is expressed in

a new simplicity and becomes the starting point for fresh advances.

In the process of evolution matter is the first emergent, life is the next and mind the last. The process is self-sufficient and there is no perfect energising source. The misus the straining or labouring of space-time does it. It is God. For any level of existence the next higher empirical quality is the deity. To creatures upon the level of life mind is deity. We, men, have attained the level of mind and for us deity is, we can but say, deity. God is infinite actual god, only in the sense of straining towards deity. As being the whole universe he is creative. But his distinct character of deity is created. Space-time is the creator and he is only a creature.

(2) Against this position we may make the following remarks. It is not possible to understand how the simple space-time can by itself give rise to the rich variety of the universe. If every new thing is emergent, then the idea of ascent is not explained. The sudden appearance of mind in the process of evolution is left without any basis. If it has any spiritual basis, then space-time cannot be the basis of all and matter cannot be the first emergent. If an external energising source is denied, then the source must be attributed to space-time. In this case how the dead or inert space-time has the energising power is not explained. Finally the whole process of evolution is without any purpose to fulfil. The whole position is only a restatement of the mechanistic view with the addition of the possibility of disorder.

(3) The Sāṅkhya position is free from many of the difficulties found in the modern theories. His prakṛiti and puruṣa as the ultimate origin make the account of living and the non-living things possible. His conception of prakṛiti as ever active presents an energising source of evolution. His idea of prakṛiti as *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* makes variation in the process of evolution possible. His theory that the product is implicit in its matter makes ascent possible. His position that prakṛiti in evolution

has a definite end to fulfil, gives a meaning to the evolutionary process and makes life worth living. Karma as determining the course of evolution leaves no room for chance work, which may result in much that is wasteful and meaningless. His idea of timeless universe gives colour to his conception of karma, active prakṛiti and passive puruṣa, since it relieves him from the burden of explaining the beginning of the process.

From our comparative study, we learn that we may more successfully carry on our investigations into the nature of evolution by making use of at least the spirit of Sāṅkhya speculations. Another point may be noted in this connection. I may briefly mention it in a dogmatic way. The present treatment does by no means imply that the position of Sāṅkhya is final. No doubt, it has influenced the subsequent Indian thinkers in many directions. Its passive puruṣa may in a sense be said to have laid the foundation for the conception of Nirguṇa Brahman in Advaita. Its Satkāryavāda has much influence on the Viśiṣṭādvaita view of the world. Its implied distinction between the implicit and the explicit has given rise to the Sadasatkāryavāda in *Bhāṭya*. Though the later thinkers improved on many aspects of Sāṅkhya, they have ultimately retained the spirit of the same in different directions.

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THE PROBLEM OF SUPERIMPOSITION (ADHYASA)
IN ADVAITA-VEDANTA.



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THE PROBLEM OF SUPERIMPOSITION (ADHYASA)
IN ADVAITA-VEDANTA.¹

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ADVAITA-VEDANTA teaches that all activities pertaining to knowledge and its objects are due to the superposition of *âtman* and *anâtman*, each on the other. But superimposition might seem to involve self-contradiction:—*Âtman* is denoted by "I" (*asmât*) and *anâtman* by "non-I" or "you" (*ya-smât*). Therefore they are of opposite characters, just as light and darkness are. From the point of a particular individual, *âtman* is his own self and *anâtman* is all that is different from it. Thus there is a clear cut difference between *âtman* and *anâtman*. There seems to be no confusion between them. So, to say that they can be superposed, each on the other, is not in accordance with their nature.

The Possible Position of Advaita.

The terms *âtman* and *anâtman* are understood in various senses. Unless we are definite regarding the meaning of these terms, we cannot pronounce the judgment that they are of opposed characters, like light and darkness, and that therefore they cannot be superposed, each on the other. In connection with this discussion, we may take three senses

¹ The following exposition is based on विवरणमयसंस्कृत (published by E. J. Lazarus & Co., Benares). This work adopts the following method of expounding the problem of superposition, just to give the reader an idea of how superposition is a fact, and how at the same time it is only *mithyâ* and not real.

of the terms *ātman* and *anātman* into consideration. In popular parlance we accept certain things as denoted by these terms; from the point of view of non-Advaitic Indian thinkers we accept certain other things as denoted by them and from the Advaita point of view we get quite other things as understood by the terms.

From the common sense point of view, *ātman* stands for the aggregation of the various bodily elements beginning with the bodily limbs and ending with the *cāitanya* part of it; and *anātman* stands for the inanimate objects like stone, etc. In these senses there is not complete opposition between *ātman* and *anātman*, because the bodily limbs, etc., which ought to come under *anātman* form a part of *ātman*. Nor does *Vēdānta* hold superposition of them in this sense.

Thinkers like *Prabhākara* hold that *ātman* is the substratum of knowing, doing and enjoying (*pramāṁśrva*, *kartrva* and *bhōktrva*), and that *anātman* is that which is not *ātman*. In these senses both *ātman* and *anātman* are inert according to *Vēdānta*. It is obvious that *anātman* is inert. According to *Vēdānta* the thing that is the substratum of knowing, etc., is also inert: such a thing is called *śaṅkhāra* in *Vēdānta* and the same is called *ātman* by *Prabhākara*. Thus, so far as the facts are concerned, there can be no opposition between *ātman* and *anātman*. The same consideration shows that either cannot be superposed on the other, since both are of the same nature.

According to *Vēdānta*, *ātman* is partless *cāitanya* and the other things *antahkaraṇa*, body, etc., are *anātman*. Of these *anātman* is denoted by "you" (*yuṣmat*). It is not from the point of usage that *anātman* is described like this. As it is already stated, the body, etc., come under *anātman*. Ordinarily they are not described as being denoted by "you."

A person does not address his own body, etc., in the second person. But they are described as "you" in Advaita technicality. Accordingly "you" (*yuṣmat*) is that which is made known by *cit* (*āśavabhāṣya*). Since every thing that is other than *ātman* is given by *cit* (*ātman*), all such things, even including body, etc., can be termed "you." But *ātman* is self-evident and therefore it cannot be denoted by "I" (*asmāt*). These considerations clearly show that the first argument against superposition—that *ātman* and *anātman* cannot be superposed on each other because they are respectively denoted by *asmāt* and *yuṣmat* which are opposed to each other—is wrong since there are no such things as are denoted by *asmāt* and *yuṣmat*.

Criticism of This Position.

Ātman may be self-evident, but yet it is something that can be spoken of. If something can be spoken of, then it must at least be indicated by some name, if not denoted by it. In the present case, we may regard it as indicated by "I" (*asmāt*) since no other term is suitable for it. If so, the opposition between *asmāt* and *yuṣmat* remains the same, and this makes the superposition of *ātman* and *anātman* impossible.

It is not merely the opposition between *asmāt* and *yuṣmat* that renders the superposition impossible, but the opposition between *ātman* and *anātman* in themselves. *Ātman* is the subject (*viśayi*) and *anātman* object (*viśaya*). So one must be opposed to the other, just as the perceiving eye and the perceived colour are. Just as eye and colour cannot be superposed on each other, *ātman* and *anātman* cannot be, likewise.

So far we have stated that *ātman* and *anātman* are opposed to each other. Of these entities *ātman* is *cit* and *anātman* is given by *cit*. So the opposition between these

two cannot be as commonly understood. Ordinarily, by opposition between two things we mean that one of them destroys or excludes the other. Neither of these conceptions holds good in the case of the opposition between *âtman* and *anâtman*. So we have to understand the term opposition in this case in a special sense. To say that *âtman* and *anâtman* are opposed to each other simply means that one cannot be the other. This meaning is not peculiar to the opposition between *âtman* and *anâtman*. For instance, a positive entity cannot be a negative entity, and so we regard them as opposed to each other.

Consistently with the above considerations the form of the main argument against superposition is this : *âtman* and *anâtman* cannot be superposed on each other, because one cannot be the other; for example, of the two entities, light and darkness, one cannot be the other and therefore one cannot be superposed on the other.

We cannot explain the opposition between light and darkness in the ordinary sense of the term. We know that in a room where there is weak light, both light and darkness are observed together. This clearly shows that light and darkness are opposed to each other not in the sense that the former destroys the latter, nor in the sense that the former does not give room for the latter. If either of these were the true sense, there ought not to have been darkness in the room. So we have to understand by the opposition between the two, that one cannot be the other.

Thinkers like *Naiyāyikas* and *Prābhākara*s hold that darkness is only a negation. If their conception is true, then we cannot prove the opposition between *âtman* and *anâtman* by the example of light and darkness. For *âtman* and *anâtman* are not negative entities, but in the example light is a non-negative entity and darkness a negative one. It is quite natural that there should be opposition between the

latter two. But this by no means proves any opposition between the former two since they are positive entities. So if we have to make use of light and darkness as examples, we have to show that both of them are positive.

Naiyāyikas hold that darkness is the negation of light, and *Prābhākara*s that it is the negation of the apprehension of colour. Both these conceptions are wrong. A negative entity does not admit of quantitative difference. It is always a positive entity that can have quantitative change. We do observe darkness both as increasing and as decreasing. So it must be a positive entity. Moreover, darkness has the blue colour. It is only a substance, *i.e.*, a positive entity, that can have the qualities like colour. This also shows that darkness is a positive entity.

It might be said against this conclusion :—If darkness were a positive entity, then it ought not to be observed in a place where there is a powerful light. But this is not the case. We do observe darkness if we close our eyes even in a place where there is a very powerful light. In a lighted room we see the light through our eyes. When we close our eyes we only see the negation of light, and we call this negation darkness. This clearly shows that darkness is a negative entity.

In reply to this objection we may consider the case as follows:—It is true that in a lighted room there can be no darkness; and that when we shut our eye lids, we do see darkness. But what we see is not the darkness that is in the room, but it is the darkness that is enclosed within the eye lids. Eye can see darkness within the lids, just as ear can hear the sound within, when it is shut. It might be asked why the eye does not see other things, for instance, an ointment applied to the lids. But this is not reasonable. We have to admit a distinction between the apprehension of darkness and that of other things. The apprehension of the

things other than darkness requires the help of light. Without light these things cannot be seen at all. But the case of the apprehension of darkness is quite different. It requires no help from light. It is not merely this. The apprehension of darkness takes place only when there is no light. When we shut our eyes there is no light within the eye lids and therefore we do not see any thing but darkness.

So far we have proved that darkness is a positive entity. *Naiyāyikas* might still say against this conclusion as follows:—Things are produced in a definite order. The origin of effects are the *paramāṇus* (atoms). In producing an effect, every two of them form a group and this is called *dvyanuka* (twin); and next, three of such twins form a group and this is called *tryanuka*; and next such *tryanukas* combining along with other *tryanukas* become still bigger and bigger in size and, finally there is produced an effect such as a jar. This is the order of production of all the substances that are effects. If darkness were a substance that is produced, it must also follow the same order when it is produced. But this is not the case at all. Supposing that the light in a room is suddenly removed, we observe total darkness immediately. Granting that darkness is a substance, we have to regard the darkness that appears in the room suddenly, as something that is produced. Obviously, the production of darkness does not follow any definite order. If it were to follow any such order it would not have appeared all at once. The fact that it appears suddenly proves that it is not a positive entity that is produced.

In reply to these considerations of *Naiyāyikas* we may note these points:—According to *Advaita* all effects are superposed on *caitanya*. There is nothing that is really produced. The cause of all production is nescience. So all effects are the various forms of nescience. The same nescience now appears as A, now as B, some other time as C,

and so on. The evolution of nescience into various effects does not presuppose any definite order. An effect may appear slowly, and some other effect all of a sudden. To get a jar out of clay may be a slow process; but the appearance of darkness after the removal of light may be immediate. Thus the immediate appearance of an effect does not stand in the way of its being a positive substance.

Further, *Nyāya* may still persist in denying that darkness is a positive entity. The qualities colour and touch always go hand in hand. If some substance possesses colour, then it must also possess touch. We may state the same thing in another form that if something is devoid of touch, it must also be devoid of colour. As an instance, we may take space. Space has no touch, nor has it colour. In the same way we may argue that darkness has no colour because it has no touch. This invalidates the argument that darkness is a substance because it has colour.

In criticising the *Nyāya* position we have to note that the argument on the analogy of space is not sound. To show that it is not correct we may employ a similar argument on the analogy of the air. We know that air is devoid of colour, but yet it possesses touch. If touch can be found in a substance that is devoid of colour, there is no reason why we should not hold that colour can be found in a substance that is devoid of touch. Thus the *Nyāya* argument on the analogy of space is not conclusive.

Further, the argument that darkness has no colour since it has no touch is contradicted by the perception of the dark colour in darkness. *Nyāya* may try to remove the contradiction of perception by explaining the appearance of dark colour as due to the perceiver's superposition of it on the negation of light when it is perceived. But, in spite of this explanation, the *Nyāya* argument is not sound. Our previous counter-argument based on the analogy of the air, attack-

ed the *Nyāya* argument only indirectly. There our whole argument was that there can be colour without touch because there can be touch without colour. We may now advance an argument that attacks the *Nyāya* argument directly. Smoke has colour but not touch. In the same way darkness may have colour without touch. It is possible for *Nyāya* to hold that the touch in smoke is not manifest thereby implying that it is there. This supposition in no way makes the *Nyāya* position better. If such suppositions have any value, it is equally possible to suppose that darkness also has touch but it is not manifest.¹

All these considerations clearly show that there is no difficulty in holding that darkness is a positive entity.

Against this conclusion *Nyāya* might still contend that to hold that darkness is the negation of light is equally sound; at the same time explaining the increase or decrease of darkness as being due to the weaker or stronger light placed in the same place. We may criticise this conception as follows:—If darkness is the negation of light, then it must either be the negation of light as such or of a particular light or of all lights. Granting that it is either of the former two, we have to determine whether it is the negation that precedes light or that is different from light or that follows light. None of these senses can be correct. To a place where there is clear sunlight, we may introduce a candle and then remove it; but we do not observe any darkness either before or after the introduction of the candle, nor does the absence of other lights make the appearance of darkness possible in that place. The conception that darkness is the negation of all light also does not hold good. If darkness were the negation of all light, then it can never be removed. In this

¹ Throughout this discussion the arguments on analogy are admitted just to meet the *Nyāya* arguments which employ analogies to prove the facts.

case to remove darkness is to introduce all light of which it is the negation. However we may try, we can only bring in a few lights to a place and it is impossible to bring all lights at the same time to the same place. All these considerations clearly show that darkness can never be the negation of light.

Nor can darkness be the negation of the apprehension of colour. For, sometimes we do apprehend both darkness and colour simultaneously. For instance, we may take the case when we see darkness within the walls of a room and without the colour of the walls. If darkness were the negation of the apprehension of colour, it ought not to have been apprehended at the time when the colour is apprehended. Therefore we may conclude that darkness is not a negation.

The foregoing discussion shows that the opposition between light and darkness simply means that one cannot be the other; similar is the opposition between *ātman* and *anātman*, and this opposition determines that they cannot be superposed on each other. It may be said against this conclusion as follows:—The fact that silver is superposed on a shell is well known. It is also quite obvious that a shell cannot be silver and silver cannot be a shell. Yet silver is superposed on a shell. In the same way why can we not hold that *ātman* and *anātman* can be superposed on each other, though there is opposition between them?

In reply to this we may note that there is no opposition between a shell and silver. In the illusion "This is silver," "this" means shell and "silver" silver. There is no opposition between "this" and "silver." This can be known when a real silver is grasped as "This is silver." The case of *ātman* and *anātman* is not like this. *Ātman* is *cit* and therefore it is only the subject; and *anātman* is of the opposite character and therefore it is only an object. If there is any

thing that has the character of both *ātman* and *anātman*, then that thing must be both subject and object at the same time. This is contradiction in terms. The same thing cannot at the same time be both subject and object. The subject is always the subject and never the object and the object is always the object and never the subject. We might say that the thing that is the subject by nature becomes the object owing to external conditions. But this does not hold good in case of *ātman*. *Ātman* is partless and it cannot be externally conditioned. Nor can it evolve into the object for the same reason. In fact, nothing that is partless can evolve into or take the form of a thing that is of opposite character. Space is partless; so it does not evolve or take the form of a thing that has parts. Similar consideration applies to the case of *anātman*. By nature it is of the character of object. It is *acit* (non-*cit*). So it cannot be *cit*. Nor can it be *cit* owing to external conditions; for to think of *acit* becoming *cit* is contradiction in thought. *Acit* evolves into *acit*. Clay evolves into pot. Pot is *acit* because clay is *acit*. Nor can *acit* be regarded as *cit*, because it gives room for *cit*; for by nature *cit* is omnipresent and to think of it as being given room afresh is contradiction in terms. So, in no case does *acit* become *cit*. They are of opposite characters and therefore one cannot be superposed on the other.

It might be said in favour of superimposition as follows:—*Ātman* and *anātman* need not be superimposed on each other as they are. Yet the properties of *ātman* may be superimposed on *anātman*. Bliss, (*ānanda*) realisation of object (*vīśayānubhava*) and eternality (*nityatva*) are the properties of *ātman*.¹ The superimposition of

¹ Of course, *Advaita* does not regard *ānanda*, etc., as properties. They are *ātman* itself. Yet these properties conditioned by *anāhkarana* appear as different from one another.

these properties on *anātman* does not presuppose the superimposition of *ātman* which is the substratum of the properties. There are cases where only the properties are superposed and not the substratum. When the *sphaṭika* (crystal) is by the side of a red flower, it appears as having the red colour. Here only the redness of the flower is superposed on the stone and not the flower. The same may be the consideration in the present case also.

This also does not hold good. There cannot be the superposition of the properties without that of the substratum. It is not only the redness that is superposed on the stone but the flower also. The flower is reflected in the stone and so is the redness. So the properties of *ātman* cannot be superposed on *anātman* without *ātman* being superimposed.

When the things cannot be superimposed, their apprehensions also cannot be superposed on each other. The superposition of one apprehension on the other presupposes that of the respective objects on each other. Thus there can neither be the superimposition of things nor of the apprehensions of them—*arhādhyāsa* and *jñānādhyāsa* respectively.

So far we have stated the difficulties in holding the superposition of *ātman* and *anātman*. These difficulties are framed in accordance with the teaching of *Advaita* itself. So they try to show the seeming internal discrepancy in the *Advaita* teaching just to give room for their evaluation. By going through these and the following pages the reader understands clearly not only the position of *Advaita* regarding the various problems connected with the question of superimposition, but also the nature and the place of superimposition in *Advaita*. It is for this double benefit that *Advaita* works employ this device in discussing the problem of superimposition. Without this plan we have very little chance of knowing these details.

**Evaluation of the Difficulties, and the Place of
Superimposition.**

The considerations against superimposition merely show that it is not real. This means that it is merely an appearance (*mithyā; anirvācya*). We cannot deny superimposition because it is not supported by reason. The probable considerations that would be further advanced in support of the denial of superimposition are as follows:—Superimposition presupposes the similarity of the thing that is superposed to the thing on which it is superposed. Silver is superposed on a shell because both are similar in so far as both glitter. A serpent is superposed on a rope because both are similar in so far as their posture is similar. The case of the superimposition of *ātman* and *anātman* is not similar. *Ātman* is propertyless (*nirguṇa*) and partless (*niravayava*). It cannot be similar to any other thing; and therefore it cannot be superposed on any other thing. Of course all cases of superposition do not require that the thing that is superposed should be similar to that on which it is superposed. Red flower is not similar to the *sphatika*, yet the former is superposed on the latter in "This is red" where "this" refers to *sphatika*. In the same way to consider that *ātman* is superposed on *anātman* is wrong. The superposition of redness on *sphatika* is a peculiar kind of superposition. The redness appears in *sphatika* because the red flower is reflected on it. So the flower conditions the redness that appears in the *sphatika*. If we remove the flower from the side of *sphatika*, the latter no longer appears as red. So we may regard this superposition as conditioned (*sōpādhika*). It is only in such cases of superposition that are conditioned, the thing superposed need not be similar to the thing on which it is superposed. But in other cases one must be similar to the other. From these considerations it follows that *ātman* and *anātman* cannot be superposed on each other.

It might be said against this conclusion as follows:—In such cases as "I do," etc., doing, etc., are imposed on *ātman*. Doing, etc., belong to *ahankāra* "I." Owing to the closeness of *ahankāra*, *ātman* appears as the doer, etc. The superimposition of doing, etc., is also conditioned by "I." This means that in this case of superposition also there need be no similarity between *ātman* and *ahankāra* "I."

In answer to these considerations, we may note that they do not explain the situation fully. The point at issue is that there cannot be superposition between *ātman* and *anātman* because they are dissimilar. Granting the superimposition of doing, etc., on *ātman* is conditioned, we may hold that this superposition does not require any similarity between *ātman* and doing, etc. But the superposition of *ahankāra*, body, etc., on *ātman* presupposes that *ātman* must be similar to the other things. In the absence of similarity there cannot be any such superposition. We have already made it clear that *ātman* is not similar to any other thing. So we may tentatively conclude that there is no superposition at all.

We may meet this difficulty as follows:—To deny superposition on the ground that there is no similarity between *ātman* and *anātman* is wrong and irrelevant with experience. We know that odour is qualityless and partless.¹ Yet we can compare one odour with the other as when we say that the odour of a serpent is similar to that of the *kēlāki* flower. The comparison simply means that the two odours are similar to each other because they are odours. In the same way *ātman* and *anātman* are things, and as things, they may be similar to each other.

Or even regarding *ātman* as not similar to any other thing, we cannot deny superposition. Superposition need not presuppose similarity. Shell and yellowness are not similar, yet the latter is superposed on the former in "Shell is yellow."

¹ This is following the Nyāya teaching *guṇe guṇānangikārāḥ*.

The superposition of yellowness on a shell may be due to billowness of the percipient, etc. Similarly the superposition of *ātman* & *anātman*, each on the other, may be due to nescience.

Nescience is not something that is conjectured. It is a matter of direct experience that the real nature of *ātman*, i.e., *cit* and *ānanda* is covered from time immemorial. This covering agent is nescience. From this it follows that it is a positive entity. So it is not the negation of knowledge. Since it is given in experience we cannot deny it. If we deny nescience, then we will have to deny *ātman*.

The superposition of *ātman* and *anātman* is beginningless. It consists of attributing to *ātman* defects like action, enjoyment and detachment. The superposition of enjoyment presupposes that of doing. For the entity that does not do, does not enjoy. The superposition of doing presupposes that of the defects, attachment, etc. For one cannot do if one is devoid of attachment. The superposition of the relation of defects on *ātman* presupposes that of enjoying. For one can be attached only to that which one has enjoyed or which is similar to what one has enjoyed. Similar considerations apply to the previous superpositions. Thus the whole course of superposition is beginningless as the course of seeds and plants. In the course of superposition, the preceding ones cause the following.

**Superposition does not Presuppose that the Thing
Superposed must be Real.**

The common criticism levelled against the theory of superposition is that it forms a vicious circle—the superposition of the world on *ātman* presupposes the knowledge of it, and the knowledge of it presupposes the superposition; for without knowing a thing we cannot superpose it and without superposing it we cannot know it, since we can know only that thing which appears.

The foregoing considerations clearly show that the theory of superposition does not give room for any vicious circle, since the knowledge and superposition of the thing are explained by different entities. If we hold that the same seed and plant are explained by each other, then it is to create a vicious circle. In the same way if we explain the same knowledge and superposition each by the other, then it is to create a vicious circle as the same cause and effect cannot be explained by each other. But no such explanation is entertained regarding the present problem. The knowledge of the previous body through the corresponding *samskāra* helps the superposition of the present body and not the knowledge of the present body.

The body, etc., are not real. But it does not follow that they cannot be superposed. For superposition presupposes only the idea of the thing that is superposed and not its reality. This may be illustrated by the shell-silver superposition. Here, in this example, silver has no reality and the shell is real from the empirical point of view. Thus the unreal silver is superposed on the real shell. In the same way the unreal *anātman* may be superposed on real *ātman*. In both the cases the idea of the things that are superposed cause the superposition. All things that are superposed are of this nature. When the two distant trees are mistaken for one, it is not one tree that is superposed on the other but it is the superposition of oneness on the trees. Here oneness is unreal and it is superposed on the real trees.

**The Meaning of Mutual Superposition of *Ātman* and *Anātman*
(Itaretaradyasa).**

So far we know that all that is superposed is unreal. From this it follows that pure *ātman* cannot be superposed. So we must understand by the term *ātman* occurring in the

previous statement "*ātman* and *anātman* are superposed on each other" the qualified *ātman*, i.e., the *ātman* that is in relation with *anātman*. *Ātman* as such is real and its relation with *anātman* is unreal and *anātman* as such is unreal (*samsargādhyāsa* and *tādātmyādhyāsa*).

It is owing to such superposition we have such experiences as "I have the body," "This body is mine," etc. It is possible to hold that we have got these experiences because *ātman* and body, etc., are just in such relation as substance and quality are. The relation between substance and quality consists in identity and difference and it is due to such relation that there are such experiences as "the colour of the cloth," etc. In the same way the relation between *ātman* and *anātman* may consist in identity and difference; and owing to this relation there may be the experiences like "I have the body," etc.

But such a position is wrong. *Ātman* and *anātman* are quite different from each other. For, of these two entities, the former is real and the latter unreal and so they cannot be identical. This is why we have to hold that *ātman* is superposed on *anātman* and the latter on the former (*ītarītarādhyāsa*).

In place of the superposition of *ātman* and *anātman*, each on the other, we cannot hold that identity (*ekatva*) is superposed on these entities just as it is done on two distant trees. Otherwise all experience must point to the identity of *ātman* and *anātman*. This is not true. Expressions in use like "my body," etc., point to the difference between them. Therefore we have to understand the superposition in the sense that identity of *ātman* is superposed on *anātman* and vice versa.

The expressions that point to the difference between *ātman* and *anātman* do not negate superposition as such. They do not presuppose a correct understanding of the dif-

ference between *ātman* and *anātman*. The knowledge of the difference between *ātman* and *anātman* can be got only through philosophy. So, such expressions are due to the superposition of *ātman* and *anātman*, each on the other, (*tādātmyādhyāsa*). But what is experienced may be the superposition of identity of *ātman* and *anātman*. As the result of the former kind of superposition there are experiences like "my body," etc., and following the latter kind of superposition there are experiences like "I" which point to the identity between body, i.e., *anātman* and *ātman*. Both kinds of superposition are not the same. The former kind of superposition admits of the usage that points to both identity and difference but denies the mutual difference (*anyōnyabhāva*); and the latter does not give room for the usage that points to difference.

Nescience (Ajnana) is the Material Cause of Superposition.

So far it is established that superposition is an effect positive in character. At this stage one may suppose that superimposition is not a fact, because it has no material cause. This supposition is not correct. Superposition always presupposes nescience. We superpose silver on a shell only when there is the nescience of the shell. From this it follows that nescience is the material cause of superposition.

It seems to be possible to explain the appearance and disappearance of superposition in quite a different way. It is obvious that the knowledge of reality does not give room for superposition. If the shell is grasped as shell, then silver can never be superposed on it. This implies that there will be superposition when there is the absence of the knowledge of reality. If this is the explanation of appearance and disappearance of superposition, then it is difficult to determine nescience as the material cause of superposition merely on the supposition that the appearance

and disappearance of superposition gives a clue to its cause.

In meeting this objection, we have first to make it clear how the knowledge of reality gives no room for superposition. The knowledge of reality may be regarded as an obstruction to superposition or as something opposed to superposition. In either case, it gives no room for superposition. Let us examine the view that the knowledge of reality is an obstruction. In doing this let us make the meaning of obstruction clear. It is a matter of common experience to regard something as an obstruction only when it opposes the production of an effect when all the causes have fully operated. From this it follows that the obstruction appears only when there is full operation of the cause. Similarly the knowledge of reality, the supposed obstruction to superposition also ought to appear when the causes of superposition have fully operated. This is not the case at all. Defects of the sense organ, etc., are the causes of superposition. We superpose silver on a shell only when the eye is defective and therefore cannot give the correct apprehension of the shell. If the knowledge of reality is to be an obstruction, it must appear only when there are the causes of superposition like the defect of the sense-organ, etc. But this is contradiction in terms. The knowledge of reality can only be the result of the activity of a sound sense-organ. It can never appear when the sense-organ is defective. From this it follows that there can be the knowledge of reality only when the defect of sense-organ, etc., the causes of superposition are absent. This clearly shows that the knowledge of reality can never be an obstruction. So it is irrelevant to take the knowledge of reality into consideration in explaining the appearance and disappearance of superposition.

Let us now take the other case that the knowledge of

reality is opposed to superposition into consideration, and examine how the thing that is opposed causes the disappearance of the effect. We always explain the disappearance of an effect by the presence of something that is opposed to it, only when the effect is likely to appear in the absence of the opposed thing. This implies that the effect has always a cause that is separate from the thing that is opposed. Applying the same consideration to the case of superposition we are now in a position to say explicitly that superposition, the effect in question, has a cause which is separate from the knowledge of reality that is opposed to it. Of these two entities, the cause and the thing opposed, with reference to the production of the effect, the cause is more important than the thing that is opposed. Consistently with these considerations, it is always natural to explain the presence and the absence of an effect by the presence and the absence of its cause. The presence and the absence of other things are of secondary importance and they do not help us when we are concerned with the production of an effect from its cause.

From these considerations it follows that it is quite correct to hold that the appearance and disappearance of superposition pre-suppose those of its cause. This implies that superposition has a cause. We term this cause "nescience."

We cannot consider that the defect of sense-organ itself is the material cause of superposition. For the material cause of something does reside in the same place as the effect. But superposition and the defect of the sense do not occupy the same place. Superposition resides in *ātman* and the defect lies in the sense-organ; and therefore the latter cannot be the material cause of the former.¹

¹ Sometimes it is stated in *Advaita* works that the superposition of silver on a shell resides in the shell and the nescience that is the material

So far we understand that superposition presupposes a material cause and this cause is nescience. There are some considerations against this conclusion. There are two kinds of superpositions—the superposition of knowledge (*jñānādhyāsa*) and the superposition of a thing (*arthādhyāsa*). In connection with the latter, we may accept that the material cause is nescience; but in connection with the former, one may regard *ātman* or *antahkarana* as the material cause. It is generally accepted by other thinkers that at least either of these is the material cause for knowledge. To say that the superposition of knowledge has *ātman* or *antahkarana* as its material cause is to deny that nescience is the material cause of the whole of superposition. These considerations create a difficulty in regarding nescience as the material cause of superposition as such.

The above considerations are thus met:—*Ātman* is changeless. So it cannot be the material cause of superposition. *Antahkarana* requires sense-contact, etc., in order to produce knowledge. If it is regarded as the material cause of superposition, then the sense-contact, etc., that help *antahkarana* must be accounted for. The thing that is superposed is not real apart from its knowledge. If sense-contact, etc., are to help *antahkarana*, first there must be the object, then it must be in contact with the sense, etc., and next there follow the activities of the *antahkarana*. This order is impossible in connection with superposition. There cannot be sense-contact, etc., because there is not the object before superposition. It is not the contact of the sense with silver that produces the shell-silver superposition. The sense is in contact with the shell; but owing to other causes there cause of it resides in *ātman*. In all such cases, we have to understand that the superposition is really in *ātman* and it has only some relation to the shell; and in this sense it is stated that the superposition of silver is in the shell.

appears the superposition of silver in place of the knowledge of the shell. The sense-contact of the shell cannot be regarded as the cause of the superposition of silver. For the contact of the shell cannot cause the knowledge of silver. Nor can we regard that the same contact helped by the *samskāra* of silver gives rise to the superposition, just as the sense-contact of a person through the *samskāra* of the experience of the same person at a past time, produces recognition "This is the same man I saw before." For, this analogy does not hold good in the present case. Recognition is true but the superposition is not true. So superposition cannot be explained on the analogy of recognition. In order to explain that recognition and superposition are of different nature, we may draw this difference between them. In recognition we experience that the thing perceived is identical with the thing that is given through *samskāra*. The man that is perceived is identical with the man that was perceived in the recognition "This is the same man as I saw before." But in superposition the thing that is perceived is experienced as different from the thing that is given through *samskāra*. The shell that is perceived as "this" is experienced as different from silver that is given through *samskāra* in the superposition: "This is silver." If this difference is admitted, it follows that what appears in superposition is not perceived. This is to deny superposition itself.

One may further explain the situation as follows:—The thing that appears in superposition is not real (*mīṭhyā*); and in perceiving such a thing *antahkarana* requires no help from sense-organ, just as in the case of dreams. It is clear that in dream the whole experience is due to the activities of *antahkarana*. So also in the superposition "This is silver," "silver" is given through *antahkarana*. So the absence of the activity of the sense-organ does not

negate the perceptual character of superposition, as it is the case in dream.

This explanation also does not hold good. Admitting that *antahkarana* itself does the whole function, what all we have stated is that *antahkarana* assumes the form of knowledge, *i.e.*, superposition. Now we have to answer the question "Who is to have the experience, *i.e.*, knowledge?" Obviously it is not *antahkarana*; because it has already assumed the form of knowledge and it cannot further evolve as the knower. Assuming that it also evolves as the knower, we have to hold that all experience is to *antahkarana*. But this is not true. *Antahkarana* is inert and it cannot be the knower. The knower must be of the character of *caitanya* and this is *ātman*. So all experience is to *ātman*. If so, superposition also is to *ātman* and not to *antahkarana*. So the cause of superposition, *i.e.*, nescience also must be in *ātman*, otherwise superposition as residing in *ātman* cannot be explained.

So far the whole position is that *ātman* is *caitanya*, in him there is nescience, and this nescience is the material cause of superposition.

VII

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THE PROBLEM OF NESCIENCE (AJNANA)
IN ADVAITA.



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THE PROBLEM OF NESCIENCE (AJNANA)
IN ADVAITA.

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Part I.

The General Conception of Nescience.

ADVAITA teaches that nescience is the material cause (उपादानकारण) of super-imposition (अव्याप्त).¹ The course of super-imposition is beginningless; it is not a negative factor (अभावस्व), and it is removed by knowledge. This gives a clue to the nature of its material cause, *i.e.*, nescience. Consistently with the nature of super-imposition, nescience also must be beginningless (अनन्त), positive in character (भावस्व) and removed by knowledge (ज्ञाननिवृत्त्यै). So we may define nescience as beginningless, positive and removed by knowledge. But the *non-Advaita* thinkers of Indian philosophy have criticised this conception, by supposing that it is inconsistent with the other aspects of *Advaita* philosophy, that it involves self-contradiction and that it is not supported by experience. Till this conception is clearly established against these criticisms, the fundamental teaching of Advaita that the world is super-imposed on Brahman and Brahman is the sole reality cannot be understood. In the following pages I shall summarise the position of *Advaita*, showing at the same time how this system explains that the

¹ For the explanation of this point, see my article on "The problem of super imposition in *Advaita*."

conception is consistent with its other aspects and that it is not opposed to experience.¹

Nescience is Beginningless.

The fact that nescience is beginningless is criticised by non-*Advaita* thinkers as follows—nescience is said to be the material cause of super-imposition. Taking for example the shell-silver super-imposition, it is held that the material cause of this super-imposition is the nescience that resides in the shell. This is inconsistent with the supposed fact that nescience is beginningless. For the shell has a beginning, because it is a product, and likewise the nescience that resides in it also ought to have beginning.

In meeting this criticism we may note the following points. Nescience conditioning *Caitanya* causes the super-imposition. *Caitanya* is beginningless and similarly nescience also ought to be beginningless. Though it is beginningless, it is supposed to be residing in a shell, etc., because the latter specify the former.²

Nescience is Positive.

This conception is criticised as follows. Nescience cannot be positive. Things of experience are not only

¹ The following pages are written mainly on the basis of श्रीदेवसिद्धि by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and its commentary गौडब्रह्मनन्दो or रघुचन्द्रिका by Brahmasūnda Sarasvatī. Since these works are written with a view to criticise न्यायपक्ष by Candrikācīrya and its commentary, न्यायसूत्र-तरङ्गिणी by Rāmācārya, which are the latest works of *Dvaita* philosophy, they embody the latest development of the position of *Advaita*.

For the general conception of nescience, see *Advaita Siddhi* with *Laghucandrikā*, pp. 544-547.

² Similar conception is employed in *Nyāya* philosophy. The absolute negation (असत्तामय) is beginningless. Yet it is regarded as being specified by a particular point of time.

positive like a jar, etc., but they are also negative like the negation of a jar (एकजम्बू), etc. Nescience as the cause of all things ought to be the cause of negative things also. This would be impossible, if we regard it as positive. We cannot hold that though nescience is positive, it can produce negative things. For, such an explanation as this results in absurdities. If it is sound to hold that the positive is the cause of the negative, it is equally sound to hold that the real is the cause of the unreal, and if the real can be the cause of the unreal, then there is no necessity for assuming nescience as the cause of the universe. For the world-appearance can be explained by Brahman itself. If nescience is dismissed, then the *Advaita* position that the appearance of the world is removed by knowledge becomes irrelevant. For it is held by *Advaita* that the world-appearance is removed by knowledge on the ground that nescience, its supposed cause, is removed by knowledge. Thus the conception that nescience is positive, on the one hand, does not fully explain the world appearance and, on the other, is inconsistent with the conception that the world-appearance is removed by knowledge.

In meeting these considerations, we have to note the following points. Nescience is positive not in the strict sense of the term positive, but because it is not negative. We have to note that in *Advaita* no product is strictly positive or negative. Every product is neither positive nor negative (अवयववैकल्या). We may describe such products as positive just in the sense that they are not negative.

It may be the consideration with nescience also.

Further the supposed criticism against *Advaita* that the real ought to be the cause of the unreal originates from the assumption that cause and effect must be of the same nature. This assumption is wrong. Experience shows that the things of an identical nature or the things of

different nature cannot be causally related. A jar cannot be the cause of itself and water cannot be the cause of fire.¹

Further the real cannot be the cause of the appearance which is not real. Otherwise, like the former the latter ought not to be destroyed. But, in fact, an appearance is destroyed; from this it follows that the real cannot be its cause, and that the appearance is destroyed because its material cause is destroyed.

It is supposed by the critics that the appearance is destroyed not because its material cause is destroyed, but the external conditions that help its production are destroyed.²

This is wrong. It is a matter of common experience that all that appears (रस) is destroyed by the knowledge of reality. For instance, we may take the appearance of shell-silver. This points to the fact that the appearance is destroyed, because its cause, nescience is destroyed by knowledge. Further the real is changeless. Otherwise it ceases to be real. So the supposition that it causes something involves self-contradiction.³

Nescience is removed by Knowledge.

This conception is criticised as follows. *Bhramas* are of two classes—unconditioned (अज्ञानादिभ्रमः) and conditioned (संज्ञादिभ्रमः). The *bhrama* of shell-silver is an instance of the former; and the sick man's *bhrama* that sugar is bitter is an instance of the latter. Of these, in the case of the former, the knowledge of reality may destroy the nescience that is supposed to be the cause of *bhrama*. But in the case of the latter, the knowledge of reality does not destroy the nescience. In

¹ Here by "cause" is meant the material cause.

² See तदपि.

³ But from this it does not follow that the real is not the substratum of super-imposition (विस्तारिणः).

spite of his *bhrama* the sick knows that sugar is sweet. Further, Advaita holds that a *Jivanmukta* even after realising Brahman has nescience in some form. This means that knowledge does not destroy the nescience of a *Jivanmukta*. From these considerations it follows that there are certain forms of nescience that are not destroyed by knowledge. Then how can it be held that nescience is removed by knowledge?

In reply to this question, we have to note that these cases of nescience are only exceptional. They are not destroyed owing to certain conditions. Owing to the conditioning agent like fever, etc., during the *bhrama* of the conditioned nature, the nescience is not destroyed and owing to the presence of the inevitable *Karma* (अविवर्तन) the nescience during *Jivanmukti* is not destroyed. So these cases do not help the supposed conclusion that nescience is not destroyed by knowledge. A cause under normal circumstances gives rise to the product without any difficulty. But under abnormal circumstances, i.e., when it is obstructed by something, it may be slow in producing the product, but this does not deny the fact that it is the cause.

Merely because that the nescience of a *Jivanmukta* is not destroyed, we should not suppose that he ought to think that the reality is not apprehended by him. For nescience has two powers *avarana* and *viksepa*. Of these the former obscures reality, and the latter projects what is not real. Of these two aspects of nescience, the *avarana* aspect of it has completely disappeared in the case of a *Jivanmukta* and therefore it is not a fact that he does not know the reality.

Critics think that the conception that nescience is destroyed by knowledge does not give the exclusive nature of it. They think that the relation between nescience and *caitanya* is different from nescience and it is at the same time removed by knowledge. This difficulty is met by holding that

nescience is immediately destroyed by knowledge. The relation between nescience and *caitanya* is not immediately destroyed by knowledge. Its destruction follows that of nescience. Or we may consider that the relation is no other than nescience;¹ and this position gives no room for any difficulty.

Nescience must be defined as Beginningless, Positive and Destroyed by Knowledge.

To say merely that nescience is that which is destroyed by knowledge does not explain the conception fully. For, like nescience, a piece of knowledge² that precedes another piece of it also is destroyed by knowledge. So we have the necessity to characterise nescience as beginningless. The knowledge that precedes another knowledge is not beginningless. So the beginningless entity that is destroyed by knowledge can only be nescience. Even now the conception is not full. The negation of knowledge that precedes the appearance of knowledge (ज्ञानप्रगमनम्) is also beginningless and it is destroyed by knowledge. So the conception that nescience is that which is beginningless and is destroyed by knowledge does not present the exclusive nature of nescience. It is in order to remove this difficulty nescience is characterised as positive. The negation of knowledge may be any thing but positive. Nescience is positive and therefore it must not be compared with the negation of knowledge. So we get the full conception of nescience when we put all these three characterisations together as "nescience is that which is beginningless, positive and destroyed by knowledge."³

¹ "तस्याविविधान्कलादा" — लक्ष्मणेन संबन्ध इति भावः अ. च. 544.

² In all these pages the word 'Knowledge' stands for *Vrittijñana*.

³ "ज्ञानत्वेन साक्षात्चित्तस्यैव तु भवति लक्षणात्" अ. रि. 544. i.e., we may define the conception of nescience as that which is immediately destroyed by knowledge as knowledge, i.e., in the capacity of knowledge.

Though Nescience is super-imposed, it is Beginningless.

It might be said against this conclusion as follows. Nescience may be something other than the negative and something that is destroyed by knowledge. But just as shell-silver, it is also super-imposed (कल्पित) and therefore like shell-silver it is constituted of only the apprehension that is caused by defect (दोषजन्यपरिमाणवत्तरम्)¹. From this it follows that it also like silver must have a beginning. So to hold that it is beginningless is wrong.

In reply to this, we have to note these points. Because something is super-imposed it does not follow that it is constituted of only the apprehension caused by defect or that it has a beginning. These conclusions follow only under the following conditions:—

(i) When the super-imposed has an agent that has a beginning. The agent of the super-imposition of nescience is the *caitanya* that reflects in it; and since *caitanya* is beginningless, nescience also is beginningless. But the agent of the super-imposition of shell-silver is the person that has the knowledge of the shell as the substratum (अधिष्ठान) and therefore the shell-silver has a beginning.

(ii) When the super-imposition has a beginning—² The super-imposition of shell-silver has a beginning but that of nescience has not³.

The idea is this—The previous knowledge is not destroyed by knowledge as knowledge. In the knowledge series when the fresh knowledge appears, the previous one disappears automatically.

¹ The silver that is superposed in a shell is *Prātibhāsika*, i.e., its being is due to that of its apprehension (अपेक्षा). This apprehension is again due to the defect in the sense organ, i.e., the perceiving eye.

² In the case of the super-imposition of shell-silver the super-imposition is the same as the *Vritti* knowledge of the silver. But in the case of the super-imposition of nescience, the super-imposition is not the same as the *Vritti* knowledge but it is the *cit* that reflects in nescience. *Vritti* has a beginning, whereas *cit* has not; and so the super-imposition of silver has a beginning, but that of nescience has not.

To say that Nescience is destroyed by Knowledge and is not Negative does not mean that it has a Beginning.

Thinkers like Niyayikas hold that a positive thing must have a beginning if it has an end. For instance, we may take a jar. Similarly, though in the converse order, one may argue that nescience has a beginning, because it is not negative and is destroyed. In meeting this difficulty we have to note that this argument is based on a wrong conception of the situation.

Since none of these Conditions is present in the case of Nescience, we cannot hold that it has a Beginning.

Nescience is also not positive as it is not negative. If it is easy to prove that it has a beginning because it is not negative, it is equally easy to prove that it has no beginning because it is not positive. (It is already made clear that nescience is neither positive nor negative in the strict sense of the terms.) It would be sound to argue that something has a beginning only if it is positive and is destroyed. Nescience is of course destroyed, but it is not positive; and therefore it cannot be characterised as having a beginning merely on the ground that it is not negative.

The Positive and the Negative are not Contradictory.

With the non-Advaita thinkers the positive and the negative are contradictory things, and the absence of the one implies the presence of the other. On the same ground it might be argued that nescience cannot be other than both the positive and the negative. For the thing that cannot be both positive and negative, cannot also be other than both the positive and negative, since to be other than the positive is the same as being negative and to be other than the negative is the same as being positive. This supposition also is incorrect. According to Advaita, the

positive and the negative are not contradictory. For, to assert that the world is either exclusively positive or negative involves contradiction. The positive is the real and the negative unreal. The fact that something has a beginning and is destroyed proves that it is not real, *i.e.*, that it is not positive; and the fact that something has a material cause proves that it is not negative. The real has neither a beginning nor an end, for instance, we may take *caitanya*; and the unreal has no material cause, as, for instance, the horns of a hare. Likewise the real cannot be contradicted and the unreal cannot be the cause of anything. We know that nescience is contradicted and therefore we may conclude that it is not real, *i.e.*, that it is not positive. We also know that it is the cause of super-imposition and therefore we may conclude that it is not negative. So nescience is neither positive nor negative. It must be an entity of a third order.

This conclusion is inevitable. It is forced by logic. Though it is not a familiar order of existence we have to accept it as the irrefutable logic gives it to be the true nature of existence.¹

Nescience is other than Atman and therefore it is destroyed and it is the cause of all.

We may hold that Nescience and Atman are similar to each other in so far as they are not-negative and beginningless. But from this we must not conclude that like *atman*, nescience is not destroyed. *Atman* by its own nature cannot be destroyed. But nescience is not so. It is destroyed because it is other than *atman*.

Other thinkers hold that there are some eternal things

¹ Similar is the ground on which the Nyāya proves the existence of *Karma* which is other than *Dravya* and *Guna*.

which do not come under the products of experience, and these are the negations called *Alyantābhāva* and *Anyonyābhāva*. The negation of a cloth in a jar is an instance of the former, and the negation that jar is not a cloth is that of the latter. These negations are eternal because at no time there will be a cloth in a jar and the jar can be a cloth. If everything that is other than *ātman* is destroyed, as *Advaita* says, then one might feel a difficulty in understanding how these negations are destroyed or what the result would be if these are destroyed. In meeting this difficulty we have to note that such a difficulty has no basis in the system of *Advaita*. In *Advaita* these negations are not considered to be different from the things of which they are predicated. The negation of a cloth in a jar is no other than the jar, and the negation of a jar in "a cloth is not a jar" is the cloth itself. As these things—jar and cloth—are destroyed, there is no difficulty in conceiving that all that is other than *ātman* is destroyed.

This is not an assumption. It is already shown that the real is not destroyed. *Ātman* is real and therefore it is not destroyed. But the case of nescience is different. It is not real. As it is already explained it is something other than the real and the unreal, and therefore we can determine that it is destroyed.

Destruction is due to circumstances.

All along we have maintained that nescience is destroyed though it has no beginning. Much of consideration was directed against a criticism advanced from the *Nyāya* point of view that a beginningless positive entity cannot be destroyed. Granting that *Nyāya* point of view is correct, we have shown how nescience is destroyed though it is beginningless and positive. Now we may note that to advance any criticism against *Advaita* from the *Nyāya* point

of view is inconsistent.¹ The view that a positive thing that has a beginning has an end has no force in *Advaita*. *Advaita* accepts no positive or negative entity. Everything is regarded as other than the positive and negative. Consistently with this view, the destruction of an entity must be explained in a different way. The only such way is that an entity is destroyed when it is under the circumstances that lead to its destruction and that an entity is not destroyed when it is not in the circumstances that do not lead to its destruction. The nature of the circumstances must be understood by the results.

Nescience with reference to its Apprehension.

According to *Advaita* nescience is apprehended by *sākṣi*. But it does not follow from this that it continues to exist as long as *sākṣi* continues.² Unlike the *Pratibhasika* objects the objects of *sākṣi* do not exist as long as there is their knowledge, i.e., *sākṣi*. Pain, shell-silver and the like objects appear only for a short time. These are the objects of *sākṣi*. Likewise nescience also may discontinue at a time.

We may even regard nescience as continuing so long as its knowledge, i.e., *Sākṣi* continues. In this case *sākṣi* also is regarded as temporary. It is not pure *cit*, but it is the *cit* that reflects in the *vr̥tti* of nescience (अविद्यावृत्ति).³ Since this *vr̥tti* is temporary, the *sākṣi* that reflects in it

¹ Against this criticism it may be argued that nescience may be destroyed as it is beginningless and is other than the positive like *Pragadhava*, i.e., the negation that precedes the production of a product.

² *Advaita* holds that *Pratibhasika* objects exist only so long as their knowledge continues.

³ According to this view also pleasure, etc., are apprehended by *sākṣi*. But it does not follow that they continue till the *sākṣi* continues. They are regarded as being destroyed, consequently upon the destruction of their other causes.

also may be viewed as temporary. Before *mukti* at no instance of an individual life this *avidyavritti* ceases. The cessation of this *vritti* means that of nescience itself. So, so long as there is nescience there will continue the *avidyavritti* in a subtle form.¹

Nescience is the Material Cause of the world-Bhrama.

Advaita holds another view of nescience. According to this, nescience is that which is the material cause of world-Bhrama, i.e., wrong knowledge. This view is held consistently with the theory that *Brahman* is the ground (अधिष्ठान) of *Māyā* (nescience) which is the material cause of the world-Bhrama.²

The Material Cause is that which endures in the Product.

Other thinkers generally hold that a product, if it is positive, requires a material cause that is also positive. The implication here is that it is the positive nature of the two things of which one is the material cause and the other the product, that is responsible for their being causally

¹ *Avidyavritti* is not single throughout. It is many. It forms a continuous series.

² There are other theories also, (i) *Brahman* alone is the material cause of the world-Bhrama, (ii) *Brahman* and nescience together form the material cause of the world-Bhrama. The present conception of nescience is not entertained when these theories are in view. Or, even with reference to this view, we may retain the present definition with some modification. Accordingly the conception is that nescience is that which admits of change (परिवर्तन) and at the same time which forms the material cause of the world-Bhrama. There is a class of thinkers which predicates change of *Brahman*. According to this view our present conception of nescience does not involve any distinction from *Bhraman*. So in retaining the same conception of nescience it is necessary to modify it as nescience is that which is not *eterna* and at the same time which is the material cause of the world-Bhrama.

related. From this point of view, the Advaita conception of nescience might be criticised as follows—In *Advaita* neither the *Bhrama* nor its material cause is positive. Both are other than positive (अनतिथम्). So it is wrong to hold that the non-positive *Bhrama* has the non-positive nescience as its cause.

In meeting this difficulty, we have to note that it is not the positive nature of things that is responsible for their causal relation; for *ātman* is positive, yet it is neither a product nor a material cause. So an entity must be regarded as material cause, if it endures in the product; and an entity must be regarded as being caused by a material cause if it is a product. The material cause and the product need not be positive. So the causal relation does not presuppose that the things in question must be positive.

One might say that according to these considerations, the *Dhvamsābhāva* (the negation that follows the destruction of a product) also ought to be caused by a material cause. This is in no way undesirable.

Prāgabha is not the Cause of Product.

One may suppose that the material cause of *bhrama* might be the *prāgabha* of knowledge and so it is needless to assume that nescience is the material cause of it. This is wrong. *Prāgabha* causes only the knowledge of which it is the *abhāva*, but it is wrong to assume that it is the cause of *bhrama*. Nor can it be assumed that in some cases *prāgabha* happens to be the cause of *bhrama*. In explaining that *prāgabha* has nothing to do with *bhrama*, we have to note these points.—Here the *prāgabha* in question is that of the knowledge that destroys *bhrama*. In the first place, there is no reason why we should believe in *prāgabha*. Granting that there is such an *abhāva*, we shall see how it cannot be the material cause of *bhrama*.

Taking the *bhrama* of shell-silver for instance, the knowledge that destroys this *bhrama* is that of the shell. So the *prāgabdhāva* of it must be the material cause of the *bhrama*. But this cannot be. Since the knowledge must arise in *manas*, the corresponding *prāgabdhāva* also must be in *manas*. But in the *bhrama*, the silver that is the object appears in the shell. So how can we hold that the *prāgabdhāva* that is in *manas* is the material cause of the silver that is in the shell? Further when we have not at all the perceptual knowledge of a thing, the *prāgabdhāva* of such a thing is as good as being unreal (अव्यक्ता). Then how can the unreal cause anything? If we have the perceptual knowledge of the thing, how can there be the *prāgabdhāva* of it? In either way it is impossible to hold that the *prāgabdhāva* causes the *bhrama*. So we may conclude that nescience and the products of experience are causally related, though they are not positive. It has been already shown in what sense they are not positive.

The Material Cause need not be known along with the Product.

Some thinkers, Naiyayikas, etc., hold that a product having a material cause, is known along with that cause. For instance, a jar may be taken. It is caused by clay. So it is known as 'the jar is clay,' i.e., jar is made of clay. Having this in mind, they may think that if all the products were caused by nescience, then like jar, they ought to have been known as made of nescience and conclude that since they are not known so, they are not made of nescience.

This is not a correct thinking. By those thinkers it is accepted that the material cause of the colour of a jar is the jar itself. If it is a rule that a product is always known along with its material cause, then the colour of the jar also ought to have been known along with the jar, i.e., just as the jar is known as "jar is clay" it ought to have been

known as colour is the jar. This is not the case at all. Further those thinkers accept that the material cause of a jar is *paramanus* or *prakṛti*. But the jar is never known as *paramanus* or as *prakṛti*. From these considerations it follows that a product need not be known along with its material cause, i.e., as being imbibed by it. So there is no difficulty in holding that nescience is the material cause of the world-*bhrama*.

Nescience need not always cause *Bhrama*.

There is a theory in *Advaita* that nescience is not one but it is as many as there are pieces of right knowledge. Having this in mind, one may feel the difficulty as follows—In certain cases we get, first, *bhrama* and then the right knowledge of the objects. Since these pieces of right knowledge destroy the *bhrama*, it follows that the nescience also that is the cause of *bhrama* is destroyed. But in certain other cases we get the right knowledge of objects even though we have not any *bhrama* regarding them. Of course this right knowledge also destroys the nescience of the objects that precedes it. But this nescience is not the cause of *bhrama*, since there is no *bhrama* at all. This creates a difficulty in conceiving that nescience is the material cause of *bhrama*.

In order to remove this difficulty the conception that nescience is the material cause of *bhrama* is understood in the sense that it is capable of being the material cause of *bhrama*. This shows that that nescience which is not seen as causing *bhrama* also is capable of being the cause of it. Though it is capable, it does not cause *bhrama* since the circumstance is not favourable.

In the case that nescience is one, we do not have this difficulty at all. The fact that it is the material cause of *bhrama* is proved by any *bhrama*. But in this case, one

may feel another type of difficulty. This is as follows—Nescience, according to this theory, is given as one. The same is the cause for the shell-silver *bhrama*. When there is the knowledge of the shell, then both the *bhrama* and nescience that is the cause of it are destroyed. This means that the single nescience is destroyed. From this it follows that the individual that has the right knowledge of the shell is free from nescience and therefore he must get emancipation.

In meeting this difficulty we have to note that nescience has various aspects (अवस्थाः). By the knowledge of the shell only a particular aspect is destroyed, but not the nescience as a whole. So the nescience even after the right knowledge of the shell, continues to exist and consequently the individual also continues to be in bondage.¹ Nescience is established by *pratyakṣa*.

The *pratyakṣa* "I am ignorant and I do not know any other thing" is common to all. This presupposes nescience which resides in *ātman*. It does not presuppose absence of knowledge. For there is no *pratyakṣa* which gives absence of anything. Every *pratyakṣa* gives something positive. For example the *pratyakṣa* of happiness, etc., may be taken.

It is true that there is the apprehension of the absence of something. For example, the apprehension of the absence of a jar. But this apprehension is not of *pratyakṣa* character²; for it is not due to the activity of sense organ.

The ignorance that is given by *pratyakṣa* cannot be the absence of knowledge. To apprehend the absence of knowledge is not possible, without apprehending the knowledge

¹ This aspect of the teaching is clearly explained in सिद्धान्तचिन्ता by Madhusūdana Sarasvati.

² The apprehension of an absence is due to the *pramāṇa* called *anupalabdhi*.

itself whose absence is in question. To think of the absence of the knowledge of a jar presupposes the consciousness of the knowledge itself. In the same way the apprehension of the absence of knowledge also presupposes the consciousness of the substratum of the absence, i.e., the place of which the absence is predicated. Since the knowledge is apprehended as residing in *ātman*, its absence also must be apprehended as residing in it. Thus, so far, it is clear that the apprehension of the absence of knowledge presupposes the apprehension of the knowledge which is apprehended as absent and *ātman* which is the substratum of the absence. If the *pratyakṣa* "I am ignorant" which means "I have no knowledge" stands for the absence of knowledge, then it means that at the same time when I have the *pratyakṣa* that I have no knowledge, I have also the knowledge of the knowledge which I apprehend as being absent in me and the knowledge of myself as being the substratum of the absence of knowledge. Further, to be conscious of the knowledge whose absence is in question is to be conscious of the object of knowledge. From this it follows that at the time when the *pratyakṣa* "I have no knowledge" takes place, the individual has also the knowledge in question. This is self-contradiction in terms. The contradiction might be removed by holding that at the time of this *pratyakṣa* there is no knowledge of the knowledge in question; but this is to deny the *pratyakṣa* itself. These considerations show that the *pratyakṣa* "I have no knowledge" is not of the absence of knowledge.

It might be stated against this conclusion as follows:—The fact of knowledge is inferred by the corresponding *vyavahāra* (usage). For *vyavahāra* is the result of knowledge. For instance, the knowledge of a jar causes the corresponding *vyavahāra*. So the consciousness of *vyavahāra* leads to that of knowledge. Consequently when there is no conscious-

ness of *vyavahāra*, i.e., when the *vyavahāra* is absent, one can infer that there is no corresponding knowledge. Similarly in the present case, i.e., regarding the knowledge whose absence is supposed to be given by the *pratyakṣa* "I have no knowledge," we do not find the corresponding *vyavahāra*. From this it might be inferred that the corresponding knowledge is absent. This helps the conclusion that the *pratyakṣa* "I have no knowledge" gives the absence of knowledge.¹

In meeting this argument one may note that it is irrelevant. The fact is that there can be no knowledge of the absence of something when that something and where that absence is *assisted* are unknown. The consciousness of the absence of knowledge may sometimes be inferred or it may be *pratyakṣa*. In either case it presupposes the knowledge of the knowledge in question and that of *ātman* which is the substratum of knowledge. *Kumārila* holds that "no knowledge" in "I have no knowledge" stands for the absence of knowledge and that this consciousness is due not to *pratyakṣa* but to a separate *pramāṇa* called *anupalabdhi*. It is not a sound conception. The *pramāṇa* that leads to the apprehension "I have no knowledge" may be of any character but the apprehension always presupposes the knowledge of the knowledge in question, etc. So to say in any form that "no knowledge" in "I have no knowledge" stands for the absence of knowledge involves self-contradiction.²

¹ This argument is formed after the system of *Kumārila* who holds that knowledge is inferred by the corresponding *vyavahāra* (व्यावहारिक).

² *Advaita* holds two theories regarding the problem of the absence of knowledge. According to one, it holds two types of the absence of knowledge; (i) the absence of all knowledge, and (ii) the absence of a particular piece of knowledge. Of these the former is grasped by *sākṣī* and the latter by *anupalabdhi*. The position that *anupalabdhi* gives the absence of a particular piece of knowledge is held

So far the position of *Advaita* is that the non-knowledge as understood by "no knowledge" in the *pratyakṣa* "I have no knowledge" is not negative; and therefore we may conclude that it is positive. This is the same as nescience which is positive in character (सर्वज्ञान). One might try to show similar contradiction in this position also. This is as follows—Like the absence of knowledge, nescience also is removed by knowledge. So the *pratyakṣa* "I do not know" involves the apprehension of both the knowledge of the object in view and the substratum of the knowledge. This consideration shows how the *pratyakṣa* of nescience involves self-contradiction.

In meeting this opposition the following points are to be noted—The same *sākṣī* that apprehends nescience, also apprehends both the object and the substratum. Though *sākṣī* apprehends the latter two it is not opposed to nescience. It is only the knowledge that is generated by *antahkarana* that is opposed to nescience. So the latter type of knowledge removes nescience, while the former gives it. The *pratyakṣa* "I do not know" is not of the latter type and therefore nescience can be established by it.¹

It might be said against this consideration as follows:—Taking for instance the *pratyakṣa* "I do not know the jar," according to the consideration that *sākṣī* apprehends nescience, the object in view and the substratum of know-

following the position of *Kumārila* since traditionally *Advaita* follows *kumārila* for conducting philosophical discussion. According to the other, *Advaita* holds that there is no absence of anything at all. This is in accordance with the theory that nothing is lost. This theory may be illustrated by taking a jar for instance. When the jar is broken it lasts as broken pieces and when these pieces are destroyed, they last as small particles of clay and through these particles we may get still finer particles. However the thing is not entirely lost.

¹ *Advaita* holds two types of knowledge—*sākṣī* and *vritti*. Of these the latter alone is opposed to nescience.

ledge, we have to hold that *sākṣī* apprehends the jar also. But this is impossible. The jar is an outside object (बाह्यविषय) and therefore *sākṣī* cannot apprehend it independently, nor can we hold that *sākṣī* apprehends it through a *pramāṇa* since *pramāṇa*, as it is due to *antahkaraṇa*, is opposed to nescience, makes the apprehension of nescience impossible. So to hold that *sākṣī* apprehends both the object and the corresponding nescience is not sound.

In meeting this opposition we have to note the following points—A jar as such cannot be apprehended by *sākṣī*; but it can be grasped as the object of nescience. This is because *sākṣī* grasps nescience and the jar is the object of nescience. It might be stated that the jar cannot be apprehended by *sākṣī* even as the object of nescience, as it is an outside object, and to illustrate this the analogy of taste which cannot be grasped by sight even though it is along with colour which is the object of sight, might be taken. But mere analogy does not prove the point. Even granting that a thing can be proved on the strength of analogy, it is not difficult to have a suitable analogy. Naiyāyikas hold that *paramanus* (atoms) as such are not *pratyakṣa* to *manas* but they are *pratyakṣa* to *manas* as being the object of the apprehension "I know *paramanus*." Even from the point of the world of *vyavahāra*, Rāhu (one of the 9 planets) is regarded as *pratyakṣa* as eclipsing the Moon or the Sun, though he is not by himself *pratyakṣa*. Likewise though a jar by itself is not apprehended by *sākṣī*, it may be apprehended by *sākṣī* as the object of nescience which is apprehended by *sākṣī*.

The position that "no knowledge" in the *pratyakṣa* "I have no knowledge" does not indicate the absence of knowledge but the non-knowledge which is positive in character, is not peculiar to *Advaita*. We find similar criticisms even in the other systems—as "Is the object of

knowledge whose absence is supposed to be *pratyakṣa* known or not? etc. These criticisms can be met only by holding that the object and the non-knowledge (nescience) of it are apprehended by *sākṣī*. From this it follows that all things are known to *sākṣī* either as known or unknown.

It might be said against this conclusion as follows—If all things are somehow known, then there ought to be no difference between the things that are known and those that are unknown and when the difference between the things that are known and that are unknown is meaningless, the activities of *antahkaraṇa* or the process of *pramāṇas* ought to be useless, and the fact that *pramāṇas* are the proximate cause of right knowledge ought to be irrelevant.

In meeting these difficulties the following points must be noted:—Both nescience and *pramāṇas* offer their objects in different capacities to *sākṣī*. Nescience makes the object unknown and offers it to *sākṣī* as unknown. On the other hand, *pramāṇas* make the objects known and offer them to *sākṣī* as known. However, either as known or unknown all objects are offered to *sākṣī* and therefore all objects are apprehended by *sākṣī*.

Thus the *pratyakṣa* "I have no knowledge," etc., establishes nescience as positive in character. The world of experience is the result of super-imposition of *ātman* and *anātman* each on the other. The cause of super-imposition is nescience. There are two types of super-imposition—super-imposition of knowledge and that of object. The thing that is super-imposed is *anirvācya* in the sense that it is other than *sat*, *asat* and *sadasat* (*Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*). Therefore nescience, the cause of super-imposition, is also *anirvācya*. If nescience were real (*sat*), then its produc-

¹ *Pramāṇas* are the proximate causes of right knowledge (प्रमाण).

tion also ought to be real.¹ The world-process is beginningless and therefore the nescience that is the original cause of all is beginningless.

So nescience is the cause of all, it is beginningless, positive and of the character of *anirvācya*, and it is removed by knowledge.

¹ *Sat* is that which is uncontradicted (अवच्छेद).

Origin of state according to
Rishina.

Rahuna and palana characterize
lays (i.e. state) (raja). Rahuna is
Vedic discipline. It is in the correct
sense Rahuna - ni ma ist ra palana
is protection. The former seeks the
latter possible.

2 The social order required for the
maintenance of the former is the
life conducive to this order. This life
is defined as varna dharma - Rahuna.
The discipline that defines the society
in terms of the philosophy Rahuna
(ra ma ist ra palana - ni ma ist ra palana).

3 The conception of the ideal state is
the distinguishing feature of Indian
civilization as expounded by Rishina
in the Mahā - Bhārata.

XX

THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE ACCORDING TO BHIŠMA (Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvaṃ)*

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Introduction.

In the opening passages of the 58th chapter Yudhiṣṭhira puts a question to Bhīṣma—What is the origin of the word, *rājā*? Yudhiṣṭhira feels that the origin of this word must be very profound, because the happiness of all men depends on the happiness of the person to whom this word is applied. In answer to this question Bhīṣma explains the origin of *rājya*.

In this connection a few words on the circumstance of this discourse may not be out of place. The fighting between the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas is over. The Pāṇḍavas have a definite success. Yudhiṣṭhira has become the king. He wants to know his real duties as a king. According to the direction of Śrīkṛṣṇa, Yudhiṣṭhira goes with him to Bhīṣma. Bhīṣma, lying on the bed of arrows, is in the last state of his life. Śrīkṛṣṇa with his divine power makes Bhīṣma quite healthy both in mind and in body. Bhīṣma fully regains the strength of his mind and of his learning. In addition to this, with the grace of Śrīkṛṣṇa, the *satva* aspect is fully manifested in the mind of Bhīṣma and *rajas* and *tamas* have disappeared from it. He is fully prepared to teach *dharma*. He has a divine eye and with this he can clearly see the truth as it is. (51. 14-21.) Śrīkṛṣṇa recognises the abilities of Bhīṣma: "From the beginning to the end your life is absolutely free from sin. By all the kings you are recognised as the knower of all *dharma*s. You are old in age. You have learning and the practice consistent with learning. You are an expert in politics and in various other sciences. You have served the Rsis and the Devas. Therefore the whole science of politics must be taught by you. (53. 35-37.)" These facts give us an idea of the full qualifications of the teacher of politics.

Bhīṣma, the teacher, recognises the greatness of Yudhiṣṭhira. The pupil: "Yudhiṣṭhira is an embodiment of *dharma*. His

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reputation is pure. He has courage, self-control, forgiveness, vigour, personality, honesty, charitable disposition, meditation, application, power, sacrifice, study and learning. He never does *adharma*. He is kind to all. (54. 2-10.)" These ideas indicate the full qualifications of the student of politics.

What is on the whole indicated in these passages is that the following teaching is really profound. The teacher, the taught, the director and the circumstance of the teaching are, indeed, very great. Therefore, great care and insight are required to interpret the teaching.

The State is characterised by Dharma and Palana.

To begin with, Bhīṣma characterises the State in the *Kṛtavya* as follows:—"There was neither *rājya* nor *rājā* nor *daṇḍa* nor *dāṇḍika*. The people were protecting themselves by means of *dharma*. (58. 14.)" This means that *pālana* by means of *dharma*, without the influence of any external force such as *rājya*, is the differentia of the State in the *Kṛtavya*. But under different circumstances this state may not be possible and *rājya* and so on may be necessary to establish and maintain *dharma* and *pālana*. Even then it is easy to see that after all it is *dharma* and *pālana* that characterise the State.

There are two types of the State—Kartavya and Raja.

Bhīṣma distinguishes two types of the State and characterises each in the following manner:—

Kartavya.

In the *Kartavya* State there is only *dharma* but no *adharmā*. No *varṇa* likes *adharmā*. Without any doubt the *yoga* and *kṣema* of the people are safeguarded. The *vaidsika karmas* are safely conducted and they are fruitful. The seasons function well. The people are free from illness. The voice, colour and *manas* of the people are pleasing. No man suffers from any disease and no man is shortlived. No woman becomes a widow. And no man is sinful. Without cultivation the earth yields food-stuff. The useful plants grow of their own accord. The skin, leaf, fruit and root of a plant have full vigour. There is no *adharmā* and there is only *dharma*.

It may be noted that these ideas are based on the general Indian conception that the whole world with all its aspects including even the so-called natural aspects is the result of human

the *vaidsika karmas* are safely conducted and they are fruitful. The seasons function well. The people are free from illness. The voice, colour and *manas* of the people are pleasing. No man suffers from any disease and no man is shortlived. No woman becomes a widow. And no man is sinful. Without cultivation the earth yields food-stuff. The useful plants grow of their own accord. The skin, leaf, fruit and root of a plant have full vigour. There is no *adharmā* and there is only *dharma*.

karma. The *Kārtavya* State is the result of *dharma*. By *dharma*, in this connection, is meant the *Varāṣṭranadharmā*. *Pālana* is implied in *dharma*. So in the *Kārtavya*, *dharma* and *pālana* are spontaneous and they are not forced by any external agency.

Rāja.

The things that characterise the *Kārtavya* are absolutely necessary for the welfare of the people. The absence of any of these things makes life inconvenient. To avoid this trouble, law and order must be established and maintained. This is possible only in a *rāja*. *Rāja* implies *rājā*, and *rājā* can function only with the help of *dāṇḍa* and *dāṇḍika*. With these elements there appears what is called government. Government is impossible without the laws that determine the relations of the government to the people of *rāja*, on the one hand, and to the other *rājas*, on the other. These are the laws of politics and the science of politics is given the name *Dandanīti*. It is a *rājā* that must exercise *Dandanīti*. A successful application of *Dandanīti* to the activities connected with government needs a careful observation of time and circumstance. What is good in one period may not be good in other periods, and what is effective under one circumstance may not be effective under other circumstances. So a successful application of *Dandanīti* presupposes great wisdom on the part of the *rājā*. The immediate result of this application is the betterment of time and circumstance, and this means the betterment of the conditions of the people. For this reason a *rājā* is described as the director of time.

The cause for the disappearance of the *Kartavya* (58. 15-21).

"As the people were protecting one another according to *dharma*, they had *dainya* (inferiority complex). Next *moha* (delusion) entered into them, and destroyed their knowledge. The destruction of knowledge was followed by the destruction of *dharma* and in the place of *dharma* there appeared *lobha* (misirliness). The people thought of the things they did not have. There appeared *kāma* (the desire opposed to *dharma*) in them. With *kāma* they had *rāga* (attachment). *Rāga* made them blind to *kārya* and *akārya* (right and wrong). As a result they did not abandon *agamyāgamana* (the acceptance of the non-acceptable), *vācyāvācya* (the speech of the non-speakable) and *bhaksyābhaksya* (the eating of the uneatable). They did both

good and bad things. Under this circumstance the *Veda* was not respected and sacrifice was not conducted. This is how *Kārtavya* disappeared. (The disappearance of the *Veda* and sacrifice stands for the idea of the disappearance of spiritual outlook on life.)

How in the ideal state of things people could have *dainya* needs an explanation. The explanation seems to be this—Under a particular circumstance if men enjoy continued *pālana* without much effort on their part naturally they come to have the feeling of gratitude towards those that protect them. As a consequence of this feeling they may feel themselves to be inferior to the latter. This is *dainya*. Further, the nature of time also may help this degeneration. (In the *Aranyaparva* we are told that time is one of the creative principles. Even God is taken to create the world of each period according to the nature of time.)

The appearance of *Rāja*.

By the destruction of *dharma* the position of the *Devas* is affected. (The human *dharma* is the principle of the existence of the *Devas*. *Gitā* v.) They consult *Brahmā*. To set things right, *Brahmā* composes *Dandanīti* consisting of a thousand chapters the subject-matter of which being *Trivarga*—*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*—the three goods of men. *Dharma* is the origin of *artha* and *kāma*. *Dandanīti* is so called, because it makes *trivarga* possible and it maintains *trivarga*. Next, this science undergoes a gradual abridgement in the hands of *Śiva*, *Indra*, *Bṛhaspati* and *Sukra* in order, and thus it becomes more easily understood even by the ordinary mortals.

Next the question of making use of *Dandanīti* arises. The *Devas* approach *Viṣṇu*. *Viṣṇu* becomes the first to make use of *Dandanīti*. He creates *Virajā*. From *Virajā*, *Kirtimān* appears. *Kirtimān* is followed by *Kardama*, *Ananga*, *Atibala* and *Vena* in order. *Vena* is devoid of *dharma* and he is led by *rāga* and *dveṣa*. The *Rṣis* kill him with the grass consecrated by *mantra*, and they churn his right hand and *Prthu* appears. *Prthu* has a sharp intellect that can apprehend *dharma* and *artha*. The *Rṣis* teach him wisdom and *dharma*, which form the essence of *Dandanīti*. He pleases the people and for this reason he is called *rāja*. *Viṣṇu* himself is present in *Prthu* and establishes *dharma* and order and protects people according to *Dandanīti*. This is how *Rāja* appears. And in *Rāja*, *dharma* and *pālana* are effected by an external force, i.e., *Dandanīti*.

The origin of the Kārtavya State.

In determining the origin of the *Kārtavya* State certain observations seem to be necessary. According to the Indian conception of the world, there can be no first beginning and the last end of the world. From the beginningless time the world comes into being and goes out of it and appears again and disappears in due course of time. The process of the world is thus beginningless and endless. We can only speak of the *kalpas* (cycles) of the existence of the world. The conception of the *kalpas* is based on the truth that nothing material or spiritual can have, in substance, the first beginning and the last end. The cause of the appearance of each *kalpa* is the beginningless *karma* of the individual souls that are benefited by the creation of the world of that *kalpa*. God creates the world according to the *karma* of the souls that live in the world. Further, time is divided into four *yugas*—*kṛta*, *tretā*, *dvāpara* and *kali*. These *yugas* follow one another and thus after *kali kṛta* appears. These *yugas* evolve several times in one and the same *kalpa*. It may, however, be noted that a *kalpa* begins with *kṛta* and ends with *kali*.

Consistently with these ideas we may, no doubt, hold that the cause of *kṛta* is the *karma* of the souls that live in it. But why in every *kalpa* the *karma* that makes *kṛta* possible operates first needs a consideration. Having in mind the teaching of the *Mahābhārata* in general and the teaching of Bhīṣma in particular, one may take the following to be the relevant answer. Man is by nature good. He is by nature a social creature and he desires to be in a company and wants that others should partake of his joy. By nature he does not want to see others in trouble. These native virtues are ever present in man. Irrespective of the external conditions, he enjoys his natural virtues. How many men are not good without any idea of the government under which they are supposed to live? Even the evil conduct of a man presupposes his natural goodness. Even the most wretched man has his own company and to please that company he commits sins. A man may be said to be the worst possible thief, but he never steals the things of those with whom he identifies himself. Even the man that commits suicide, does so for the love of himself. He hates his present environment, feels that it is the source of his trouble, knows that he cannot rectify it, likes to free himself from the trouble and determines that he would safeguard his interest in himself by committing suicide. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* says that the self likes anything for the love of itself.

Further, if man is not by nature good, then there would be no meaning in anybody's attempt at setting him right. If man is by nature evil, then even an ideal government cannot correct him. Nature cannot be altered. And in fact if man is by nature evil any sort of government is impossible. The possibility of a good government presupposes the natural goodness of the originators of the government. Evidently the goodness of these originators cannot be due to the fact of the government they originate. So a good government is based on the natural goodness of men; and the natural goodness of men is the very presupposition of any kind of law and order.

The question may appear—If man is by nature good, how does he become evil? Bhīṣma says that *daiṇya* and so on make man evil. His description of the evil condition of men is very carefully expressed. He never says that the evil condition of men consists of only *doṣa*, but he holds that the evil condition is a mixture of *doṣa* and *adoṣa*. According to him even the *kali*, which is said to be the worst possible period of time is characterised by one-fourth of *dharma* and this means that there can be no condition of life that is utterly devoid of *dharma*.

Further, the relative merits of *dharma* and *adharma* may be considered. *Dharma* is self-supporting. There can be *dharma* even in the absolute absence of *adharma*. But the case of *adharma* is different. *Adharma* presupposes *dharma*. In the absence of *dharma* *adharma* cannot subsist. *Adharma* and deception are intimately connected. A liar goes on successfully for the time being, because others do not know that he is a liar and for the time being they take him to be honest. So a lie presupposes honesty at least in appearance. Without this basis, lying is impossible. So *adharma* presupposes *dharma* and the evil condition of man presupposes the condition of his good nature.

The truth of these considerations is, in a sense, recognised by the later Indian philosophers also. We may, for example, take the *Sāṅkhya* position that of the three constituents of *prakṛti*—*satva*, *rājas* and *tamas*, *satva* operates first, because it is good; and as the result there appears *buddhitattva*, in which *satva* dominates.

Consistently with the spirit of these ideas we may hold that the origin of the *Kārtavya* State is the true nature of man. In this State there was no *Dandanīti* and no necessity for *rāṇya*. Man, by his own nature, observed *dharma* and *pālana*. *Daiṇya* and other vices appear in man owing to particular external conditions.

The origin of Rājya.

With the degeneration of mankind owing to *dainya* and so on the *Kārtavyuga* State disappeared. There arose the confusion of *dharma* and *adharma* and on account of this *pālana* suffered a lot. To re-establish *dharma* and *pālana*, Brahṁā composed *Dandanīti*. Several others abridged this science and made it quite useful to men. Then the necessity arose for a *rājā* to make use of *Dandanīti* effectively. Viṣṇu became the first *rājā* and established *dharma* and *pālana*. Thus *Rājya* came into existence. The origin of *Rājya* is evidently the wisdom of the authors of *Dandanīti*.

Whatever value may be given to the theological aspect of the teaching of Bhīṣma, one thing is certain. The author of *Dandanīti*, as it is expounded in the *Mahābhārata*, is Bhīṣma. The *Rājya* in question is that of Yudhiṣṭhira. And the source of this *Rājya* is the wisdom of Bhīṣma. The theological aspect of the teaching is, at best, the expression of the general Indian way of looking at things that the best in the world has a divine origin. Thus the wisdom connected with *dharma* and *pālana* is divine and the *rājā*, who establishes and maintains them, has a divinity in him. (In this connection that the Rsis created Prthu and taught him *Dandanīti* must not be forgotten. It illustrates how the wisdom of the philosophers is the origin of *Rājya*.)

The aim of Rājya.

The aim of *Rājya* is the re-establishment of the *Kārtavyuga* State. The *rājā*, who really satisfies *Dandanīti*, re-establishes *Kārtadharma*.

Thus Bhīṣma has in view three stages of the existence of men—the *Kārtavyuga*, confusion of *dharma* and *adharma*, and *Rājya* leading to *Kārtavyuga*. This idea is in keeping with the other general Indian conceptions. In the philosophy of the self we are told that the self is originally pure, owing to *avidyā* it has the state of bondage in which purity and impurity are intermixed, and with the spiritual discipline the original purity of the self is regained. (The original purity of the self is of course logical, but it illustrates the spirit of the present consideration. The conception of the *Kārtavyuga* State has also a logical priority to that of *Rājya*.) Further, a *jñānin* is often compared to a young boy who is not yet affected by the vices of the world. (*Bhāgavata*, 11.5.) This comparison means that the boyhood is pure, manhood is impure and the purity of the boyhood is regained when the man becomes a *jñānin*.

The view of Bhīṣma compared to the Modern views.

Bhīṣma's view of the origin of the state has all the virtues of the different theories of the origin of the State as expressed by the European thinkers, but it is free from the defects of these theories.

The modern thinkers give us in all four types of views with regard to the origin of the State. An attempt is made in the following pages to see how far the ideas underlying these views can be applied to the view of Bhīṣma.

1. The Theory of the Social contract.

This theory distinguishes two periods of man's existence—the period of the law of nature or natural law and the period of civil society or body politic. In the former there is no State and with the latter the State appears. The natural law is characterised by human rapacity and in the latter human law operates.

But the position of Bhīṣma is entirely different. According to this position man's nature is pure and the vices like rapacity appear in man owing to the external conditions like *dainya*. The operation of human law is an expression of man's nature; and with this expression there is the *Kārtavyuga* State. Plato and Aristotle come nearer this truth when they uphold that the social bond with his fellowmen forms an essential part of man's nature. The period of the law of nature corresponds to the state of man's life between the *Kārtavyuga* and *Rājya*.

Hobbes holds that the state of nature is a state of war and therefore man is driven to join himself with his fellows under some common authority. These two ideas are mutually inconsistent, because how the warring nature miraculously submits itself to law and order cannot be justified. The position of Locke that "the state of nature is not one of universal war, but it is inconvenient and unsatisfactory" corresponds to the intermediate stage of Indian division. The same observation holds good with reference to the position of Rousseau that the primitive condition of idyllic felicity becomes no longer advantageous as the members of the race increase.

We may however note one virtue in the contract theory that it after all recognises the capacity for contract in man. Indian view makes the best use of this virtue. The chief defect in the contract theory is that it does not justify the expression of this capacity in man, as it starts with the assumption that man is by nature evil. Indian view believes in the natural greatness of

man and holds that all good arrangements of man are the expressions of this greatness.

2. The Theory of Divine Origin.

The essential meaning of this theory is that each and every existing State represents an institution of deliberate divine creation; and the monarch represents direct divine agency against whom no supposed principle of individual rights can be valid. This theory is sound in its general meaning that all human institutions represent in a sense the controlling power of God. The Indian view has nothing to say against this meaning. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Indian teaching is generally mixed with theological ideas. But the theory of Divine origin implies much more and it denies political supremacy to the mass of the community. The Indian view does not subscribe to this view. According to Bhiṣma *pālana* is the only aim of any government, and this is impossible unless the mass of the community is sufficiently respected. Further, corresponding to "Divine right of kings" there is the Indian expression, "The king is a form of Viṣṇu"; but the implications of these expressions are profoundly different. "Divine right of kings" implies the negation of the individual rights against the king; but "The king is Viṣṇu" is an expression of the complete identity of the king with the individual interests. According to Indian tradition *pālana* is an aspect of Viṣṇu and it is *pālana* that makes one a *rājā*. So the belief is that a *rājā* is as intimately connected with the people as Viṣṇu, the creator, is. According to this view a *rājā* is not a *pālaka*, but a *pālaka* is *rājā*.

3. The Theory of force.

This theory holds that government is the outcome of human aggression. This is partly true, i.e., it is true in so far as it means that under particular conditions force is required to establish *dharma* and *pālana* and in this sense it can be applied only to *Rājya*. But one must not overlook the fact that the conception of *Rājya* is really based on the truth of human greatness. This means that to emphasise human aggression is wrong.

4. The Historical Theory of the State.

Modern thinkers consider the previous three theories to be fallacious and support the historical or evolutionary theory of

the State. This theory stands for the idea that the State is not an invention; it is a growth, an evolution, the result of a gradual process running through all the known history of man. It may be noted that this theory presents one of the aspects of *dharma* and *pālana*. The practice of *dharma* requires the observation of experience. This is the idea involved in *deśadharma* and *kāladharma* and consistently with *dharma*, *pālana* must be conducted. In order to be sound, the historical theory must recognise the natural greatness of man that makes evolution or progress possible. On the part of the Indian thinkers the recognition of this truth is however, responsible for the idea of the *Kārtavya* State. How far this State is a historical fact needs an investigation. The conviction of the Indian thinkers is that this State is really historical. Further, the historical theory of the State seems to emphasise the known history of man. Though this is correct the possibility of the unknown history of man needs to be duly recognised.

In the sight of the foregoing ideas, it may be concluded that Bhiṣma's theory of the origin of the State is based on the true insight into the real nature of man. And in this connection a word on *Varaṇśramadharmā* may not be out of place. Two aspects are involved in this conception—birth and function. With regard to the latter, there can be no difference of opinion; but the importance of the former aspect depends on what value we attach to racial or parental inheritance. If the birth is also emphasised, then *Rājya* having in view the establishment of *Varaṇśramadharmā* becomes only an ideal towards which the present conditions must move. *Varaṇśramadharmā* is the discipline connected with society defined in terms of the true nature (essence) of man.

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MADHVA'S CONCEPTION OF SVATANTRA

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MADHYA lived in the thirteenth century A.D. He is the last of the originators of Vedānta systems. Coming last he has a definite advantage over his predecessors. Having studied both their merits and defects he has propounded a system of Vedānta which has so far proved the last word in Vedānta.

1. Svatantra, the One Principle of All

Madhva teaches that the Cause, Source, Ground, Principle, Substance, Basis, Truth or Reality of all that is in the world is essentially one. Following the Vedas, he names this Cause *Satvatva, Brahman, Parabrahman, Ātman, Īśa, Nārāyaṇa, Hari, Ivara, Paramaśvara, Vāśudeva* and so on. In the course of his thought Madhva constantly makes use of the conception of *Satvatva*, explains its significance, and, on its basis, justifies the various aspects of the ultimate Reality that underlies all. The term *satvatva* is a compound of *sva* and *tantra* and it means *svādīna*, the Independent. This implies that the source of all is self-established, self-evident, unbound and all-complete. These are the various aspects signified by the various other Vedic names, Brahman and so on. *Satvatva* as the source of all reality is the giver of the reality of all. This means that all else is *paratantra*, or *parādīna*.

Madhva's teaching is purely a philosophical justification of *Svatantra* with all its implications. He shows also that *Śruti* and *Smṛti* reveal the truth of *Svatantra* only and that their teaching expresses the conclusion of the philosophy he expounds. This is the reason why he constantly makes a reference to the texts of *Śruti* and *Smṛti* in his works. We must not infer from this that he reads his own ideas into *Śruti* and *Smṛti*. Whenever he defines an idea presented by a *Śruti*, he gives not only the philosophical justification of the idea, but the support of other passages of *Śruti* which state the same idea more clearly. This is why he quotes profusely from *Śruti* and *Smṛti*. Thus his teaching by way of giving a self-complete system of philosophy makes the several texts of *Śruti* a consistent whole. This is an attempt at presenting a philosophy which holds true at all times and in all circumstances.

As regards the history of philosophy that preceded him, he notes the following: The Vedas started the real philosophical enquiry as expressed

in such passages as "From which all these creatures come into being, by which they are living and into which they enter and disappear, reflect on That. That is Brahman" (*Tai*).¹ The sole purpose of the whole Veda is to study the various aspects of Brahman, the Ground of all. This is the teaching of the passage "All the Vedas reveal the truth of Brahman."² The *Smṛtis* illustrate the truth taught by the Veda. *Bhāgavata* says "Dravya, Karma, Kāla, Svabhāva, Jiva and Prakṛti (all the items of the world) exist because of the desire of Brahman. And if Brahman is indifferent to them they do not exist."³ The *Gītā* says "I am the creator of all."⁴ The teaching of *Śruti* and *Smṛti* is confirmed by the *Brahmasūtra*: "That from which this world has production and so on is Brahman."⁵ The manner in which the Truth is taught in these works is highly significant. They hold that the cause of all is Brahman but not that Brahman is the cause of all. This circumstance indicates better the spirit of the teaching which is that the whole universe is an expression, work or a product of a single principle and this is named Brahman.

Next followed the *Darśanas* including the schools of Vedānta. Their originators failed to see fully the significance of the lead given by the Vedic tradition. Each in the course of his thought somehow developed an undue interest in some aspect of the world or other and made much of it. Cārvāka denied *caetana* and made *svabhāva*, an aspect of matter, the principle of all. Bauddha denied the world of actual experience and made *śūnya* the ultimate. Jaina began to explain everything with his *syādvāda* and ended by saying that nothing can be really explained. *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* and *Pūrvaśākhā* assumed several self-established realities together with *Īvara* or *Karma* as a connecting link. Though *Sāṅkhya* spoke of two principles, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, it attributes all creative activity to *prakṛti* and made *puruṣa* practically a non-entity. None of these schools respected the spirit of *Brahmavāda* started by the Vedas. This circumstance gave rise to the idea of re-establishing the old *Brahmavāda*. There appeared several schools of Vedānta. But they formed only the basis for the greater systematisation of Vedic thought at the hands of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. But even they did not do proper justice to the Vedic spirit of finding out the single principle of all. Śaṅkara found it impossible to justify *Brahmavāda* without mixing it with *Māyāvāda*. Just as it is with *Sāṅkhya*, Śaṅkara attributed all creative activity to *māyā* or *avidyā* and reduced Brahman practically to the position of *Sāṅkhya puruṣa*. Similarly Rāmānuja found it impossible to explain the origin of the world without giving Brahman the assistance of *sūkṣmadācit*. Whatever be the importance given to the name Brahman in these systems, they have posited something other than Brahman as the origin of the world and have thus abandoned the pure *Brahmavāda* taught by the Vedas.

By way of illustrating this point, T. C. 770 says* (Śaṅkara) denies that *pradhāna* is the cause of the world; but holds that the cause of the world is *avidyā*. This does not help *Brahmavāda*, i.e., it does not help the conception of Brahman as the only origin of all. The attempt found in *avidyāvāda* (*māyāvāda*) is like giving the sheep to a tiger after snatching it by force from a wolf. This passage compares creatorship to a sheep, *pradhāna* to a wolf and *māyā* to a tiger. The idea is this: whether a wolf eats the sheep or a tiger eats it, it is not saved. Similarly, whether the creatorship goes to *pradhāna* or to *māyā* the result is the same, and Brahman as the creator of all is not maintained. With this observation the passage of T. C. reveals the vigour or spirit of Madhva's teaching.

Madhva makes nothing other than Brahman the source of the world. According to him, Brahman, and Brahman only, is the source of all and as such, It is *Svatantra* and It is therefore all that explains the world with all its aspects. For this reason Madhva calls It *Guṇapūrṇa* (all-complete).

Because Madhva speaks of Brahman as *Guṇapūrṇa*, his conception of Brahman must not be taken to be the same as *saguna* of Śaṅkara. *Saguna* of Śaṅkara is a product of *Brahman* and *māyā*. But *Guṇapūrṇa* of Madhva is the uncaused Cause of all. It is essentially One. It is an expression of complete identity. Madhva calls this identity *svātēśahēda*. He means that though this identity is essentially one, it admits of different expressions—the substantive and the attributive. He points out that this is the nature of every identical thing. Further, the higher conception of Brahman according to Śaṅkara is *nirguṇa*. Madhva points out that the conception of *nirguṇa* involves self-contradiction, because to call something *nirguṇa* is to attribute *nirguṇatva* to it.

He shows how Brahman is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa* by explaining how It is the cause of all. He distinguishes the two aspects of the world *caetana* and *acetana*, spirit and non-spirit. *Acetana* stands for *Prakṛti*, *Kāla*, *Dēśa*, *Veda*, the products of *Prakṛti* and *abhāva*, absence of different kinds. *Caetana* stands for all *jīvas* including the *abhimānis*, the presiding deities of the various aspects of the world. He explains in every work of his, how Brahman is the sole creator of all this. His position as explained in *M. Bh.* with S. may be quoted*: "Hari is the creator of all, *caetana* and *acetana*. This conviction occurs only to the good (*catam*) and it never occurs to the evil-minded (*asatām*). Hari creates *acetana* as *acetana*, i.e., without mixing it with *caetana*. But He creates *caetana* along with *acetana*, i.e., body. He is thus the cause of all. None else can be the cause of the world. Some think that *prakṛti*, etc., cause the world. They are wrong. *Prakṛti*, *Kāla*,

etc., are products. They are created by Hari. Some say that Hari Himself changes into the world. Others believe that the creation is something like a dream or illusion. Both are wrong. Hari is changeless and He transcends illusion. The mere desire of Hari gives rise to the world. He is free from all defects. How then can He have change? Hari, the Changeless, desires. The world is really created. This is the teaching of the Veda. This is the conviction of *Caturmukha*, etc., who know the truth. It is illusion to think that something else is the cause of the world. Illusion is *dvaita*. It is created by Hari. It must therefore be destroyed by Himself. He destroys *dvaita*. He is therefore *Advaita*. If He has no desire to release *jiva* He creates *dvaita*. If He desires the release of *jiva* He destroys *dvaita*. Good *jivas* never favour *dvaita*. They know that Hari destroys *dvaita*. Hari, Parabrahma is therefore *Advaita*."

This is the essence of Madhva's *Brahmavāda*. It traces everything of the world to the wish or desire (*icchā*) Brahman. Brahman's wish is the sole cause of all. Brahman is therefore *Svatantra*. "To be *svatantra* is indeed to follow one's own desire."⁸

2. Svatantra, the All that Explains All

The cause of all must be *Svatantra*. This may be illustrated in the following manner: Cause in the ultimate sense is necessarily one. Two ultimate causes limit each other and each ceases to be ultimate. Further, the two causes must be brought together if they were to give rise to the world. The principle that brings them together becomes the ultimate cause of all and it is necessarily one.

The conception of one cause needs an explanation. We all commonly speak of *upādāna* and *nimitta* causes. Taking the production of a jar for example, we call the clay from which the jar comes *upādāna* and the jar-maker and so on that help the production of the jar *nimitta*. But the cause of all is neither *upādāna* nor *nimitta*. The cause of all is necessarily changeless. If it has change, then the change must be caused by something else. It is therefore no longer the cause of all. So the cause of all is not *upādāna*. Nor is it *nimitta*. For a *nimitta* cause cannot do anything without the help of *upādāna*. It cannot therefore be the one cause of all.

The cause of all does not depend on anything else. It is independent. It is called *Svatantra Kāraṇa*. In the same sense it is often called simply cause—*kāraṇa*, *nimitta* and so on.

Svatantra Kāraṇa or in short, *Svatantra* cannot be *acetana*, because *acetana* cannot cause anything. When *acetana* appears to do anything,

what actually takes place in that a *cetana* works through it. *Svatantra* is therefore *cetana*. This means that It has knowledge, desire and will, the several aspects of *cetana*. Further, *Svatantra* is the cause of the *cetana* aspect of the world. This also proves that It is *cetana*.

Thus the very conception of *Svatantra* implies that Brahman, the cause, is uncaused, unconditioned, unlimited and unaided by anything else. Brahman is thus absolutely changeless. Even the fact that It causes all must not be taken to mean change in It, because with change It cannot be *Svatantra* as change implies a cause of change. Brahman as *Svatantra* is thus self-established. If it were not self-established It cannot be *Svatantra*. N. S. says in conclusion of this discussion: "Therefore the cause of all must be taken to be *Svatantra*. That alone is indeed *Īśvara*."⁹

The truth that Brahman is *Svatantra* implies that the world is caused, conditioned, limited and aided. It is nothing but change. Its reality is therefore derived from Brahman. For this reason the world is called *paratantra*. Thus according to Madhva, *Svatantra* is cause and *paratantra* is product and *Svatantra* is the cause of all that occurs to *paratantra*.

Madhva distinguishes eight aspects that occur to *paratantra*, viz., production, living, destruction, direction, knowledge, non-knowledge, bondage and release (*ṣṣṭi*, *sthiti*, *samhāra*, *niyamana*, *jñāna*, *ajñāna*, *bandha* and *moksha*). The first four and non-knowledge in the sense of the absence of knowledge occur to *acetana* and all the eight aspects occur to *cetana*. Of them, production (*ṣṣṭi*) consists in the reception of *sattā* (being or reality) from *Svatantra*. T. S. T. says that *ṣṣṭi* is *sattālabha*, reception of *sattā*.¹⁰ *Svatantra* as the giver of *sattā* is the creator of all. The same idea may be extended to the other seven aspects. To give them to the world is to give them *sattā*. This is how *Svatantra* is characterised as the creator of the eightfold aspect of the world. For this reason *Svatantra* is called *Īśvara*.

The term *sattā* in this connection means *svarūpa* (essence), *pramāṇa* or *prameyatva* (the state of being known), *prayit* (function) and existence in space and time. Only from *Īśvara* does everything in the world receive *sattā* in all these four senses and with reference to every aspect that occurs to it. For this reason everything is called *adhīna* (dependent). *Īśvara* as the giver of *sattā* in these various senses is called *Niyāmaka*. Madhva says in *Ai. Bh.* 37, "By explaining creation, etc., as occurring to the world, the text proves *adhīnatva* (the dependent nature) of the world."¹¹

To hold that the *Kāraṇa* of all is *Svatantra* and that *Svatantra* is Brahman implies that it is the very nature of Brahman to create. Brahman as *Svatantra* is unconditioned. Space, time, etc., never condition *Svatantra*.

Svatantra is thus self-established always and everywhere as the cause of all time and all space. *Br. Bh.* 9-15 says, "Because It is eternally existent It is called *Ātman*.... Hari is *Ātman* because He is All-pervading, All-infinite and All-knowing."¹² These are the expressions of the infinite nature of His creatorship. This implies that the process of the world-creation is beginningless and endless—*anādi* and *nitya*. For this reason the Veda speaks of the *nitya* character of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, *kāla* and so on; but at the same time it distinguishes *Svatantra* as the *Nitya* of the *nitya* things (*Nityonityānām*). This means that It is the giver of *nityatva* to the *nitya* things of the world.

Svatantra is thus the source of all that the world has. This implies that It is all-complete in every sense of the term. This aspect of *Svatantra* is called *Guṇapūrṇa*. This is the significance of Brahman as conceived by the Veda. The idea that Brahman is *Guṇapūrṇa* is justified by the idea that It is *Svatantra*. *Svatantra* signifies all-creatorship. The knowledge of Brahman as *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa* therefore presupposes a correct understanding of the creatorship of Brahman.

How the knowledge of creatorship leads to the knowledge of *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa* is explained by T. C. 332, "*Īśvara* creates not only the properties of *cetana* but also those of *acetana*. When it is understood that *cetana* itself is dependent on Him, i.e., created by Him, there is no difficulty in holding that He is the creator of *acetana*. The fact that *Īśvara* creates both *cetana* and *acetana* points to his *Guṇapūrṇatva*. This may be illustrated by taking for example an *acetana*, say space (*ākāśa*). In understanding the fact that *Īśvara*'s creation of *ākāśa* points to his *Guṇapūrṇatva*, the following difficulty may be felt:—*Ākāśa* is *acetana*. Its property, say room-making, is therefore *acetana*. To create this property which is *acetana* does not mean the completeness (*pūrṇatva*) of this property in *Īśvara* (because *Īśvara* is *cetana*). Further, room-making is the very essence (*svabhāva*) of *ākāśa*. An essence must not be conditioned by anything. To hold therefore that *Īśvara* creates it cannot be justified. This difficulty is met as follows:—*Īśvara* wishes that *ākāśa* must have room-making. *Ākāśa* has this property. If *Īśvara* had a different desire *ākāśa* would have been solid (*nibida*). Further even after creating *ākāśa*, *Īśvara* has the power completely to destroy the room-making of *ākāśa* and make it solid. He has not done it, because He has not wished it. If even men can with the help of some chemical make copper non-copper, cannot *Īśvara* do room-making non-room-making? Though *Īśvara* has not destroyed *ākāśa* He has the power to do it. He has indeed the power to do anything He pleases. *Śruti* and *Smṛti* also teach that the essence of everything is created by Him. 'The rivers flow because of His command; the wind blows because of His fear. And *ākāśa* gives room for

creatures because it is His will.' Therefore *Īśvara*'s creation of room-making in *ākāśa* points to the completeness of room-making in Him. So the term *ākāśa* with the completeness of its meaning applies to *Īśvara*. It is applied to *ākāśa* only in a very limited sense. It is therefore said that *Īśvara* has the *guṇas* of all creatures. N. S. says 'Room-making in *ākāśa* is limited by space and time. *Ākāśa* with its room-making is therefore the creation of *Īśvara*. It is an expression of *Īśvara* who is immanent in it. This immanence is itself a form of His.' So to establish that room-making which forms an essence of an *acetana* has in view the determination of the divine properties, both room-making and the power of creating the very essence of things. The same way of thinking must be extended to all items of creation. Therefore the term *ākāśa* means primarily Brahman."¹³

Īśvara is the creator not only of positive entities, but also of the negative ones. T. C. 835 says, "The horn of a hare is eternally absent. Its absence is the creation of *Īśvara*. If *Īśvara* had desired its existence it would have been there. *Īśvara* did not desire it and it is eternally absent."¹⁴ So nothing in the world is uncreated. "*Īśvara* as the creator of all is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa*. For this reason *Śruti* calls the Creator Brahman."

3. Svatantra, the Cause of Causes

We have noted that *Īśvara*'s creative activity is at work through the whole course of eternity. This implies that particular aspects of the world are made to continue from the beginningless to the endless time. This is also proved by our experience. Every product we observe has a previous and a later state. Before a jar is produced, there is in its place clay and clay is the later state of the jar when destroyed. So N. S. 422 says, "Everything is *nitya* in substance and *anitya* with regard to its change."¹⁵ This idea holds true with regard to the whole of creation. Creation of the world presupposes the existence of the substantive aspect of things and the destruction of the world is followed by the same aspect. Even to maintain the existence of these aspects is the work of *Īśvara*. It is therefore held that *Īśvara* creates the world by making use of the elements that are already existent, i.e., the elements to which *Īśvara* has already given existence. These elements are *prakṛti* (the root matter), *deśa* (space), *kāla* (time), and *cetana* (spirit).

The fact that *Īśvara* creates things making use of the things that are already existent does not in any manner modify the creatorship of *Īśvara*. N. S. 293 says, "Though Hari is able to create things without making use of anything, He always creates this world from the things that are already existent. Even this rule is His desire."¹⁶ And in fact "To make use of *prakṛti*, etc., in producing the world illustrates really His unlimited creatorship,

(*Prakṛti*, etc., are therefore said to be the causes of the world.) But these causes are after all His creation." This indeed points to the richness of His omnipotence (*aśvarya*).¹² N. S. 299 says, " (Actually the order of creation is this—From *Prakṛti* comes *mahat*, from *mahat* *ahankāra* and so on. *Prakṛti* is *upādāna*, and *kāla*, etc., are *nimitta*). But Hari is quite able to create *ahankāra* from *prakṛti* and *mahat* from *ahankāra*, and to make *prakṛti* *nimitta* and *kāla*, etc., *upādāna*. Yet Hari always creates the world following the order He pleases." "This is the conclusion. If it is asked whether Hari makes use of *upādāna* and *nimitta*—the answer is, yes. He makes use of them. So in this limited sense, *prakṛti*, etc., may be said to be the causes of the world. But it must not be supposed that *Īśvara* is not able to create the world either without making use of them or making use of them in a different manner. Therefore *Īśvara* the creator must not be compared to a pot-maker. It does not therefore follow that He is not *Svatantra* and *Prakṛti*, etc., are not *paratantra*. What then is the origin of creation? The origin is His desire. This proves that He is *Svatantra*. Even though He makes use of *prakṛti*, etc., they are not uncreated by Him. How is then His overflow of omnipotence or creatorship modified? *Prakṛti*, etc., are indeed produced by Him. Therefore to make use of them points to the richness of His creatorship. Madhva proves it thus: "Because the very causeness of causes is given by Him His making use of causes proves the richness of His creatorship."¹³

In this connection we have to note the following: From the point of view of Brahman's creatorship, the so-called causes of the world are only products. To make use of them in the creation of fresh things is only to make use of products in producing fresh products from them. But the real cause of even these fresh products is *Īśvara* Himself, because the creation of these products is after all the result of His wish. So, just as *Īśvara* is the giver of reality to *prakṛti*, etc., He is the giver of reality to *Mahat* also. And just as *Mahat*, etc., are products, *prakṛti*, etc., also are products. What is meant in these passages is that there is nothing in this world that is self-established, or that has reality independent of Brahman or that does not receive reality from Brahman. For this reason, the whole world is called *paratantra*. *Paratantra* means product (*kārya*). It receives reality from *Īśvara*. This means that *Īśvara* who gives reality to the world, and who is uncaused and therefore has self-established Reality, is *Svatantra*. Only Brahman is *Svatantra* and all else is *paratantra*.

In T. S., Madhva speaks of two *tattvas*, *Svatantra* and *paratantra*. *Svatantra* is that the Reality of which is self-established and *paratantra* is that the reality of which is derived from *Svatantra*. *Svatantra* is *Kāraṇa* and

paratantra is *kārya*. *Tattva* in this connection means *prameya*.¹⁴ *Prameya* is the object of correct knowledge. Though both *Svatantra* and *paratantra* are called *prameya*, it must not be forgotten that *Svatantra* is the object in the highest sense. The *Śruti* says, "Nārāyaṇa is Mahājñeya" (the object of objects). This means that Nārāyaṇa is the Giver of objectivity to objects and He is therefore the Ground of objects. His objectivity is self-established. He is *Svatantra*. So, the mention of two *tattvas*, *Svatantra* and *paratantra*, has in view the establishment of *Svatantra* as the Ground of all and this is done by showing that all else is *paratantra*.

4. Svatantra, the Eternal of the Eternals

Madhva's position that all that is other than Brahman is *paratantra* means that all without any exception is actually created by Brahman. In opposition to this truth, *Nyāyavaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, etc., hold that there are items of the world that are beginningless (*anādi*) and therefore not produced; *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* speaks of *paramāṇus*, the indivisible and indestructible units of matter, space, time and so on, which are in themselves *anādi* and therefore uncreated. *Sāṅkhya* calls the root-matter *prakṛti* in the sense that it is uncaused (*anādi*) but is the cause of all that is produced (*vikṛti* or *sādi*). Madhva holds that even the so-called *anādi* things are essentially the creation of *Īśvara*. In explaining this position T. C. 379 notes—" *Īśvara* has the power to do, undo and do in any manner He pleases. Even the so-called *anādi* things are therefore His creation, just in the same way as the *sādi* things are. The power of *Īśvara* is unmodified and unopposed in every sense. This truth may be illustrated in the following manner. We believe that the past existed in space. But *Īśvara* has the power to make the past without space. He has not done so because it is not His desire. This is proved by the experience that the past was in space. We must not imagine that He cannot meddle with the past. This imagination is opposed to His creatorship (*aśvarya*) and it is sublated by the *Śruti* which says that *svabhāva*, *jīva*, *karma* and so on, exist because of His desire. The supposition that the *anādi* things must have their own *anādi* essence (*svabhāva*) does not in any way modify the creatorship of *Īśvara*, because His desire which produces *anādi* essence of *anādi* things is also *anādi*. In a previous section called *Akāśādhikaraṇa*, the truth that the essence of all things is the work of *Īśvara* is proved. In the present passage the fact that *anādi* essence is the work of *Īśvara* is established. So this passage supplements the previous one. In a later division called *viyātpāda*, it is established that the production of everything in the world consists in its receiving a change which is the work of *Īśvara*. Production in this sense is called *parādhina viśeṣāpatti*. But the

special teaching of the present passage is this—Some items of the world may not admit of creation in the sense of coming into existence only at a point of time and for this reason they may be taken to be *anādi*. But their very essence, i.e., their reality, is created by *Īvara*. The fact that *Īvara* is the creator of *anādi* things proves the transcendence (*māhātmya*) of *Īvara* and it is the same as *anādi svabhāva nityamaka śakti*, the power of creating *anādivabhāva*. This means that the term *anādi* applies in the primary sense only to *Īvara*.²⁰

The statement that *Īvara* has the power to make the past spaceless is really very significant. On the basis of actual experience even though we believe that the past existed in space, *Īvara* has the power of making this belief or experience wrong or even impossible. This means that the correctness of correct knowledge also is dependent on Him, i.e., made by Him. Further, this passage interprets production as *parādhitā viśeṣādvāpi*. The significance of this interpretation will be explained shortly.

So far, it has been shown that the creative power of *Īvara* is absolute and unconditioned in every sense. This must not be taken to mean that chaos prevails in the world. Madhva assures us that *Īvara's* desire is *satya*. The word *satya* in this connection means consistent. Consistency is an item of all-completeness (*guṇapūrṇatva*) of *Īvara*. This enables us to take it for granted that *Īvara* gives no room for any kind of disorder or confusion in the world. *Bh. Bh.* 21. 18 says, "The process of this world is *anādi* and *nitya*. It is never destroyed and never confused. Like the flow of a river it is always in order. Nobody, whatever his power be, can interfere with the order of the world, because *Viṣṇu* is *satya*, *Sri* is *satya* and *jīva* and *jāda* are *satya*, that which is known is *satya* and there is nothing *asatya*. One who knows *Viṣṇu* consistently with these ideas attains *mukti* and goes to *Purugottama*."²¹ One must not forget that in this passage the word *Viṣṇu* means *Guṇapūrṇa* and the word *Purugottama* means the highest principle of all. The statement that *Viṣṇu* is *satya* therefore means that He is the giver of *satyatva* to other things. The other entities are helplessly *satya* because *Viṣṇu* is *satya*. *At. Bh.* 30 says, "Hari is *Nirdosa* and *Guṇapūrṇa*, because He is the Giver of *satyatva* to all (that is given as *satya*)."²²

Because Madhva holds that the process of the world is *anādi* and *ananta* and that *Īvara* creates it by making use of certain elements such as *prakṛti* which are taken to be *anādi* and *nitya*, it is often found necessary to explain repeatedly how the *anādi* things are produced. Some important ideas in this connection may be mentioned. In the first place, the idea that *Īvara* creates *anādi* things is not new to the *Darsanas*. In the Vedānta of Śaṅkara

the distinction between *jīva* and Brahman is taken to be *anādi*; yet it is considered to be the creation of *avidyā*. According to *Nyāyavaiśeṣika dravyatva* is *anādi*; but it is conditioned by *guṇatva* (the state of having *guṇa*).²³ And in the second place, from the standpoint of *Brahmavāda* the *anādi* items of the world are never considered to be *anādi* in the sense that they oppose or modify the creatorship *karitva* of Brahman. The *Brahma-Sūtra* teaches that *prakṛti*, etc., are *anādi* only in a secondary (*gauṇī*) sense. Brahman alone is *anādi* in the primary sense. The so-called *anādi* things of the world undergo constant change. They are *vikāri*. It is evident that they are interdependent and therefore limited (*vibhaktā*). These facts prove that they are products. This means that their cause is necessarily changeless (*nirvikāra*) and unlimited (*pūrṇa*). Therefore that which is *nirvikāra* and *pūrṇa* is Brahman. So Brahman is not a product and It is only cause.²⁴

Further, the term *anādi* as applied both to Brahman and the world has different implications. The world as *anādi* means that it exists from the beginningless time. This means that it is in time. But Brahman is the creator of time itself. There is no sense in holding that It exists in time. The fact that the world exists in time means that time is the support (*ādharma*) of the world. But Brahman is the support of all. This is an implication of the truth that It creates all. Further to hold that Brahman exists in time is to make time the support of Brahman. This is to deny Brahman and make time Brahman. The *Śruti* says: "*Sadeva Somyedamagra āsit*," and so on. The apparent meaning of this is that Brahman (*Sat*) was prior to this world. But, because time is one of the items of the world, the real meaning of the *Śruti* must be that Brahman transcends time, because It is the creator of time. So, the term *agra* in the *Śruti* does not mean priority in time; it means *guṇapūrṇa*. The whole passage means that *guṇapūrṇa* is the presupposition of the world (*At. Bh.*).²⁵ So, the statement that Brahman is *anādi* must be finally taken to mean that It is the giver of *anādivta* to *anādi*. This is an implication of the fact that It is the creator of *anādi*. *Anu. V.* i. i. ii says, "such is the creatorship of Brahman." *N. S.* interprets this passage as "the creative power of *Īvara* has in view everything, the eternal, the non-eternal, the essence, the non-essence, etc. If anything is excepted, His creatorship becomes modified. What then does this power do? It is the Giver of the very reality of these things. Is not the reality of these things *anādi*? Yes, it is. But it is so because of the *anādi* creatorship of *Īvara*."²⁶

All these ideas clearly show that Brahman, and Brahman alone, is the cause of the world and that there is nothing in the world that is not uncreated,

The objects of the world seem to be produced by means of other objects of the world. But we have seen how even this is the desire of *Īśvara*. The various entities that help the production of an object may seem to bind it. But even this binding is His creation. This implies how He binds everything but He is never bound by anything. *Br. Bh.* says, "He gives causeness to causes. How then can the causes help Him?"¹² *N. S.* 19 says, "All causes have their existence, function, etc., from Him. Therefore no effect is produced without His desire."¹³ He is therefore the only cause of all. As the only cause, He is completely unbound. For this reason He is called *Svatantra*. This term implies two ideas: (1) He is uncaused, i.e., self-established. (2) He acts purely according to His desire, i.e., His desire is the source of all. Both these ideas are, as a rule, involved in defining Brahman as *Svatantra*.

Brahman's creation has a much wider scope than has appeared so far. Creation is defined as giving of *sattā*, etc. (*sattādhāna*). *Sattā*, etc., stand for *satta*, *pramiti*, and *pravṛtti*. In some passages, *svarūpa* is mentioned in place of *sattā*. *N. S.* 330 says, "Some thinkers hold that *svarūpa* is *sattā*, others *pramāṇayogyatva* (the state of being revealed by *pramāṇa*) and some others *arīhakriyākāritva* (the state of producing something). All these are found in the objects and they are created by Him."¹⁴ *N. S.* 513 says, "the property that is special or peculiar to a thing is called *svarūpa* or *svabhāva*. Everything possesses it. It is created by *Īśa*. If it were not created by Him: It would be *svatantra* and this affects the *Īśatva* of *Īśa*. To have an affected *Īśatva* is sublated by the *Śruti*, 'All this is Brahman indeed' (*Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*)."¹⁵ *N. S.* 166 says, "(To limit the creatorship of *Īśvara* is not justified). Take the case of a person, Devadatta. Only that thing the existence, knowledge and function of which Devadatta does not create, control and direct, stands in opposition to him. But the case of the world is different. The existence, etc., of the world are dependent upon *Īśvara* (because He gives them to the world, maintains them and destroys them as He wills). How can then the world be opposed to Him? Further, if the existence, etc., of the world were not dependent on Him, the world would be a rival to Him. It is not so. (Existence, etc., are certainly dependent upon Him and therefore the world is not a rival to Him.) These ideas clearly show that *Īśvara* is not merely a controller or director of the world, just as a king controls or directs his kingdom, but He is the giver of the very *sattā*, etc., to the world. This is the significance of His immanence (*antaryāminva*) in the world."¹⁶

N. S. 330, after stating an objection, applies the same idea both to the things that are said to be *nitya* and to the things that are said to be *anitya*:

"An objection may be raised. The existence, etc., of the *nitya* things are *nitya*. That which is *nitya* cannot therefore be *paratantra*. This objection is met as follows: Just as *Īśvara* controls and directs *anitya* things by giving them existence, etc., being Himself *nitya*, He controls and directs the *nitya* entities continuously and incessantly by giving them existence, etc. Objects like a jar, for example, are of *anitya* nature. That they are *anitya* is not an accident. If they were an accident, they would have been destroyed immediately after their production. (But they are not destroyed. After production they are maintained for some time and only afterwards, they are destroyed. At the time when they are maintained, they are as good as *nitya* things. That they are produced does not affect this aspect, viz., the aspect of their existence during the period when they are maintained. And to hold that they are dependent, *paratantra*, at the time when they are maintained, does not create any difficulty.) Similarly, there is no difficulty in holding that the *nityatva* of *nitya* things is *paratantra*. Further, because the *anityatva* of *anitya* things is *paratantra*, it does not follow that objects like a jar are *nitya*. Similarly, to hold that *nitya* things are *paratantra* does not make them *anitya*. (They may be *nitya*; but as *nitya*, they are *paratantra* in the sense that their reality is derived from *Īśvara*.) This simply means that it is His desire to maintain *nitya* things as *nitya* and *anitya* things as *anitya*. (Therefore that the world is *paratantra*, i.e., that it has derived reality, does not confuse *nitya* and *anitya* things.)"¹⁷

The ideas that Brahman is the cause of the world and that the world is a product must not be understood from the commonsense point of view that a product has necessarily a beginning in time. The point of view of *Brahma-vāda* is entirely different. It holds, as already noted, that a product may be *āndī* or *sādi*, *nitya* or *anitya* but it is more concerned with the finding out of the Ground or Basis of the whole world, recognizing the world as it is given, i.e., as consisting of enduring and non-enduring elements. This is what is meant by offering an explanation of *nitya* as *nitya* and *anitya* as *anitya*. That which explains them is their cause, Ground or Basis, i.e., Brahman. The *nitya* and *anitya* things are not self-explanatory because they are changing and limited (*vikāri* and *vibhakta*).

5. Svatantra, the Only Aim of Sound Thinking

To ignore this truth and to hold that something of the world is the cause of all or one of the causes of all is to overlook the changing and limited character of all that is the world. This error presupposes an undue interest in something that is of the world and a natural dislike for the ultimate source of all. Madhva calls this undue interest *durāgraha* and the dislike *paratattva-*

vidvega. In the presence of these defects, thinkers ignore the *Svatantra* character of the Creator and deny or modify His creative power. For example, *Nyāyavaiśeṣika* holds that the so-called *Īśvara* is only one among the many causes of the world and that he himself, i.e., without the help of other things, cannot create the *svarūpa* or *svabhāva* of anything. Thus *durāgraha* and *paratattvavidvega*, and not impartial enquiry, are the causes for the appearance of systems other than *Brahmavāda*. In addition to this circumstance as Madhva notes, there are people who know only that much on the basis of which they entertain wrong ideas of Brahman. He calls them *alpaavedins*. Further, people are influenced by those whom he calls *kupaṇḍitas* (sophisticated people). Making use of time-honoured terms in their own interest, such persons popularize their own ignorance about truth. This circumstance he calls *mithyājñānaprasakti* (spreading of wrong knowledge). Further, people are in general interested in things that are *tāmasa* (evil) in nature. All these circumstances are also the creation of *Īśvara* and they have also a purpose to serve. If a person were to transcend these evil influences, he must be naturally endowed with pure intellect (*buddha buddhi*). Even this is a creation of *Īśvara's* wish and Madhva calls it *Īśvaraprasāda*.³²

In stating these ideas Madhva does not condemn the world as evil because his is the spirit of seeing Brahman even in the so-called evil things. He only indicates the abilities required really to appreciate the truth that Brahman is the Ground of all. Even though we seem to be quite free from these defects and are deeply interested in understanding what really Madhva has taught, we may not in reality be free from the defects and may not be following his actual teaching. Sometimes, we may read carelessly some passages of Madhva such as:—the world is *satya*, *nitya*, etc., it is different from Brahman, Brahman creates the world making use of *prakṛti*, etc.; Brahman is *tattva*; the world is *tattva*, etc., etc. And after such a careless reading, we may wrongly think that Madhva teaches as follows:—World is as real as Brahman. Brahman is one of the causes of the world; Brahman has therefore a second or many seconds to it, etc., etc. We may even think that we can support these ideas by means of *Śruti*, *Smṛti* and the arguments used by the other *Darśanas*, *Nyāya*, and so on. But all these are only notions that are fundamentally opposed to Madhva's *Brahmavāda*, the sole aim of which is to establish *Svatantra* as the only ground of the world. The passages cited above which seem to mislead us have a deeper significance if we take them in their context. So in describing the general circumstance of the world Madhva gives us a caution so that we may be better able to maintain *buddha buddhi* transcending at the same time the evil influence of lower passions, *durāgraha*, etc.

In reflecting on *prakṛtivāda* of *Sāṅkhya*, i.e., the theory that *prakṛti* is the origin of all, Madhva notes that it is undue interest in *prakṛti* that is the source of this theory. This interest is called *pradhānadurdikṣa*. He does not make any difference in substance between *pradhānavāda* and *māyāvāda* because both imply the denial of Brahman, the only source of all.³⁴ Nor can *pradhāna* or *māyā* by itself be the cause of the world. The *pradhāna* of *Sāṅkhya* is limited by *puruṣa* and *māyā* of Śāṅkara is limited by *Nirguṇa Brahman*.

All these considerations show with what care and accuracy Madhva is establishing his *Brahmavāda*. He demands the same care and accuracy from his readers also. To emphasise this aspect is, after all, not out of place. Being misled by the term *dvaita* that is applied to Madhva's thought even an ardent follower of Madhva may try to find out dualism or pluralism in his thought. Whatever be the name given to his thought, in fairness to him, one ought to start from his actual teaching, but never from the popular and sometimes misleading name given to it. In every work of his, in the beginning, middle and in the end, Madhva asserts at the cost of much repetition that the sole aim of his philosophy is to establish that Brahman is the *Svatantra* cause of all. At every stage of his thought he amplifies in unambiguous language the teaching of *Śruti*—"Ekamevadvīṭyam Brahma"—(Brahman is one only and It is second-less) by his favourite expression that Hari is *Sarvottama*—the highest Principle of all. To make use of English terms, his system is unmodified monism in the sense that it traces everything absolutely to one principle, i.e., Brahman. It is thus far from dualism or pluralism. Further, to call his thought monotheism is not to do justice to him. Monotheism implies something of religious faith. But mere faith as opposed to reason has no place in his philosophy. He accepts only that as real which is in every sense revealed by *pramāṇa* the truth of which is well established. His conceptions are without exception rationalistic. When he quotes *Śruti* or *Smṛti* his aim is not to gain strength from it, but to indicate the philosophy underlying the text. With him the items of the world may be many. They may be real or actual in so far as they go. But they are all without exception the work, expression or creation of one single Principle, i.e., *Svatantra*, Brahman. Madhva says that this is the real teaching of *Śruti*, "*Sa idam sarvamastjāta*". (He created all this.) The same truth is further amplified in the following pages.

A superficial reading of *Purāṇas* often makes us familiar with the creation of the world in cycles (*kalpa*). We are told that *Īśvara* gives rise to the things of the world, *maḥat*, *aḥankāra*, etc., making use of *prakṛti* as *upādāna* and *kāla*, etc., as *nimitta*, in accordance with the *karma* of the *jīvas* that have

to play their parts in the created world. This is the popular idea of creation among the Hindus in general and the *Mādhvas* in particular. It is popularly believed that the *upādāna* and *nimitta* causes of the world and the *jīvas* are *anādi* and therefore uncreated. It is also believed that God is the creator in the sense that he connects and directs the several self-existent *anādi* things and with their help creates the objects of the world, even as a pot-maker connects water, clay, etc., and makes a pot. The idea that the *upādāna* and *nimitta* causes of the world exist irrespective of God, the creator, is the substance of this belief. In spite of the Vedic teaching and *Brahmavāda* founded on it, this belief has somehow become a tradition. This tradition seems to be the result of an undigested mixture of *Nyāyavaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya* and *Pūrva-mīmāṃsa*. Most often, it seems to appeal to common sense because people at large are generally unable to comprehend how *anādi* things can be created even by *Īśvara*. This circumstance is given a colour by the term *dvaita* which is commonly taken to mean that there is a second to Brahman, namely *anādi*. This *anādi* thing may even be dependent on Brahman just in the sense that a servant is dependent on his master, but it is self-existent even as Brahman is. Whatever be the value of this belief, Madhva's *Brahmavāda* gives absolutely no support for this belief. The author of *T. C.* seems to laugh at this belief when he says on p. 389, "If the teaching of *Śruti* 'He created all this' is taken to mean that He created only the products that have a beginning in time, i.e., the products that are *sādi*, then consistently with this idea another *Śruti* passage 'He transcends all this, etc.' also ought to be taken to mean that He transcends only the world of products (*sādi*), but not the things of the world that are said to be *anādi* and *nitya*."²⁸ The idea is that to limit the meaning of the term all (*sarva* or *viśva*) in these passages can never be justified. The teaching of these passages is that *Īśvara* is the creator of all—both *sādi* and *anādi*. He therefore transcends all and for this reason He is *Svatantra*.

6. *Svatantra, the Sole Creator of All, Always, Everywhere*

The truth that Brahman is the cause of all does not imply that the objects It creates continue to exist and operate independent of It. Brahman is also the cause of the maintenance of existence and operation. Objects of the world operate in different manners under a given circumstance. Certain things act as causes. Certain other things appear as products and the remaining things seem to be indifferent. Causeness, productness and indifference are different operations of the objects. They are equally the creation of Brahman and they are therefore products. We have seen how the rich creatorship of *Īśvara* can make, unmake and differently make things.

Applying this thought to the case of these three entities, cause, product and indifferent entities, it is easy to see how *Īśvara* can cancel all or make each the other. He might have cancelled a different product and produced the product in question. Or, He could have made the present product its cause or an indifferent entity and made the cause or indifferent entity the present product. Further even with regard to time in which a product is supposed to appear, He could have made the present past or future and the past or future the present. He could have even made the present pastless or futureless and the product causeless or effectless. We are thus required to see His *kāraṇa*, *akāraṇa* and *anyathākāraṇa*—doing, undoing and doing differently with reference to every item of the world. So the fact that He has created a product is purely an expression of His independent will and it only illustrates the final truth taught by the Upanisad, '*Ichāmātram prabhokḥ sṛṣṭiḥ*'. The circumstance under which alone a thing seems to be produced does not therefore offer any serious difficulty with reference to *Brahmavāda*. And in fact, it amplifies the *Svatantra* character of Brahman. Further, if the purāṇas mean that *Īśvara* really needed the assistance of *prakṛti*, etc., they are wrong, because they are sublated by *Brahmavāda*. If they can be interpreted so as to amplify the richness of *Īśvara*'s creatorship, then only they are respected. One who is engaged in *Brahmajijñāsā* can never dispense with these truths.

The inevitable conclusion from the previous considerations is that the creation of the world or the creative activity of *Īśvara* cannot be confined to any one period or periods. *Īśvara*'s creation is going on incessantly and unceasingly everywhere without exception and with reference to everything in the world including even the things that may be looked upon as being already created. There is nothing in the world that does not undergo change. Everything however stable it may seem to be, is really undergoing deep changes incessantly. Take the case of a *cetana*; change in the body or in mind and change even in the duration of its existence speak of the incessant change that occurs to *cetana*. Similar is the consideration with regard to *acetana*. Change is the very essence of the relity of the world. Nothing is thus self-same as it is ordinarily taken to be. The authorship of this universal change speaks for the incessant creative activity of *Īśvara*. So the *Gītā* says, "I am the giver of all *bhāvas* to the creatures".

In following this discussion, we must bear in mind that according to Madhva the so-called substance and its property are not different from each other. So, to speak of a change as occurring to something is to represent the real or actual essence (*svarūpa*) of the thing itself. This position enables

him to explain how even the so-called *nitya* things, *prakṛti* and so on, are incessantly created in having incessant changes. This explains how from the standpoint of *Īśvara's* creatorship, there is no significant distinction between *nitya* and *anitya* things.

Change comes from *Īśvara*. It is therefore *parādhiya*. The state of a thing obtaining *parādhiya* is called *parādhiya-viśeṣāvāpti*. *Parādhiya-viśeṣa* means a variety of *parādhiya*. *Avāpti* means obtainment. This is the meaning of *srṣṭi* (creation). It applies to all that is other than Brahman. It is called by Madhva *parādhiyatva* or *tadvaśatā*. It is not a mere occurrence to an enduring entity, but it is the mark of the creation of the entity itself. Change and changing entity are thus one and the same thing. This means that both form a single entity which is called *viśiṣṭa*. With reference to a *viśiṣṭa* two aspects may be distinguished—attributive (*dharmā* or *viśeṣaṇa*) and substantive (*dharmī* or *viśeṣya*). This distinction is made on the basis of *viśeṣa* (peculiarity or uniqueness) which is found in everything we think of. Without it nothing can be thought of. For the reason that everything conceived has its own *viśeṣa*, a single entity, i.e., *viśiṣṭa* is treated as though it consists of two aspects, *dharmā* and *dharmī*. This explains how nothing in the world can be *nirviśeṣa* and nothing is really different from its property.

N.S. 431 says, "The production of a property of a thing means the production of the *viśiṣṭa*. *Viśiṣṭa* is identical with *svarūpa* of the thing. The production of a *viśiṣṭa* means the production of *svarūpa* of the thing."³⁶ To illustrate this point the production of a *jīva* may be taken for example. Whenever a *jīva* has a relation to something external such as body or has even an idea in its mind, it has the production of its *svarūpa* itself. An idea in the mind or relation to a body is a case of change that occurs to *jīva*. With this change *jīva* becomes a *viśiṣṭa*. This *viśiṣṭa* is not different from the essence or *svarūpa* of *jīva*. So the production of change means the production of *svarūpa* (*svarūpa* *srṣṭi*) of *jīva*. Change is *parādhiyaviśeṣa* and its occurrence to *jīva* is *parādhiyaviśeṣāvāpti*. T. Pr. 2.3.18 says, "*Jīva's* production in this sense is not metaphorical, but it is a real case of production."³⁷ This is the implication of the *Sadasatkāryavāda* of Madhva according to which nothing is permanent and nothing is devoid of *pūrvavasthā* and *uttaravasthā*, i.e., nothing has a first beginning in time. It is true that we are not commonly familiar with this meaning of production. We commonly believe that production of a thing is a fresh beginning of a product in time. This belief is perhaps the influence of *Nyāyavaiśeṣikā's* *Asatkāryavāda*, non-existent-product-theory. This theory is not true to

experience, because it does not explain how something comes only from a particular thing. We have seen that oil comes only from the oil-seeds, but not from sand. By way of appreciating the significance of this experience *Sāṅkhya* holds *Satkāryavāda*, existent-product-theory. According to this theory a product is existent even before the so-called production of it just as oil exists in oil-seed before it is produced. So *Sāṅkhya* concludes that the so-called production consists in making patent (*vyakta*) what is latent (*avyakta*). But he does not somehow see that this making patent is itself a fresh change brought upon the thing. So Madhva favours *sadasatkāryavāda*. This is the theory that holds that a product is existent only as a *pūrvavasthā* and non-existent as product, i.e., as an expression of a fresh change. This is what Madhva means by *parādhiyaviśeṣāvāpti* and it is in this very sense that he holds that *Īśvara* creates the world incessantly. N. S. 327 says, "Therefore the doership in the real sense belongs only to Him."³⁸ This implies that nothing in the world can be said to do anything in the real sense of the term. *Acetana* does not do anything. The case of *acetana* also is in reality the same. Taking for example a case where a *jīva* seems to do something, N. S. 327 says, "Both *jīva* and *Īśvara* are in the body—(*jīva* as *abhimānin* and *Īśvara* as *antaryāmin*). He (*Īśvara*) produces knowledge, desire and will of the *jīva* by means of His knowledge, desire and will. He also gives the power of causeness to the other causes which are external to *jīva*. Thus He produces jar, etc. The so-called doership of *jīva* is thus given by Him. The same is the implication of the teaching of the *Gītā*—'knowledge, discrimination, etc., come from me'.³⁹

This illustration explains how rich *Īśvara's* creatorship is. In creating even an ordinary thing like a jar, one can note the real extent of His rich creatorship. His knowing the abilities of *antākāraṇa* is to give those abilities to *antākāraṇa*. This is to create both the abilities and the *antākāraṇa* as having them. *Antākāraṇa* is thus a *viśiṣṭa*. To give this *viśiṣṭa* to *jīva* is to create *jīva* as a *viśiṣṭa*. Under the same circumstance the knowledge, desire and will of the *jīva* are created. With them the *jīva* becomes a more complex *viśiṣṭa*. Some external entities such as implements, etc., as having causeness are also created. As a result of all these productions, the production of a jar takes place. Further, the production of the jar in this manner directly or indirectly moulds the circumstances of the whole world. This implies that the whole world is created with this special circumstance. (Similar ideas are not new to modern scientific thinking.) Further according to the Vedic tradition every aspect of the world is presided by a controlling principle or agent (*abhimānin*). There

are good and bad elements in the world. And there are corresponding good and bad principles—*Devas* and *Daityas*. The latter are finally brought down by the former. The former are therefore good and superior. *Vāyu* is the highest of them. He controls knowledge, life and strength. He is therefore called *jivottama*. *Srī* or *Lakṣmī* is still higher. She is the controller of all *cetana* and *acetana*. The production of the things of the world is an expression of the operation of these agents. This means that when a thing is produced all the agents with their special operation are created. N. S. 280 says, "Abhimānti is that which is the condition (*prayojaka*) of the reality of the thing in question."⁴⁰ The *abhimānins* are thus the lower principles of the world. *Īśvara* is the highest of all. He is the principle of principles. He creates things with all the principles. This is the richness of His creatorship. This does not mean that He creates things through the agency of the other principles. It only means that their agency also is created. This implies that they are themselves created as *viśiṣṭa* with their special agency. For this reason they are called only *nimitta* or *dvārā* in the creation of things. This explains how *Īśvara* is the direct or immediate cause (*sākṣātkāraṇa*) of all that exists. Madhva says in *Anu. Vy.* 1.1.6, "The direct and immediate cause of all is *Nārāyaṇa* (*guṇapūrṇa* and *nirḍoṣa*). He is Brahman. This is the teaching of the whole *Śruti*. The aim of this *Sāstra* is to establish this Truth."⁴¹ In the light of these ideas, it is easy to see how the production of a change means the production of the whole world, i.e., *Brahmāṇḍa*. From *Srī* downwards everything is affected in some way or other whenever and wherever a change takes place in the world. Thus the creation of a change means the creation of all. These ideas illustrate well how the whole world being nothing but change and limitation is *paratantra* and how Brahman, the Ground of all, is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa*.

In the foregoing discussions some sort of doership is attributed to *jīva*. This does not in any sense modify the doership of *Īśvara* and in fact it amplifies *Īśvara's* doership. N. S. 305 says, "[In giving doership (*kartrtva*) to a *cetana*, this is what *Īśvara* does.] Having been the author (*Niyāmaka*) of the particular *svarūpa* and *svabhāva* of the *cetana*, having made *caitanya* the basis, having made *viśeṣa* the means, having introduced many items of identity (*abhedā*) though they are opposed to one another and having given power to *cetana* that is consistent with the production of the thing in question, *Īśvara* makes the things produced by the *jīva*. . . . Such is the power of *Īśvara* which is nowhere else observed. He is Omnipotence itself (*Aśeṣaśakti*) and His doership knows nothing impossible."⁴² This illustrates how the so-called doership

of *jīva* can in no sense be compared to the doership of *Īśvara*. Both are called doership because of the poverty of language. This circumstance is to make use of *Samākarṣanyāya*. This *nyāya* means actual borrowing of words that are primarily applied to *Īśvara* and then applying them to the things of the world in a much inferior secondary sense. In fact, the doership of *jīva* illustrates its changing character and thereby proves how its *svarūpa* is constantly created. But the doership of *Īśvara* illustrates His *aśeṣaśakti* and amplifies His *Svatantrya* and *Guṇapūrṇatva*.

A question may be asked, If *Īśvara* has *aśeṣaśakti*, why has He created this imperfect world? This question does not arise, because the philosophical enquiry concerns itself with the world that is given and not with what ought to be given. Even assuming that the question does arise, this question implies that what is created must be as perfect as the Creator. In that case, the created is either different from *Īśvara* or not different from *Īśvara*. If it is different, it cannot be perfect, because perfection implies absence of limit and thus there cannot be two perfect entities. If it is not different, it is identical with *Īśvara* and then the distinction between the created and the Creator is not justified. Either way, the question is not justified. But it does not follow that the creative power of Brahman is in any sense modified. Madhva holds, however, that in creating a thing, *Īśvara* takes a form that is immanent in that thing. *Īśvara* has thus *Anantarūpa*. Each form is *Īśvara* Himself, in the sense that each is the self-identical expression of *Īśvara*. Because He is *Svatantra*, the difference between the created and the creator does not apply to this form of creation. *Śruti* says, "In Brahman there is no difference of any sort" (*Neha nānāsti kaccana*). Thus *Īśvara* creating Himself along with the creation of the world is an aspect of His creation and this is an expression of His *paramaiśvarya*. Madhva says, *Tai. Bh.* 5, "Thus willed *Īśvara*: let me take many forms" (*Bahurūpo bhāvānītiacintayāt*).

Thus the fact that the world is limited implies the all-completeness of its Ground, i.e., Brahman. This conception would be impossible if the several items of the world could be confused and could not be arranged in a definite order. Confusion and disorder mean that nothing can be fixed. The fact of this very statement and the conception behind it imply order and law in the world. Consistently with this truth and with a view to amplify it, Madhva speaks of *tārāmya*, gradation of higher and lower realities according to the nature of existence, knowledge and function of the things. After fixing them in the scale of gradation, he shows that they can never be confused. He amplifies this idea by his conception of *pañcabheda*—fivefold

difference, namely the everlasting difference between one *cetana* and another *cetana*, one *acetana* and another *acetana*, *cetana* and *acetana*, *cetana* and *Īvara* and *acetana* and *Īvara*. The one aim of Madhva in studying all this is the establishment of *Svatantra* so as to prove the further richness of Its creative power and all-completeness.

Madhva explains in this connection how the world has a definite programme, a definite purpose and a definite order. Nothing is confused in the world. Even the so-called confusion of things from the standpoint of the ordinary beings has to help a definite order of the universe. Even the imperfection or dark side of the world helps the expression of the bright side of the same. This shows how the things are created on a principle. Imperfection leads to perfection. Errors lead to correction and bondage leads to release. The previous stages of things help the expression of the later developments of the same.

Madhva brings in this connection the conception of *karma*. *Karma* is an expression of the disposition of the individuals based on their own doings. This means that *Īvara* brings out fresh changes in the world consistently with the *karma* of the individuals that are to enjoy the creation of the fresh changes. He does not give individuals what is not due to them. And he never fails to give them what is really due to them in accordance with their own *karma*. For this reason He is called *sama*, equal to all. This means that He has no partiality (*vaiṣaṃyā*) and unkindness (*nairghrṇyā*). He does not do things indiscriminately. But this does not mean that He is bound by certain principles. The so-called principles of the world are only the expressions of His perfection and they do not therefore bind Him. That He fashions things according to the *karma* of the individuals does not mean that He is bound by *karma*, because *karma* is after all His creation. He desired law and order in the world. *Karma* appeared. So the world with all its order is the creation of His free desire.

The fact that He wished higher and lower beings does not mean that He is affected by the defects—*vaiṣaṃyā* and *nairghrṇyā*. N. S. 311 says, "With a view to free *Īvara* from *vaiṣaṃyā* and *nairghrṇyā*, it is so far said that *Īvara* creates things according to the *karma* of the *jīvas*. But this means that His creation is not the result of His free desire as he wants the help of *karma*. (How then can He be *Svatantra*? This is the answer.) Though He creates things of course according to *karma*, still His *Svātantrya* is justified. It is already established that He gives *sattā*, etc., to *karma* and so on. To make use of something to which He Himself has given *sattā*, etc., does not affect His *Svātantrya*. An objection may be raised:—So in His

case to make use of *Karma* is as good as not making use of it and this means that He can never be free from *vaiṣaṃyā* and *nairghrṇyā*. This is the answer: *Pramāṇas* establish that *Īvara* has *vaiṣaṃyā* and *nairghrṇyā*. To attribute them to Him is not therefore wrong. Further *vaiṣaṃyā* and *nairghrṇyā* are not by themselves defects. They are defects only when they originate from defects and lead to defects. They cause evil in *jīva*. But they do not cause evil in *Īvara*. *Īvara* is free from evil. For this reason the author of the *Sūtra* attributes them to *Īvara* and the author of the *Bhāṭya* supports it.¹⁴ The idea is that *vaiṣaṃyā* and *nairghrṇyā* are some of the essential aspects of *Svātantrya*. Even in the world one cannot be said to be *svatantra* without having *vaiṣaṃyā* and *nairghrṇyā* in some sense or the other.

7. Svatantra, the Transcendent

So far, the conception that *Īvara* is the sole Creator of all is explained. In this connection the richness of His creatorship is indicated. How the richness of His creatorship leads to the conception of His *Guṇapūrṇatva* is also noted. In recognition of all these truths Madhva calls *Īvara acintya* (inconceivable) and *adbhuta* (wonderful). These are the expressions of His transcendent (*aloukika*) nature. *Śruti* illustrates His transcendence in such passages as "He is smaller than the smallest and bigger than the biggest." Human reason does not of course comprehend this truth. But this does not mean that this truth is meaningless. It is consistent with the *Svatantra* nature of Brahman. It is therefore an expression of *Svatantra* and it is self-established.

The fact that *Svatantra* is the source of the very reality of *paratantra* implies that It is immanent in the latter. Whatever is *paratantra* is a production of *Svatantra*. In order to signify this idea *Śruti* makes use of various terms such as *pratibimba* (reflection), *abhāsa* (appearance), *cchāyā* (image), etc. Corresponding to these terms *Svatantra* is called *Bimba* (the source of reflection). Because the terms reflection, etc., are sometimes applied to unreal or illusory things by people, it must not be supposed that what is created is unreal or illusory. Much energy may be wasted to prove the correctness of this supposition but the supposition leads nowhere. It neither justifies life in the world, nor philosophy nor Brahman as the ground of all. If everything is denied, the fact of denial at least is asserted and this fact at least needs an explanation. And *Svatantra* alone can be this explanation. This is how *Svatantra* is ever self-established. To hold that the denial of all implies the denial of even the fact of denial is only a clever way of explaining away the point at issue and it cannot be respected in a

sound philosophy. So, on no basis can the actuality or the reality of *paratantra* be considered to be unreal or illusory and the self-established nature of *Svatantra* be denied.

Sometimes in place of *pratibimba* the terms like *sadrśa*, *śarīpa* and *amśa* are used. These terms are commonly taken to mean similarity or part. On the basis of this commonsense meaning, it must not be supposed that *Svatantra* is similar to *paratantra* or *paratantra* is a part of *Svatantra*. For *Svatantra* is transcendent and it cannot be similar to *paratantra*. Further, *Svatantra* is devoid of difference within Itself and It has no parts. So the terms *sadrśa*, etc., as applied to *paratantra* or *pratibimba*, mean that its reality is derived from *Svatantra*.

Of the two entities *acetana* and *cetana* that constitute the world, *acetana* has mere *sattā* and it is a *pratibimba* of the *sattā* aspect of *Svatantra*. *Cetana* has in addition *jñāna* and *ānanda*. It is therefore a *pratibimba* of *sattā*, *jñāna* and *ānanda* of *Svatantra*. *Jīva* in this sense is called *ābhāsa* of *Īśvara*. *Anu. V. 3. 2. 42* says, "jīva is called *ābhāsa* because its knowledge and existence are always produced by *Īśvara*. Just as a man's shadow is a reflection and a creation of the man all the *jīvas*, *caturmukha*, etc., are *pratibimbās* of *paramātmān*. They are incomplete and Hari alone is all-complete."⁴⁴ *Anu. V. 4. 1. 65* says, "The entity denoted by the term *Ātman* is therefore only *Viṣṇu* and none else. Because the other entities are not *Guṇapūrṇa*, the terms *Ātmā*, *Brahma*, etc., do not mean anything other than *Viṣṇu*."⁴⁵ So a *jīva*'s reality is only derived. *Jīva* is therefore *ātmābhāsa* but not *Ātman*. *Ātman* is only *Viṣṇu*. Therefore the belief that Madhva holds *Ātmanādvaitavāda*, namely, the doctrine that there are many *ātmāns*, does not represent the spirit of his teaching. His position alone brings out the real significance of the doctrine of One *Ātman* (*Aikātmya Vāda*) taught by the *Upaniṣads*, because it accounts for the actual existence of *jīvas*.

By holding that *Svatantra* alone is *Ātman*, Madhva brings out the complete identical character of *Svatantra*. To note this point is essential, because the truth that *Svatantra* is *Guṇapūrṇa* may be carelessly taken to mean that each of the *guṇas* that constitute *Svatantra* represents only a part of *Svatantra*. It may be further concluded, in spite of Madhva's teaching that *Svatantra* is completely devoid of distinction within Itself, that each *guṇa* is essentially different from the others. In explaining the complete oneness of *Svatantra* Madhva says in *Anu. V. 3. 2. 16*, "The *guṇas* of *Īśvara* transcend all. All His *guṇas* are all His other *guṇas*. All are the creators of all. All are all-complete. . . . The identity of them is *Vāsudeva*. He is completely defectless."⁴⁶ This is the conception of *Guṇapūrṇa*.

Having established that *Īśvara* as *guṇapūrṇa* is all transcendent, Madhva speaks of His *bheda* (distinction) from the world. The word *bheda* in this connection signifies the highly distinguished nature of *Īśvara*, namely His complete transcendence. To modify *bheda* in any manner is to lower down *Īśvara* and to deny His *Svātantrya*, for *asvatantra* is defective and *svatantra* is defectless and the two can never be identical. *Anu. V. 3. 2. 42* says, "As implied by *Śruti*, *Svatantra* is so far well conceived. It is not confused with *asvatantra*. All the attributes given to *svatantra* are justified, because they are implied in the conception of *Svatantra*. These attributes cannot be justified, if they are applied to *asvatantra*. Any attribute that is inconsistent with *Svatantra* must not be applied to It, for that which is opposed to *Svatantra* is itself. All aspects of our experience must be interpreted consistently with *Svatantra*."⁴⁷ *Svatantra* is thus ever distinct from *asvatantra*. *Anu. V. 3. 3. 39* says, "*Svatantra* is distinguished from *asvatantra* in order to prove Its defectlessness (*nirḍoṣatva*)."⁴⁸ Thus Madhva speaks of *bheda* just to define *Svatantra* clearly.

8. Svatantra, the Real of the Reals

Just as Madhva employs the conception of *bheda* to prove the *nirḍoṣatva* of *Īśvara*, he employs the conception of the reality (*satyatva*) of the world to justify the creatorship of *Īśvara*. If the world is not real, the creatorship of *Īśvara* cannot be justified. The conception of a creator of nothing involves self-contradiction and the denial of the reality of the world ends in the denial of its cause, i.e., Brahman. *N. S. 210* says, "It is wrong to think that to hold the world is real does not lead to any good (*puruṣārtha*), for the reality of the world justifies the creatorship of *Īśvara*. Through this, His *guṇapūrṇatva* or *māhātmya* is conceived and this leads to *puruṣārtha*."⁴⁹ The reality of the world can be justified from the standpoint of Brahman also. Because Brahman is *Guṇapūrṇa* and *nirḍoṣa*, His creation must be necessarily real. But the *satyatva* of the world is never confused with the *satyatva* of Brahman. Because the world is *satya*, it is never taken to be a second to Brahman. It is never equal to Brahman in any sense of the term. Brahman is *Paramārtha* in the sense that it gives reality to all. For this reason, Brahman is *Advaita* or *Advītiya*, secondless and superiorless. This is the teaching of *Śruti*: *Advaitam paramārthataḥ, Advaitaḥ sarva bhāvānām*, etc.

Further, to call the world *satya* proves the *paratantra* character of the world. The world is *satya* because it has *satva* from Brahman. As the giver of *satva* to the world, Brahman is *satya*. *Anu. V. 1. 1. 6* says, "Brahman is *satya* because It gives *satva* to the world. This is the meaning

of *śreṣṭhi* (creation).¹⁹⁰ In interpreting this passage, N. S. 134 says, "Sat means *sadbhāva*. This means birth. Because Brahman gives this to everything other than itself. It is called *Satya*. . . . Living or existing is also a meaning of *satva*. . . . Destruction is also a meaning of the same. . . . It is called *Satya* because Brahman gives living and destruction also to the world. It is called *Satya*."¹⁹¹ The world having *satva* in these senses, is necessarily a changing entity (*vikāri*) and is therefore a product (*kārya*). This means that it has a cause. That cause must be changeless (*Nirvikāra*) and is therefore *Svatantra*. This is how the conception of *satya* of the world helps the conception of *Svatantra* as its Ground.

Such a conception of *satya* of the world also leads to various other conceptions of the world that establish the truth of *Svātantrya*. *Bhṅ. T.* 139 says, "The world does not continue to be the same. It changes. For this reason, it is said to be *anṛta*, though it is real because Brahman is always changeless. It is always *Satya*."¹⁹² N. Mr. 289 says, "In some passages of the scriptures, the world is said to be *asat*, because it is *asādiu* and *asvatantra*; *apāramārthika*, because it changes and is destroyed; *mithyā*, because it is useless (*vythā*); *avidyamāna*, because it does not continue to be in relation to *jīva*; and *māyāmāya*, because it is an expression of *prakṛti*. The world is compared to a dream, etc., because it is *anītya*, *vikāri* and *paratantra*, and never because it is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman."¹⁹³ So, according to Madhva, the world as *satya* is *paratantra*. This speaks for the transcendence or *Svātantrya* of Brahman.

9. *Svatantra*, the Only Reality

Anu. V. 3. 8. 39 says, "The *gunas*, *satya*, etc., form the very essence of this highest *Īvara*."¹⁹⁴ Consistently with this idea, *Bhṅ. T.* 138 says, "He alone is *Satya*. *Satyatva* means *Svātantrya*. That is *Viṣṇu*. The *satyatva* of other things is their being always in changing process. Such is always the being of *puruṣa* (*jīva*) and *prakṛti*."¹⁹⁵ The being of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in this connection is their being in space and time. *Viṣṇu* is *Satya* in the sense that He is the very Ground of all this—space, time, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. This means that He alone is *nītya*. *Satya* and *Nītya* connote the same idea. N. S. 225 says, "*Satya* is interpreted as *sanātana* (existing always). *Satya* and *nītya* therefore mean the same thing."¹⁹⁶ This passage implies that nothing else can be *satya* or *nītya* in the primary sense of these terms. N. S. 200 says, "To say that *prāṇa*, etc. (world) are *satya* implies that they are *adhīna*."¹⁹⁷ In this sense, *Śruti* says, Brahman is *satya* of *satya* (*satyaśyasatyam*). In this expression, the second *satya* means *adhīna*. N. Mr. 292 says, "The *satyatva* of the world, i.e., *prāṇa*,

etc., is inferior (*apakṛṣṭa*).¹⁹⁸ The *Sūtra* calls the world *avara* (inferior). It is inferior because it is *adhīna* and *adhīna* means derived. So the *Satyatva* or *nītyatva* of the world is only derived. It is *avara*, *apakṛṣṭa* or *adhīna*. But the *satyatva* or *nītyatva* of Brahman is *Svatantra*. So the difference between the two cases of *satyatva* or *nītyatva* is one of kind and not of degree. One can never be compared with the other. In fact, the *satyatva* of the world can never be expressed along with the *Satyatva* of Brahman. N. S. 188 says, "Therefore it is established that to mention anything along with *Īvara* (as similar to *Īvara*) is prohibited."¹⁹⁹

If the statements "Brahman is *satya*" and "world is *satya*" occur anywhere in Madhva's works, his intention is to prove or illustrate one by the other as follows:—The world is *satya*, because Brahman is *Satya*, i.e., Brahman gives *satyatva* to the world. Brahman is *Satya*, because the world is *satya*, i.e., *satyatva* of the world points to Brahman as its Ground. It is evident that to take the *satyatva* of both as similar is sublated by the very foundations of this system, viz., *Brahmavāda*. If Śaṅkara says that the world is *mithyā* because it is *bādhiya* (sublated), Madhva points out that the world is not *bādhiya* because it is given by *pramāṇa* even as Śaṅkara's Brahman (*Nirguṇa*) is not *bādhiya*. Madhva holds that the world is *satya* in the sense of *abādhiya*, even as Śaṅkara's Brahman is *satya* in the sense of *abādhiya*. Thus he brings Śaṅkara's highest Brahman, i.e., *Nirguṇa* down to the level of the world as he conceives. N. Mr. 95 makes use of this idea and says, "Let the world have *satva* (*satyatva*) that is similar to that *satva* (*satyatva*) of your (Śaṅkara's) Brahman, i.e., *Nirguṇa* (supposing it to be real for the sake of argument)."²⁰⁰

Madhva justifies the conception of *Svatantra* as the Highest Reality on the basis of a well-conceived scheme of degrees of reality of the world. He says in *Br. Bh.* 31, "That which has evil is *mūṛta*. (That is the word below *Vāyu*.) *Virinca* (*Vāyu*) is the *rasa* (principle) of *mūṛta*. He is free from evil (*Śrī* is the *rasa* of *Vāyu*). She is free from evil) because *Śrī* and *Vāyu* are free from evil, they are *amūṛta*. *Viṣṇu* is not like *mūṛta*, not like the *rasa* of *mūṛta* and not like *amūṛta*. He is therefore always under all circumstances the Highest. All else is inferior. He is therefore *Satya* of *satya*. He alone is the principle of *mūṛta* and *amūṛta*. Therefore He alone is *Satya*."²⁰¹ According to this passage, the order of gradation of Reality is this—*mūṛta*, *mūṛtarasa* or *amūṛta* and *Viṣṇu*. The latter ones are the principles of the former ones. *Viṣṇu* is the Highest of all. In holding that *Viṣṇu* alone is *Satya*, Madhva's idea is explained in *Bhṅ. T.* 138: "If He wills, then all this exists; otherwise, it does not exist. Therefore, under every circumstance

and in every connection, the truth that He alone is real must be fully recognised."⁶¹

From the standpoint that Brahman alone is real Madhva says in *Bhg. T.* 125, "Svāntantra is satva. Viṣṇu alone has it and none else. *Bhg. T.* 125, 135. . . *Svatantra* is vastu; *paratantra* is avastu, i.e., not vastu. *Bhg. T.* 125, 135. . . *Svatantra* is cetana, Viṣṇu alone is cetana."⁶² These expressions mean that from the standpoint of Brahman, the world is neither sat nor vastu and the so-called cetana is not cetana. Madhva says further, *Bhg. T.* 106, "Svatantra is Paramārtha (Absolute). Hari's desire is svatantra. Anything else is paratantra. It does not at all exist as paramārtha. . . . The real (sat) is the Independent (Svādhīna). The dependent is unreal. Therefore, the wise say that it does not exist. . . . Though the world exists from the beginningless to the endless time, because it is paratantra, it must be said to be non-existent. The changeless Viṣṇu alone is Paramārtha, because He is svatantra. . . . If there is dvaita (illusion) about Him, it is His creation. He Himself removes it, if the conviction that dvaita is adhīna and He is Svatantra (occurs to jīva). Because dvaita is adhīna, it is said to be nāsti (non-existing). This is the teaching of those that know Brahman and teach it."⁶⁴

This is how Madhva justifies the teaching of *Śruti*, "Brahman is one only and It is secondless" (*Ekamevadvītyam-Brahma*). He brings out the significance of this *Śruti*, by means of another *Śruti*, "All these different aspects of the world, *svabhāva*, *jīva*, *karma*, *dravya*, *kāla*, *Śruti* and *kriyā*, exist because of His will. And if He is indifferent, they do not exist."⁶⁵ It may be noted that all these entities also represent the world-principles according to other systems of thought like *Cārvāka*, etc. Madhva brings them all under the category of the world and makes them the creation of Brahman. Thus the only aim of his teaching is to establish the truth of Brahman, i.e., *Svatantra*. As he says in *Bhg. T.* 3, "Paramātman alone is *Tattva*. Therefore the wise see Him only."⁶⁶

10. Svatantra, the All

We have seen how creation means giving *sattā*, etc., to the created. This meaning of creation enables Madhva to explain the passages of *Śruti* which apparently teach the identity of Brahman and the world. He says, *Bhg. T.* 17, "All this, viz., the world consisting of *bheda* is said to be *puruṣa* Himself, because the *sattā*, etc., of the world are *adhīna*."⁶⁷ *Bhg. T.* 53, "Because Hari gives *sattā* to all, He is called *Sarvatattva*."⁶⁸ *Bhg. T.* 55, "Because Keṣava gives *sattā* to *jīva*, He is said to be identical with it."⁶⁹ *Tai. Bh.* 9, "All this is He, because He is the giver of all this."⁷⁰ *V. T. V.*,

"All this is called Brahman, because *sattā*, etc., of this are *Brahmādhīna*."⁷¹ The following is what Madhva means by these passages:—On the strength of the apparent meaning of certain Vedic passages, to hold that there is complete identity between the world and Brahman is to confuse one with the other. This results in the denial of both. *Paratantra* as being identified with *Svatantra* is unreal, because it ceases to be *paratantra*. Similarly, *Svatantra* as being identified with *paratantra* is unreal, because it ceases to be *Svatantra*. Therefore, we must abandon the apparent meaning of *Śruti*, and study the implication of the *abheda* or identity taught by it. This implication consists only in recognizing the fact that Brahman is the Giver of reality to the world. Thus Madhva explains *abheda* by employing the same conceptions, *Svatantra* and *paratantra*, that point out *bheda* between the two. *Bheda* according to him is thus an expression of *abheda* as taught by the *Śruti*. *Abheda* implies that *paratantra* can never be separated from *svatantra*, i.e., it can never exist independent of *Svatantra*. *Paratantra* therefore is *ananya* but Brahman is transcendent. It transcends all that is the world. *Bhg. T.* 21 says, "Because *Sattā*, etc., of Viṣṇu are *Svatantra*, He is different (*Anya*) from the world. And because all else derives *sattā*, etc., from Brahman, though it is by nature different from Brahman, it is identical (*ananya*) with Brahman."⁷²

So, Madhva concludes *Anu. V.* 3. 2. 46, "Bhagavān, and Bhagavān only, is taught by all the Vedas."⁷³ *Bhg. T.* 59, "Those that have little or no knowledge do not see Brahman as the only meaning of the Vedas, but he alone who has pure knowledge sees only Brahman as taught by them."⁷⁴ *Anu. V.*—"Therefore the object of enquiry is the Dearest, the All-complete Vāsudeva, the Secondless Parabrahman The Highest."⁷⁵

Thus the *Brahmavāda* of Madhva establishes how Brahman, the Ground of all, is *Svatantra* and *Guṇapūrṇa*. Madhva says: the contemplation of this Truth is an immediate joy and a joy for ever. This is Madhva's philosophy of *Ānanda* (Brahman) and for this reason he is rightly called *Ānanda Tīrtha*.

ABBREVIATIONS

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| <i>Anu. V.</i> . . . <i>Anu Vyaakhyaṇa</i> , by Madhva. | <i>Tai. Bh.</i> . . . <i>Taittirīya Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva. |
| <i>At. Bh.</i> . . . <i>Āitareya Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva. | <i>T.C.</i> . . . <i>Tātparyā Candrikā</i> , by Vātsesaja. |
| <i>Bhg. T.</i> . . . <i>Bhāṣyaṇī Tātparya</i> , by Madhva. | <i>T.Pr.</i> . . . <i>Tattva Prakāśika</i> , by Jayatīrtha. |
| <i>Br. Bh.</i> . . . <i>Bṛhadāraṇya Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva. | <i>T.S.T.</i> . . . <i>Tattva Saṅkhyāyana Tīkā</i> , by Jayatīrtha. |
| <i>Br. S. Bh.</i> . . . <i>Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva. | <i>V.T.V.</i> . . . <i>Viṣṇu Tattva Vinirṇaya</i> , by Madhva. |
| <i>M. Bh.</i> . . . <i>Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣya</i> , by Madhva. | |
| <i>N.S.</i> . . . <i>Nyāya Sūdhā</i> , by Jayatīrtha. | |

APPENDIX

1. *Tai.* वतो वा इमानि भूतानि जानते । येन ज्ञातानि जानते । न च प्रवर्ति अभिसंविद्यते । तद्विजिज्ञातव्यं तद्वत् ।
2. सर्वेष्वेवा यत्नद्वयमर्थेति ।
3. *Bhg.* इत्थं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च । यदुपग्रहतः संततं न संति बहुपेक्षया ।
4. *Gha.* अहं सर्वस्य प्रभवः ।
5. *Br. S.* जन्माद्यस्य ततः ।
6. *T. C. 770.* प्रथमे ब्रह्मलक्षणस्य अतिश्यासि परिहारीऽपि अविचारौ तद्विपरिहारश्च । कारणत्वं प्रधानस्य निरस्य स्थापितं वदि । अविचारैः तदा कोऽपि सामान्यं ब्रह्मवादिनः । वृत्तेष्वप्यहलं मेघं आदायति प्रभवतः । संवेत्तुं स्वाग्रयद्योनेन कोलासः तेन विद्यपति ।
7. *M. Bh.* with *Srinivasa Tirthiya.* 'प्रभवः सर्वमाधानां सत्तामिति विनिर्धयः । स च जनयति प्राणः यतोऽहं पुरः पृथक् ।' हारेण सर्व भावानां चेतनाचेतन पदार्थानां प्रभवः उत्पादकः इति निश्चयस्त्वं ज्ञानं सतामेव । असतां तु अन्यथा इति भावः । ... हरिः सर्वमेतत्वं स्वकोषेण जनयति । ... चेतनान् पृथक् जडैरन्यथेन देहद्वारा जनयतीत्यर्थः । ... अनेन ब्रह्मणे जगज्जन्मादि कर्तृत्वमेव सिद्धाति इत्युक्तं भवति । ... प्रधानादीनां असात्त्वत्वात् न जगत्कारणत्वमिति भावः । 'सर्वकर्ता सर्वकारिकः एकएव नचापरः ।' 'केचित् बालान् एतौ दृष्टिमाहुरकीर्तिताः । ... प्रधानादिति चारे । विमुखाः सर्व एते । ... प्रधानकाल प्रवेशमुखाः सर्ववितदशाः ।' 'विभूति प्रवर्गं त्वन्ये मन्यते दृष्टिविस्तकाः । स्वप्र-मायास्तस्मैति दृष्टिरन्यैः विचारिता । ... सर्वदेशभ्यन्तरीयस्य विचारः कुतश्च्यते । तस्मादेवाविकारस्य विष्णोर्दिच्छावशादिदं । यथार्थमेव संभूतं इति वेदकचोखिलं । प्रमोः अविकारिणः मानातीतस्य हरेः सकाशात्तत्वाद्यर्थः अविकल्पवि जगतः सा इच्छामात्रं इच्छामात्राधीनं दृष्टिविषये यथार्थनिश्चयवतो ब्रह्मादयः प्राहुः । 'अन्यथाप्रत्ययोद्वैतं शमयेतं यतो हरिः अद्वैतः तेन चोद्विष्टः तुरीयः पुरुषोत्तमः । यस्मात्कारणात् यदप्रसिद्धं भगवत्सत्त्वं वरेण ब्रह्मणा प्रपन्नं तदप्रसादादिति यावत् । द्विधावस्तु तच्चापेक्षया अन्यथा महद्भिः न ज्ञानं प्रयुक्तोक्तैव ज्ञातं । तस्मात्परमेष्ठाद्वैतमुच्यते । तदेव जीवेन ओम्नेन असृजनेन अन्यथाज्ञानं द्वैतमुद्विष्टं । तन्मिथ्या ज्ञानं परमाथस्य विष्णोः इच्छावशात् अन्येव ज्ञातं । अतः तद्विच्छन्नैव निवर्तते । 'तद्वैतं परं ब्रह्म तदेव ज्ञातमन्यथा । जीवेनैतद्वैतमुद्विष्टं मिथ्याज्ञानं तदेव च ।'
8. *Anu. V. 2. 2. 1.* खेच्छाजुगारितामेव सातंम्यं द्विविधे विदुः ।
9. *N. S. 335.* अतः स्वतंत्र एवासौ अंगीकृताः । स एव च ईश्वरः ।
10. *T. S. T.* पदपर्यायानां तत्प्रयुक्तं दृष्टिच्छावसादिनमते । In interpreting this passage Raghavendra notes—मूलोक्त्युद्दिष्टार्थमाह । सहेति ।
11. *At. Bh. 37.* तद्विचिन्त्येभवेत्तथा दृष्ट्यादिनादर्शयति ।
12. *Br. Bh. 9-15.* यस्यासंसर्गतो भावः तस्मादभ्येति अश्वेत । आतत्त्वाच्च मातृत्वात् आभ्येति परमो हरिः ।
13. *T. C. 332.* विद्वत्स ईशतंत्रत्वात्सादेवाचिन्नसत्त्वत् । यतोऽस्तत्परार्थानां चेतनादभ्यन्तरेण ।

- ... तस्माद्विपरत्वा द्विकेश्वराधीनमित्यतः ननुक्तं । नगरिस्वभावत्वात् तदनधीनत्वमित्यतः युक्तं । अस्तु' मीछिद्वैतमिति वाहरीच्छा तद्वत्त्वत्वात्तमः । मिछात्मकं हि संज्ञातं अन्यथाविनिर्धयेत् । ... किंच उत्तरखन्तरमपि आकाशस्य विस्तरत्वं निम्नतुल्य आविर्भावत्वं संपादितुं शक्यः ईश्वरः । तथा इच्छाभावात्तत्तत्पदवति । औपधा-दिवशात्तत्त्वैकताकादेरप्य तात्पर्यं । कुर्वतांस्तत्त्वैकताकादेरप्य तात्पर्यं । तस्माद्व्यवस्थाकारणमपि अन्यथाकर्तुं शक्यत्वात् यथेष्टविनियोगाहता अस्त्येव । बोधयति च बुद्धिस्तुतः स्वभावस्यापीश्वराधीनत्वं । संदेहे शासनाख्यः मीषास्मात् पत्तनिलः । नमोदादातिश्रुतां मार्गमिच्छादिवाताः । ... आकाशनाकाशा इति युक्तेच्छाया औपिकाकाशाद्व्यप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्य अकाशगतस्य विस्तररूपस्य अवकाशाप्रदत्वस्य न केवलं ईश्वरायतत्त्वान् तत्र तत्समवायिनीः । किन्तु परिच्छिन्नादाकाशादपि अतिरिच्छिन्नेष्वपि सर्वभूतपुण्यैकमिति वचनात् तस्य निरवधारितत्वात्पीति इत्यर्थः । अत एवोक्तं सुभावां 'नहिदेवकाशायां परिच्छिन्नस्य अवकाशादनुत्वं निरवधारितमिति आकाशस्य अवकाशादातुल्यस्य ईश्वरायतत्वं ईश्वरस्यापि पृथक् सत्त्वं चोक्तं । ... सिद्धाति नस्य ईशतंत्रत्वं समर्थनं च स्वभावविषयमन्तरमहत्पुण्यसिद्धयर्थं । ... एवं उत्तराधिकारोपपत्ति उपपत्त्यै । तस्मादाकाशाद्व्यो ब्रह्मणि मुख्यः ।
14. *T. C. 835.* शराविषाणादिरलंताभावप्रतिबोधितमधीनता । उरिपादविषेदीयो यदिदं यथादिक् । यथादाविषवायेत तदभावाद्भूतसत् ।
 15. *N. S. 412.* सर्वे हि इत्यर्थेण मितं अवस्थाभेदेन अनित्यं ।
 16. *N. S. 293.* कारणैः विनाकर्तुं शक्नोति हरिः कारणानि उत्पादयैव करिष्यामीति खेच्छानियमतः कारणैरेव इदं जगत् सदा स्रजति ।
 - 17-18. *N. S. 299.* एवं अन्यथा प्रकृत्वा अहंकारं अहंकारमहोत्तं इत्येवं तथा प्रकृतिं निमित्तीकृत्य कालादिकं बोधायनी कृत्य कर्तुं शक्नोति एतेनैव इदं उत्पादनीकृत्येव इदं संप्रदायीति खेच्छानियमतो नियतः स्तुतिवत्तत्ताशक्त्यादि मन्त्रिष्वकारणैः इदं जगत्सदाभोतीति चेजाना । ... इदमुक्तं भवति । ननुक्तं ईश्वरस्य कारणोपादानादि निवर्तो स्तुतिरिति । तत्रास्ति विषयः । तथाच प्रकृत्वादीनां कारणत्वं युक्तं । सचानि-यमीनकुलात्तद्विषयं तान्यपहाय व्यवस्य वा करणे शक्यमन्यथैव नवनः । चेनतस्यसातंम्यं देशं च पारतंत्र्यं न स्यात् । किं नामखेच्छावत् एव । ततः सातंम्यादिकमपि युक्तं । नचतानि स्वाधीनताशक्त्यादिसंति । येन ऐश्वर्यं निरर्थकं न स्यात् । किन्तु भगवत्त्वेन तदीय शक्त्यादिकमावर्तते । एतः सत्ताविषयं अतिशयेन ऐश्वर्येयतमेव । यथोक्तं । साधनानां साधनत्वं यदासाधनानिमित्तं । तदा साधनसंपत्तिः ऐश्वर्येयतमेव ।
 19. *T. S. T.* 'स्वतंत्रमस्वतंत्रं द्विविधं तत्त्वमित्यते' तत्त्वमयारोपितं प्रतिविषय इति यावत् ।
 20. *T. C. 379.* किंच अकर्तुं अन्यथाकर्तुं कर्तुं चालीश्वरस्य वत् । सामर्थ्यं तेन तत्तत्र अनाद्यपि च सादिवत् । ईश्वरेति सर्वशक्तिप्रतिद्वयशक्त्यात् । ... अथाकृताकाशादित्यादिह तं अतीतादिकालं कर्तुं शक्नोति । संकृताभावात्तुतद्वत्त्वं । तदभावाच्चकारणित्वं । न च शक्यमन्यथावत् तदुपपत्तिः । स्वभाव जीवकर्मणि इत्यादि टीकाद्वयं सुभावादिरोपात् । ऐश्वर्यं विरोधाच्च । तथा चानादीश्वरेच्छाधीना अनादिसमावता कर्मनिर्गतताविरोधात् । स्वभावमात्रस्य ईशाधीनता आकाशाधिकरणे उक्ता । अत्र तु अनादेरपीति भेदः । परार्थविरोधाभावादिहः ईशाद्वयस्य सर्वसापीति विवक्षादिवक्ष्यते । अत्र तु प्राप्तसत्ता सत्तासंबन्धस्य उत्पत्तिरहितानामपि स्वस्वसत्ता ईशाधीनत्वमिति विवक्षा । ... अनादि स्वभाव नियामक शक्तिरूपमहापुण्य सिद्धयर्थं विष्णोः । अनादिप्रवृत्ति निमित्तकशब्दसमन्वयार्थं च ईशाधीनताका ।

21. *Br. Bh.*, 21-18. उपासनेन च नैव तत् सर्वस्यार्थवर्तिनं । न कदाचिज्जगद्वाचो न कदाचित्-
दन्यथा । जगत् प्रवाहुरेण सर्वदेवं व्यवस्थितं । आनतः कर्मतो वापि तपसा चाकितोपवा । न कस्या-
प्यन्यथाभावं जगदेतत्कदाचन । सत्येतिष्ठतुः श्रीधरसाजीनाः सत्याः खड्गे तथा । असत्त्वं नोस्ति काचय
सर्वेषां ज्ञानोत्तरं । ज्ञात्वा विष्णुमते मुक्तिं प्राप्नुयात् पुरुषोत्तमं ।
- सत्यसंस्कृतो विष्णुः नान्यथातु करिष्यति ।
22. *At. Bh.* 30. सर्वेषां पुण्यत्वात्पुनः सत्यं इति चेत् । तस्मापि सत्यतादत्तासाधुदुर्गुणो हरिः ।
सत्यसत्यएतस्यात् श्रीपुरुषः संकेतः ।
23. *N. S.* 19. अद्वैतिनां अविद्याधीन जीवमहाविभागवत् तार्किकार्दीनां च गुणवत्त्वाधीन
द्रव्यत्ववत् अमादेरपि ईशराधीनत्वोपरतेः ।
24. *T. Pr.* 2. 3. 7. 'विमलत्वाच्च विकारित्वेन युक्तं । विकारिण एव विमलालेकेदृश्यते । . .
एकोऽविमलः परमः पुरुषो विष्णुरप्येते । . . विभारोद्भात्यशक्तिः स्यात् तददस्ति जनादिने । अत्रैव प्रयोगो
भवतः । विषदुर्वाप्तस्तत् विमलत्वात् घटादिबन्ध । प्रज्ञातोत्पत्तिमत्, अविमलत्वात् स्वतिरेकेण घटादिबन्धितं ।
किंकारिण एव विमलत्वात् इत्येते नाविकारिणः ।
25. *At. Bh.* 37. अत्रात्ता गुणाप्रवृत्ताः । गुणाप्रवृत्तायामेव कालकृत्येष्टस्याप्यन्तर्भावः ।
26. *Anu. V.* 1. 1. 11. 'तादृशत्वात्तच्छब्दः ।' *N. S.* तादृशीकृत्य ईश्वरशक्तिः । यथिष्टानि स
स्वभावास्त्वामसर्वविषया । अन्यथासर्वधरत्वद्वयेः । अतस्तस्याः शक्तः किं शक्यमिति चेत् । तत्सत्यसत्त्वैव
अनादित्विदित्वमिति चेत् । सत्यं । अनादीश्वरसकलैवेति वदामः । उक्तंचात्रप्रमाणं । इत्थं कर्मचकारश्चेति जिज्ञा-
सापिकरये ।
27. *Br. Bh.* साधनानां साधनत्वं दत्तः । तत् साधनं ।
28. *N. S.* 19. सकलकारकाणां तदधीनसत्ताप्रभुतिरेव तद्विच्छां विनाकार्त्वापि कार्यस्य
अनुवृत्तादिति ।
29. *N. S.* 330. केचिन्मन्येते सत्त्वमेव वस्तुनः सत्यमिति । अग्रेतु प्रमाणयोग्यत्वं अन्ये पुरश्च
क्रियात्वं । तदिदं त्रयमपि भगवदधीनमेवेति ।
30. *N. S.* 513. परानुपेक्षया प्रतिविमानं सत्त्वं धर्मोऽसत्त्वं इत्युच्यते स सर्वेषां पदार्थानां ।
स सर्वोपि ईशान एव । अन्यथा तेषां स्वातंत्र्यं प्रसंगेन ईशत्वात्पुनरेतेः । सर्वं शक्तिवदमिति धृतिविरोधा
परिणतः ।
31. *N. S.* 166. तद्वस्तु स्वात्मना देवदेवेन अतिसत्त्वं देवदत्ताधीनं सत्ता प्रतीति प्रभृतिरुक्तं तदव-
त्सगो देवदेवस्य प्रतीतिं प्रतिविशेषकं भवेदिति दिष्टं । इदं तु अग्रे ईशराधीनं सत्तादिकं । तत्कथं तस्याचित्त
विशेषकं भवेत् । अथ वा बदीदं वस्तु स्वात्मना ईशेण अनित्यत्वात् तदधीनसत्तादिकं न स्यात् तदेव स्वात्मनः
परमेश्वरस्य प्रतीतिरिति चेत् । न चैवमिति चेत् । नराजादिषु त्रिषु विनामकत्वात् मत्तयासित्वं अपितर्हि सत्तादि
प्रदत्तमित्युक्तं भवति ।
32. *N. S.* 330. नन्वेतदुक्तं । प्रपञ्चादिसत्तादेः निराल्पत्वात् । नित्यस्वरराधीनताऽप्रमत्तात् इत्यत
आह । नित्यमिति । यथा अनित्यं घटादिकं अनित्यतामिति च तदा नित्यमपि नित्यात्मना नित्यं च सर्वदेव
ईश्वरो नियामयति । . . एतदुक्तं भवति । यथादिष्टादयो अनित्यस्वभावा अपि नाकस्मादनितामभवति ।
तथास्त्वैव उल्लस्यत एव विनास प्रसंगात् । एवं नित्यस्यापि नित्यताविरपराधीना तद्विकारोपः । न च

- अनित्यतापराधाभेति कदाचित्पदादेः नित्यताप्राप्ता । विनाशकारणोपनिपातप्रोच्यत् । तथा नित्यस्य
नित्यताधीः पराधीनत्वेऽपि नञाच्च नित्यता प्रसक्तिः । तच्चिन्मन निजमादिति ।
33. *Anu. V.*, 2. 2. 1. दौर्लभ्याच्च ब्रह्मदीनां बाहुव्यादप्येति । तामसत्त्वाच्च लोकस्य सिध्दाज्ञान
प्रसक्तिः । विद्वेत्तात् परमेतत्वे तत्त्वैरेति युक्तानि । अनादि वाचनायोगात् अद्वाराणां बहुलतः । पुराप्रह
गृहीतत्वात् कर्तृ समवाः सदा । तथापि शुद्धब्रह्मदीनां ईशानुप्रदीनां । सुतुक्थः तमोऽद्वयः आगमावृत्ताः
सदा । इति विद्यापतिः सम्यक् सत्त्वानां निराकृति । चकार निजमकानां बुद्धिगणत्वमित्ये ।
Previous to this passage we have 'अनादि कालतोद्भूताः समवाहि प्रवाहृतः । न चोच्छेदोऽस्ति कस्यापि
समयस्य स्वतोविष्णुः । नातिमूल्यमेतेषां पृथग्दर्शनाति स्फुटं । तर्कैर्दृष्टमेव कार्येण व्याप्यमादिना ।'
34. *N. S.*, 328. सर्वमानविरोध एव वा प्रधानब्रह्मदीनां ब्रह्मोद्धान संस्कृतः । तथादीक्षितोऽप्येतु
मायावादिनां उपमात्वं प्राप्नुयात् । तेषां हि कर्तृत्वमोक्षवादि सकलधर्मै विकलं असत्कल्पं नैतन्वमात्रं
अभीष्टत्वं अविद्याया एव अचेतनायाः सर्वकारणत्वं वंचमोक्षापिकरणत्वं अनुपपन्नमिति ।
35. *T. C.*, 389. अन्यथा ('स इदं सर्वसंयुक्त' इत्यादी सर्वसंयुक्तः अदिकर्षः प्रयुक्तः) 'विश्रतः
परमात्मित्वं विद्यात्मनं परावर्ण' इत्यादावपि कार्यमात्रपरः स्यात् । तस्मात् धृतिपुत्रोः अन्योत्कार्पस्य
अनुकल्पात् भाष्योक्त एवार्थ इति ।
36. *N. S.*, 431. अपूर्वविशेषोपजननेहि विशिष्टाकारोपजननेहि भावी विशिष्टाकारश्च वस्तुसह-
पाभिश्च इति तत्संबन्धी उपजानो भवति ।
37. *T. Pr.*, 2. 3. 18. युष्माकानादेरपि जीवस्य उत्पत्तिः तदुपपत्त्येतेः । न चैव जीवोत्पत्तिरिति
उपचारासाधनत्वात् । पराधीनविशेषनामस्य उत्पत्तेरत्र विवक्षितत्वात् ।
38. *N. S.*, 327. तस्मादीश्वरत्वेन सुखस्वात्म्यं कर्तृत्वं च ।
39. *N. S.*, 327. एतदुक्तं भवति । जीवेश्वरी इत्यपि शरीरमभिहितः । तत्त्वैश्वरीयः कर्मानं
स्पष्टं दृष्ट्वा तत्र ज्ञानिच्छाः प्रयत्नरूपवृत्तिः श्रेष्ठज्ञानप्रयत्नः उत्पद्य बाह्य कारणातिच अविद्याय घटाधुलादयः ।
जीवस्तुतत्तत् स्वाम्योत्तिष्ठते । यथोक्तं बुद्धिर्जानमिवादि ।
40. *N. S.*, 280. अभिमानविच्छा अभिमतस्य सत्तादेः प्रयोजकः । तथा च तदधीनत्वादिति न्यायेन
स एव तन्मुक्त्यर्थ इति ।
41. *Anu. V.*, 1. 1. 6. जन्मादिकारणं तत्र साक्षात्कारावगामिदं वदति ध्रुवशेखर शास्त्रं चेत्तत्
तदर्थतः । प्रवृत्ते ।
42. *N. S.*, 305. तस्माद्भगवत्वेन सत्त्वस्वभाव विशेषाणां त्रिषामकः चैतन्यं अवच्छेदकं विद्याय
विशेषं निमित्तद्विषयविच्छेदो अन्धमेव ब्रह्मत्वे समोच्य . . कार्यातुरूपं सामर्थ्यं विशेषं योजयत्, जीवनाकार्यती-
त्येवार्थकत्वं इति । नन्वेतत् सर्वं जीवसासम्प्रदादिना अचक्ष्य संवादं कथं भगवतापि संवादयेत् इत्यत
आह । तत्सत्त्वेषु शक्तित्वात् बुध्यते सर्वमेव च । इति ।
43. *N. S.*, 113. निमित्तं विद्यापानं कर्मणां कारवितुः वैषम्यं नैकैरेवेत्यातामिशाक्षिप्य कर्मादीना-
मानादिताम्बुपमेन समाधानमुक्तं . . . एवं तर्हि कर्मोदितोपस्य स्वातंत्र्यं न स्यादित्यर्थः . . कर्माद्ये-
षस्यापि तस्य स्वातंत्र्यमुपपद्यते । कर्मोदित सत्त्वैरपि तदधीनत्वस्य . . समर्थितत्वात् । नहि साधीन सत्तादिक-
मपेक्षमाणस्य स्वातंत्र्यप्रत्युक्तिः युक्ता इति । एवं तर्हि तदपेक्षानाम् अनपेक्षितं । तथा च पुनः वैषम्याया-

पतिः इत्याशंक्य उक्तं . . . उपरम्भेति ईश्वरस्य ईदृशं वैद्यनं निर्गुणत्वं च प्रमाणीः । अतोऽनेदमनिश्चितमिति ।
 . . . वैष्णवादिनां तावत् न स्वस्वोप देशः किञ्च दोषोऽस्तु । . . मापि जीवामात्मिक ईश्वरस्य प्रत्यक्षवहेतुः ।
 तदभावात् । अतोऽप्युपगन्तात् अंगीकृते सूत्रकृता इति न कश्चिदोपः । तथा च भार्ये । न च पुनः वैष्णवा-
 द्वापतेन दोष इति ।

44. *Anu. V., 3. 2. 42.* भान्तासित्वमपि चैवा समंतादतः । जीव आभासवद्दिष्टः सर्वत्र परमा-
 त्मनः । छाया यथापुंसदृशो पुमर्थाभावात् दृश्यते । एवमेवात्मकाः सर्वे ब्रह्माद्याः परमात्मनः । सर्वत्र-
 शक्यत्वेनैवः पूर्णशक्तिः पराहुरिति ।

45. *Anu. V., 4. 1. 65.* अन्तर्बन्धोदितः तस्मात् विष्णुरेव न वा परः । आत्मब्रह्मादयः शब्दाः
 त मूले विष्णुपदार्थः । न सर्वत्र यतो माताकापि नैर्गुणपूजा । . . एतस्मादात्मबन्धोर्न परमात्माभिधा
 भवेत् ।

46. *Anu. V., 3. 2. 16.* ते चाक्षरविकल्पाः । सर्वे सर्वगुणात्मनः सर्वकर्तार एव च । . .
 पूर्णोऽप्येव निर्वन्तात् सुखादुत्तम एककः । गुणादि समुदायोर्न बाहुदेवः क्षुण्णिकलः ।

47. *Anu. V., 3. 2. 42.* अतोऽप्येव गुणोर्बर्हि निर्दोषं यत्तदेव हि । तावन्नेवैश्वरोनाम तत्र भेदोपि
 न कश्चित् । . . ईशत्वेऽपि चास्मिन् सुखा सम्यक् प्रसाधितः । अयुक्तमपि चाप्यत्र युक्तं भवति तद्वत्तत् ।
 . . . ना युक्तमपि विहितः ईशत्वस्या विरोधितः । यदीदृशं विरोधितम् । तदेवायुक्तमवसा ।
 ईशत्वस्या विरोधेन योऽपि लाक्षाः प्राप्ताः । किञ्चित्त्वेन चायुक्तमपि दृष्टोपयोग्येति । मानतः प्राप्तमपि
 मामां योजयेत् कश्चित् ।

48. *Anu. V., 3. 3. 49.* अतोऽप्येव गुणपूर्णं सर्वदोषं समुन्मूलितः । विष्णोरन्यत्र तत्तत् इति
 सम्यग्निर्णयः । स्वतंत्रत्वं सदा तस्य तस्य भेदश्च सर्वतः । अतोऽप्यस्य सिद्धयर्थः । . . भेदाभिधेयभेदेन
 दोषाणामपि निवृत्तिः ।

49. *N. S., 210.* अनुपपन्नत्वात् न प्रत्येकं सत्तायां तात्पर्यमिति चेन्न । सत्यवशात्किमाहुत्वादि
 पारमेश्वरमाहात्म्यशान्त्यैव पुत्रावर्तिदुल्लात् ।

50. *Anu. V., 1. 1. 6.* सद्भावं वाप्येवमात् सत्वं ततोऽपि कथ्यते । इति चण्डिगिरिप्रोक्ता
 जगत्सद्भावापत्तिः ।

51. *N. S., 134.* सचछन्दः सद्भावापत्तिः . . . सद्भावा जन्म । . . ततः सद्भावं जन्मवाप्येत प्राययेत्
 स्वान्तरित्येकं सर्वं यस्मात् तस्मात् तत् ब्रह्मसत्त्वं कथ्यते इति सचछन्दजन्मकारणत्वं सत्यशब्दार्थः । . . न
 केवलं जन्मेव सचछन्दार्थः । किञ्च जीवने च प्राणधारण लक्षणं सत्यमेव सचछन्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमेव । अस्ति
 देववत् इत्युक्ते जीवतीति प्रख्यातः । . . वितीर्णता च वैश्विकलक्षणा । सर्वं सचछन्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं स्यात् ।
 . . सत्तत्त्वं जीवने विचारणे वा मूर्तानां वाप्यवर्तते सत्यमित्युक्तं भवति ।

52. *Bhg. T., 139.* एकदाज्ञानत्वेन यत्किञ्चित् सर्वदा । चैकत्वत्वात् सत्यमपि कथ्यते जगदुच्यते ।
 सर्वदेवैककारणत्वात् । सर्वब्रह्मसदोच्यते ।

53. *N. Mr., 289.* पुराणादिषु कश्चित् जगतोऽस्त्वोक्तिः असंख्यत्वात् अस्मात्तत्त्वाद्वा । अपार-
 मार्थिकत्वोक्तिश्च परिणामित्वात् विनाशित्वात् । मिथ्यात्वोक्तिस्तु यथावा । अविद्यमानत्वं किञ्चित् जीव-
 संश्लेषितेन अविद्यामानत्वात् । मायामयित्वोक्तिस्तु प्राकृतत्वात् । अविद्यमानत्वात् पारतन्त्र्यादि रूपतः ।

स्वातन्त्र्यादिव जगतः तत्तु बोधनिर्गता । (अवाप्यत्वं विषयेति अन्यधीनावाप्यत्वं जगतः अनन्याधीना-
 वाप्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः ।)

54. *Anu. V., 3. 8. 39.* सत्तादिगुणाः तस्मा एव परदेवतायाः स्वरूपभूताः ।

55. *Bhg. T., 138.* तदेव केवलं सत्त्वं । . . स्वातन्त्र्यमेव सत्त्वं विष्णोरन्यस्य सत्ता । प्रवाहः
 सदासित्वं पुंशुल्लोः सदासिता ।

56. *N. S., 225.* अनन्यापेक्षया सर्वदासत्तादि धर्मयोगः सदादि शब्दवाच्यता च ब्रह्मणः ।
 . . . नित्य सत्त्वान्दयोः ऐकात्म्यस्य ब्रह्ममाणत्वात् । . . सदातनं सत्त्वमिति निर्वचनेन सत्त्वमित्यनेन
 नित्यमुच्यते एव ।

57. *N. S., 200.* प्राणवैसर्त्यं तेषामेव सत्त्वं इत्यादि कुतोः प्राण सत्त्वस्य ब्रह्माधीनतापेक्षोपपत्तेः ।

58. *N. Mr., 292.* प्राणादि सत्त्वस्य . . . अपकृष्टत्वमात्रेण तदुपपत्तेः । (ब्रह्मणस्तु) अनन्या-
 धीनसत्त्वं लक्षणमस्तु ।

59. *N. S., 188.* ततः परेश्वर समकक्षतवाप्यव्य प्रतिषेधोऽज्ञाते ।

60. *N. Mr., 95.* तत्र आत्मनि यत् सत्त्वं तदेवैवमम । उक्तं हि । यादृशं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं तादृशं सत्
 जगत्स्य । इति ।

61. *Br. Bh., 31.* शिवेवायोर्विराचकत्वेन मूर्तहितस्मृताः । मूर्ते पापं हि तेनातं मूर्तमित्यभि-
 धीयते । . . तस्य सरोः विरिचस्तु तद्विरिचस्मावकः । मूर्तोद्विष्टस्त्वत्वात् शिवोऽयुष्याय मूर्तको । सर्वज्ञो
 ततोऽपि विद्यते । इति चेत्ततोः । ततोः सारस्तु जगत्वात् हरिर्नारायणः । परः । . . नेतातो मूर्तविरिचः
 नचमूर्तलोचनः । नचामूर्तोपमेदिनं स एव परमः सदा । तस्याप्यद्वयं सर्वं सत्यस्यः स एकरत् ।
 मूर्तमूर्तोत्तमकाः प्राणाः तेषां सत्यः स एव हि ।

62. *Bhg. T., 138.* तद्विरिचत्वात् सत्ये एतत् सर्वमिति । अन्यवानास्तीत्यव्यव्यतिरेको । तदेव
 केवलं सत्त्वमिति सर्वत्रसंभवः । स्वातन्त्र्यमेव सत्त्वं ।

63. *Bhg. T., 125.* सत्त्वस्वातन्त्र्यमुद्दिष्टं तच्चकृष्णेनवापरे । अस्मात्तन्त्र्यावचान्येषां असत्त्वं विद्धि ।

Bhg. T., 135. वस्तुस्वातन्त्र्यमुद्दिष्टं असत्त्वं अवस्तुच ।

Bhg. T., 125. चेतनत्वं स्वतन्त्रत्वं सर्वेको विष्णुरेव तु ।

64. *Bhg. T., 106.* स्वतंत्रं परमात्मैकं स्वतंत्रैकाद्वैतमिति । . . पारमार्थ्येन नास्त्वैव तदन्वात् ।
 तद्वैतवत् । . . स्वाधीनं सदिशितं परमात्मनस्तत्त्वं । अविद्यमानत्वेतस्मात् जगदाहुर्विचरितः ।
 अनाद्यनन्तकालेषु विद्यमानमपि युक्तं । अस्मात्तन्त्र्यानुनास्त्वैवेत्येवं वाच्यं अतः सदा । परमात्मैकत्वेन
 स्वातन्त्र्यादियुक्तमर्थः । यदि कस्यचित्देसः स एव विनिवर्तयेत् । विष्णुः तस्मात् तद्वशात्वात् नास्तीति द्वैत-
 मुच्यते । स्वातन्त्र्यहारीकते पराधीनत्व निश्चयात् । इत्याहुर्देष्टारः आत्माः तत्त्ववेदिनः ।

65. स्वभावजैवकर्मणि द्वयं काष्ठः युतिः किञ्चाः । यदसदादिभिरसति न सति यदुपेक्षया ।

66. *Bhg. T., 3.* यस्मात्परमात्मैकतत्त्वं तस्मात्मेव परमेति सुमयः ।

67. *Bhg. T., 17.* सर्वं पुरुष एवेति भाष्येन भेदव्यजगतः । तदधीनं तु सत्तादि यतोऽस्त्वस्य सदा
 भवेत् ।

68. *Bhg. T.*, 53. सर्वसत्ताप्रदत्तायु सर्वगतं हरिस्ततः ।
 69. *Bhg. T.*, 55. जीवसत्ता प्रदत्ताय . कथ्यते तदभेदेन ।
 70. *Tai. Bh.*, 9. सर्वे सर्वप्रवत्तायु ।
 71. *V. T. V.* सर्वे ब्रह्माख्यायते तदर्थीय सत्ताप्रतीतिवत् ।
 72. *Bhg. T.*, 21. सत्तादिवत् स्वर्गाविष्टोः तस्मादन्यः स सर्वतः । अस्मादिदमित्यस्य तान्यत्वं
 भवितुमिच्छति ।
 73. *Anu. V.*, 3. 2. 46. अतोर्लतगुणस्यैको भगवान् एक एवतु । उच्यते सर्वेदेव ।
 74. *Bhg. T.*, 59. नैवेदेयस्यसुदूरीनां ब्रह्मात्मनं समीक्यते । महाबुद्धिपुत्रेभ्यु परमैव ब्रह्मैव केवलं ।
 75. *Anu. V.* तस्मात्, शास्त्रेण जिज्ञास्ये अस्वदीनं शुभात्मनं । बाबुदेवात्मनमर्द्धं परं ब्रह्मास्मितोत्तमं ।